

# JAPAN BITES BACK: DOCUMENTS CONTEXTUALIZING PEARL HARBOR



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Edited By  
**Joshua Blakeney**

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
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## **TABLE OF CONTENTS**

**INTRODUCTION** *Joshua Blakeney*

**1. THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT: A SHORT SURVEY** *The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan*

**2. THE BOLSHEVIZATION OF CHINA** *Hikomatsu Kamikawa*

**3. THE AMERICAN POSITION : CAT'S-PAW OR COMMON SENSE** *Ujiro Ohyama*

**4. JAPAN'S CONTINENTAL POLICY** *Katsuji Inahara*

**5. TOTALITARIANISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY** *Kojiro Sugimori*

**6. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON FRONT** *Kumataro Honda*

**7. THE THREE POWER PACT** *Nobumasa Suyétsugu*

**8. GENESIS OF THE PACIFIC WAR** *Kohsaku Tamura*



# **INTRODUCTION**

Joshua Blakeney

## **The War on Truth**

The publications contained in this book are particularly rare and the powers-that-be hoped that they would never reach the eyes of you, the reading public. In September 1945, just one month after the U.S. had dropped atomic bombs on the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, killing approximately a quarter of a million people in the process, The Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) of the newly installed General Headquarters (GHQ) began a process described by scholar Nishio Kanji as “book burning.” 7,769 publications were identified by the CCD for confiscation, most of which favourably explained Japan’s prior actions or critically questioned those of the Allied forces. [\[1\]](#) A post-war propaganda film made for the consumption of U.S. occupation personnel entitled “Our Job in Japan” (1945), written by Theodor S. Geisel, expressed the ethos of the GHQ lucidly. “Our problem’s in the brain inside of the Japanese head” the film’s narration proclaimed. Zooming in on an image of a brain, it continued “there are 70 million of these [brains] in Japan, physically no different than any other brains in the world, actually all made of exactly the same stuff as ours. These brains, like our brains, can do good things or bad things all depending on the kind of ideas that are put inside.”[\[2\]](#)

In order to begin their process of psychological warfare against the vanquished people of Japan, the GHQ would have to remove all evidence of Imperial Japan having ever been involved in “good things” while promoting narratives, irrespective of historical facts, which depicted the ousted Japanese Government as having been solely a fountain of “bad things”. This demonological process encountered a hitch early on when Justice Radhabinod Pal expatiated his dissentient verdict at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East which had been convened on April 29, 1946 to prosecute much of the deposed Japanese leadership. Pal, a subject of the British-ruled Indian subcontinent, adjudged that Tokyo’s actions during the War did not constitute a war crime and

rebuffed many of the hypocritical allegations levelled at the dislodged Japanese Government. He exposed the principle of “victor’s justice” inherent to the Tribunal, with a burst of clarity and justice that the German equivalents of those on trial in Tokyo would not receive. “Thus, in a sense, the color lines that Pan-Asianism emphasized were acted out in an ironic way on the benches of the Tokyo Tribunal” writes Cemil Aydin.[\[3\]](#)

Pan-Asianists, such as Shūmei Ōkawa, the prominent intellectual prosecuted during the Tokyo Trials, believed that Japan as the most developed nation in Asia had had an obligation to lead regional anti-colonial forces to liberation from Western and Communist colonialism. He and his colleagues proposed the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, an organic amalgam of peoples, goods and services which would allow nations such as Indonesia, Burma, India, Korea, Taiwan, China, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam to develop symbiotically and without the depredations of colonialism.

The proponents of this Asiatic regionalism were not initially universally liked in Japan. Throughout the 1920s Pan-Asianism was in fact a marginal and negligible tendency. However, by the early 1930s its precepts had become governmental policy. The pro-British, liberalist Japanese establishment of the 1920s clung to the hope that Japan would be afforded a seat at the table of Imperialism by a process of accretion. Multilateralism was embraced and those, such as Ōkawa, who proposed that Japan operate outside the parameters of the (Western-dominated) League of Nations and without regard for the West’s aspirations in Asia, were deemed dangerously idealistic. In this vein, the 1926 Pan-Asiatic Conference in Nagasaki was widely ridiculed by literati and the chattering classes as fanciful and divorced from political reality. From 1926 to 1943, the year when the Japanese Government itself hosted the Greater East Asia Conference, something unprecedented arose. The realists within Japan, who had in 1926 firmly supported Liberal Internationalist palliatives to Japan’s predicaments, metamorphosed into Pan-Asianists, coming to terms with the inevitability of what Gerald Horne has described as a “race war”[\[4\]](#) or what Ōkawa characterized as a “clash of civilizations” between East and West.[\[5\]](#)

The scholarship of this radical shift in policy bifurcates into two main groupings; explanations which focus upon domestic political convulsions and those which emphasize the international context. Frederick Dickenson has aptly dealt with the epochal domestic factionalism which existed between the pro-liberal, pro-British elements of the Japanese establishment and the Germanicist, Pan-Asianist, illiberal elements, the latter of whom would come to the fore in Japanese politics from 1933 when Japan withdrew from the League of Nations in the wake of the Lytton Report which delegitimized Japanese operations in Manchoukuo.[\[6\]](#) Other interpretations which emphasize domestic social and political influences have been written by Richard Storry[\[7\]](#) and Christopher Szpilman.[\[8\]](#)

The documents in the book before you do not emphasize domestic variables as much as geopolitical ones. This, in short, is because the preponderance of evidence suggests that international developments impinged more greatly upon Japan’s actions by compelling Liberal Internationalists to realize the fruitlessness of their treaty-based approach to international relations relative to Imperial Powers which broke treaties and stabbed nations such as Japan in the back. In his essay “Totalitarianism versus Democracy”, contained in this book, Kojio Sugimori observed “the intranational relationships of the past are becoming less important than the international relationships among countries.” Of course when viewing the clash of civilizations that was World War II in Asia within a more prolonged historical context, it was the global supremacy of the West (i.e. external

factors) which spawned the Meiji Restoration of 1868 and the process of modernization which led Japan to emerge as a regional hegemon. This further justifies an emphasis on supranational developments.

It is the politically-motivated distortion of contemporaneous geopolitical happenings and the lopsided allotment of blame for Greater East Asia War which this collection of essays intends to undermine. Typically Western accounts, especially those emanating from popular media sources in the U.S., begin the historical narrative on December 7, 1941 when Japanese planes appeared, as if out of nowhere, and attacked naval targets in Hawaii. The Opium Wars, the imposition of unequal treaties upon Japan by Commodore Perry and subsequent U.S. diplomats, U.S. naval expansion in the Pacific, the funneling of arms to the dictatorial Chiang Kai-shek regime, the Soviet, and by extension, International Zionist meddling in Asia, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Administration's provocations against Japan and many other seminal historical occurrences are concealed from Western audiences, obviating the necessary contextualization of Nippon's counter-hegemonic activities as expressed in the Pearl Harbor operation.

## Old Themes, New Realities

Three of the documents provided in this text—"Japan's Continental Policy", "The Genesis of the Pacific War", and "The Sino-Japanese Conflict: A Short Survey"—were retrieved from the archives at the National Diet Library in Tokyo. Although the GHQ undertook a mass eradication of pro-Japanese literature in the aftermath of the War, according to Kanji "[o]ne copy each of approximately 80 to 90 percent of the original total of 7,769 books that endured the 'book-burning' is at present housed in the National Diet Library."[\[9\]](#) The NDL, therefore, houses a treasure-trove of priceless material which can help demythologize the victors' history of the era.

The other five pieces offered in this work were originally published in *Contemporary Japan: A Review of Far Eastern Affairs*. All of the documents are ultimately publications of the then *Foreign Affairs Association of Japan*. My research indicates that the NDL currently only possesses two editions of *Contemporary Japan*. I, however, was fortunate enough to find an antique book dealer in Connecticut who was willing to sell me a collection of eighteen editions of the periodical. Of the twenty-eight publications I retrieved from the NDL archives and of the countless editorials contained in the editions of *Contemporary Japan* I had access to, I feel the eight pieces contained in this book, in their totality, offer the best introduction to the developments that led to the events of December 7, 1941, from a Japanese perspective.

That being said, there are obviously many subtopics which are either underemphasized or omitted *in toto*. I was forced to be discriminating and censorious in order to make this book project viable and in order to provide the readership with a basic overview of the "Japanese side of the argument" of the period as opposed to a laborious exposition of every nuance of Asian history. Most notably, the book does not dilate sufficiently upon the architectonics of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. This is a subject upon which I hope to focus in future works.

Having served as Press TV's Canadian correspondent[\[10\]](#) at a time of artificially heightened tensions between Iran and the West, I am all too aware of the import of the dissemination of counter-

hegemonic nostrums. *The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan*—as is currently the case with Press TV—challenged skewed, Orientalist discourses which apportioned all moral impropriety to those challenging Western and Marxian-Zionist global totalitarian schemes. In bringing the documents contained in this book back to life it is my hope that people will, in Nietzschean terms, undergo a *revaluation of values*, or at least a *re-evaluation* of their assumptions and question the epistemological construction of Western “just war” discourses.

Japan after 1868 transformed into a developed, sophisticated, regional hegemon and thus posed a challenge to the British Empire, the French Empire, the Dutch Empire and indeed to the U.S. itself, which after the Spanish-American War of 1898 had seized control of the Philippines and expanded operations in the Pacific basin. Japan also, via its staunch anti-Communism, ruffled the feathers of certain influential Jews, who post-1917 viewed the Soviet Union as the polity most amenable to Jewish upward mobility due, in part, to its State-enforced philo-Semitism.

Indeed the pioneers of anti-Japanese propaganda in this epoch were often Jews, the most prominent of whom was Wilfrid Fleisher. Fleisher worked for his father’s outlet *The Japan Advertiser* which propagated an Anglophile and pro-Chiang Kai-shek line and was vehemently opposed to the kind of Asiatic regional-determination of the Pan-Asianists.[\[11\]](#) The Japanese Government would bring the *Advertiser* to an end in 1940, arresting and evicting much of its staff. After his ouster from Japanese letters Fleisher returned to the U.S. and would author a number of alarmist anti-Japanese works including “Volcanic Isle” (1941), “Our Enemy Japan” (1942) and “What to Do with Japan” (1945) [\[12\]](#) which attempted to neutralize anti-war sentiment within the U.S.

Morris Cohen was another anti-Japanese personality of Jewish lineage who incited war against Japan. Cohen worked as Chiang Kai-shek’s liaison officer to foreign consulates during the period. He would later be described by the South African *Sunday Express* as “the guiding genius behind the War-Lords of China”, the very fractious elements Imperial Japan was trying to suppress, ostensibly to bring peace and stability to Asia.[\[13\]](#) Communist Harold Isaacs would also offer his propaganda skills to the anti-Japanese forces, keen as he was to see Asia bolshevized. His book *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*[\[14\]](#) would be introduced by Lev Bronstein, who was commonly known as Trotsky, an ethnic supremacist responsible for the deaths of, arguably, tens of millions of people.

Another influential agent of International Zionism involved in pitting Asian against Asian was Adolph Joffe who was also a comrade of Trotsky’s. He was head of the Soviet Mission to Sun-Yat Sen and, along with Jacob Borodin, formed the Red Section of the Kuomintang, later operating as political adviser to Chiang Kai-shek.

The Soviet-backed Chinese Red Army would operate under the advice of Zionists W. N. Levitshev and J. B. Gamarnik. Additionally, Jews Ludwik Rajchman and R. Haas were influential in the Nanking Chamber of Commerce and would be unseated when Japan invaded Nanking in December 1937. Rajchman would serve as China’s special representative to the U.S. between 1940 and 1943.[\[15\]](#)

Tom Segev in a *Haaretz* article entitled “The Jews who fought with Mao” outlines the phenomenon which arose whereby Jewish members of the ethnically-skewed International Brigades, who had fought against the New Spain of Francisco Franco, travelled to China to fight alongside Soviet-backed forces with the professed goal of absorbing the people of Asia into the Soviet



totalitarian empire.[\[16\]](#) Among the most prominent of those Jews who aided the inorganic Communist takeover of China, which would lead to the deaths of as many as sixty-five million people, were Israel Epstein, Frank Coe, Elsie Fairfax-Cholmely and Solomon Adler.

It is also noteworthy that within the remit of U.S. politics that Harry Dexter White—the son of Lithuanian Jews and a proven Soviet mole who worked intimately in the U.S. Treasury with Henry Morgenthau of the notorious Morgenthau Plan—contrived many of the hostile acts of provocation, such as the asset freezes and economic blockade that expedited America’s engagement in war with Japan. These war-inducing policies of the Soviet-infiltrated White House are discussed at length in the appended documents.

Japan’s alliance with National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, reified in the Tripartite Pact of September 1940—about which there is an essay in this book—motivated Jews to turn against Japan. Ralph Townsend, a U.S.-based journalist who was imprisoned for his pro-Japanese thoughts, on the personal order of Franklin D. Roosevelt, noted how within foreign policy circles “Liberalist Jewish writers, who are rather numerous. . .favour Russia.”[\[17\]](#) Such pro-Soviet Jews, it logically follows, viewed the spread of Communism to Asia as a positive phenomenon and the Nippon-led anti-Communists as thus deleterious to Jewish interests. John Koster’s book *Operation Snow: How a Soviet Mole in FDR’s White House Triggered Pearl Harbor* (2012) explains how such pro-Soviet Jews created circumstances wherein the prospect of a German-Japanese, East-West attack on the philo-Semitic Soviet regime was thwarted via the dragging of the U.S. into war with Japan.[\[18\]](#)

I mention the Jewish role in fomenting hostility toward Japan for numerous reasons. Firstly, certain Jews have been instrumental in promoting “hate speech” legislation and anti-revisionist laws in the West—and latterly in Japan[\[19\]](#)—which have enabled the official histories of World War II to be exempted from universally accepted standards of scientific inquiry. For example in France, the Gayssot Act, enacted in July 1990, enables the French State to imprison for up to five years anybody who openly disbelieves the official history as proffered by the Nuremberg Tribunal. Such legislation is particularly Orwellian when one factors in the reality that Article 19 of the Nuremberg Charter conceded that “[t]he Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence.”[\[20\]](#) The zealous lobbying by certain Jews for laws which proscribe revisionistic historical interpretations is evidently a case of “they who doth protest too much”, but this can only be understood, ironically, when historical interpretations are written revisionistically, in violation of State-imposed, Jewish-exceptionalist strictures. This requires a sort of *kamikaze intellectual*; persons who are willing to, if necessary, relinquish their liberty and freedoms in pursuit of historical truth. Ernst Zündel, Fredrick Töben, David Irving, Germar Rudolf and Robert Faurisson are some of the more prominent of these *kamikaze intellectuals*, who were brutally assaulted by the State for their historical analyses.[\[21\]](#)

It is the *de facto* mandatory presupposition in Western historiography that Jews have done no wrong, that Jews, Judaism and Jewish culture should be exempted from criticism, that Jews have throughout history been powerless and persecuted, as opposed to powerful and, in the case of certain Jewish political actors, persecutory, that must be overcome.[\[22\]](#) Hence, the fact that Jews played a significant role in fomenting war between Western powers and Japan ought to be included in histories of the period, not merely because the dissemination of truthful historical accounts is necessary and important but because Jewish-exceptionalism and State-imposed historical amnesia is enabling contemporary wars to be waged on behalf of the same forces based on the widespread misconception that the West only wages just wars.

It is noteworthy that the process by which pro-Communist elements were able to veer the isolationist U.S. in a war direction against Japan[23] is closely analogous to the methods by which pro-Israel lobbyists and largely Jewish neoconservatives have, in the post-9/11 world, engineered wars against Israel's adversaries. Many of the public relations techniques which were honed by the enemies of Japan to demonize her, have been applied on a grand scale to foster ostracism toward, most egregiously, the Islamic Republic of Iran in the contemporary world.[24]

The provocative policies implemented against Japan have also been reutilized contemporarily. The imposition of economic sanctions—an act of war itself—is one example of a policy applied both to Imperial Japan and to Israel's enemies in the Middle East, such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic. The Western sponsorship of warlords and terrorist zealots as agents of destabilization is arising today within the Middle East—à la the infamous Oded Yinon Plan[25]—and, as noted, occurred in relation to mainland Asia in the 1930s and 1940s. Political analyst Mark Dankof has not missed these symmetries. He writes: “the political forces operating behind and through Franklin Roosevelt, are identical to those in play in the American political power elite now: International Central Bankers and the disproportionate role of Jews in that milieu; Zionists and the Jewish and Israeli Lobby organizations; and in the case of the Roosevelt Administration, the pro-Soviet foreign policy agenda of key Jewish agents in their midst, the 20<sup>th</sup> century counterpart to the *Israel First Fifth Column* operating in the Bush and Obama Administrations in the 21<sup>st</sup>.”[26] In September 2000, just one year prior to the false-flag operation on 9/11, the Zionist think tank *The Project for the New American Century* cited the perceived need for a “new Pearl Harbor” to enable their desired policies to come to fruition, an indicator of the saliency of comparisons between the demonization of Imperial Japan and the manufacturing of Middle Eastern enemies prior to and after 9/11.[27]

I have clarified the above facts because the Japanese analysts whose writings I offer in this text employed more nebulous phrases such as “Anglo-America” to categorize their enemy. As with the post-9/11 wars of aggression, attributing the epochal strife to a generic “Anglo-America” provides only a partial picture of the political reality. Of course, there were numerous non-Jewish cheerleaders for war between Japan and the Allies, as is also the case vis-à-vis the so-called “war on terror”. As Ralph Townsend lamented in his writings, Christian missionaries, who had a working relationship with the anti-Japanese factions in China, often misreported and romanticized the facts on the ground. Townsend observed that in order to provide a perception to their Western benefactors that they were improving the lot of the average chinaman, Christian fundamentalists suppressed evidence that China was rife with privation, warlordism and societal fissures and that the most stable, prosperous territories were in fact those controlled by non-Christian Japan. This loosely mirrors the myopic support of certain Christian fundamentalists for Zionist pro-war policies within the contemporary context.[28]

Similarly, pro-Chiang Kai-shek lobbyists in America were adept at playing on the anti-monarchical undercurrent within the U.S. national sensibility, depicting the Kuomintang forces as pro-democracy republicans besieged by Japanese monarchists akin to King George III's British redcoats. Many besuited warlords would be brought to the U.S. for speaking tours in which they extolled the virtues of freedom and democracy before returning to China to continue their raping and pillaging.

These additional pro-war elements notwithstanding, there can be no doubt, however, that International Zionism and Jewish pro-bolshevist elements were decisive in winching the U.S. off its

isolationist footing. The noxious combination of Hollywood films, uncritical establishmentarian “scholarship”, biased documentaries and anti-revisionist laws have managed to keep from public knowledge the provocations that the Land of the Rising Sun was subjected to prior to Pearl Harbor which forced her to retaliate. Indeed even to refer to the Pearl Harbor operation as *retaliatory* is heterodox in academic and journalistic circles. That European Powers, the Soviet Union and the American Empire were meddling in Asia on a far larger scale than Japan was prior to the 1930s is not emphasized in modern historiography. Neither is the proposal for the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere and a non-Communist Asia, situated within the context of the subsequent murderous regional developments such as the Communist atrocities in China, the Korean War, the Indonesian Civil War and the Vietnam War, which collectively may have taken the lives of over one-hundred million Asians.

### **Revisionism and Liberty or Subjugation and a World Based on Myths?**

I have coined the maxim *holocaustianity is the opium of the masses* and it is ultimately—and somewhat bizarrely—the case that it is the sanctity of the holocaust narrative which psychologically, politically and scholastically precludes the Japanese side of the argument, as expressed in this book, from being aired.

The holocaust narrative has castrated Western man; it has prevented us from placing our national and ethnic interests over those of our hostile elite. It is a cardinal variable impinging upon the foreign policies of Western nations, compelling us to fight wars for Israel which jeopardize our national interests. Gentiles are made to feel that they owe something to Jews because of the uncritically accepted belief that Adolf Hitler personally ordered the mass execution by poisoned gas and other means of at least six million Jews. That narrative, despite evidence existing to undermine it, operates at the level of religious myth in an otherwise secularized, post-Christian West. To question it will lead one to be “burnt at the stake”, to metaphorize, or to be thrown into a dungeon, to be literal, in most Western nations.

Japanese revisionists, such as those involved with the impressive think-tank *Society for the Dissemination of Historical Fact*, appear to be bemused as to why it is deemed heretical, seven decades after the culmination of the War, to question the propagandistic claims made about the Japanese role in Asia in the epoch.[\[29\]](#) Even though, as mentioned above, Jews do have certain skeletons in their closets when it comes to the Asian theatre of the War, it is primarily the necessity, from the perspective of many influential Jews, of stigmatizing historical revisionism *per se* which spawns the flurry of excoriations of Japanese historical revisionists one can witness, in particular, in the English-language Japanese press.

It was highly stimulating and somewhat amusing observing the hysterical response to the 2014 book *Falsehoods of the Allied Nations' Victorious View of History, as Seen by a British Journalist* authored by the former Tokyo bureau chief of *The Times*, *The New York Times* and the *Financial Times*, Henry Stokes, in which he questions the notion that a massacre took place in Nanking in 1937-38. The English-language Japanese media initially falsely claimed that he had recanted his controversial statements—in other words they resorted to disinformation—which compelled Stokes

and his publisher to reaffirm that “the author’s opinion is: The so-called ‘Nanking Massacre’ never took place. The word ‘Massacre’ is not right to indicate what happened.”[\[30\]](#)

A foundational claim of World War II revisionists is that because all of the belligerents in World War II committed atrocities and engaged in immoral acts, that the victors had to concoct narratives of unprecedented mass executions, *ex post facto*, which would distinguish the killings of the Axis forces, morally, from those of the Allied forces. Imagine, for example, the average Briton asking: why did the British Government declare war on Germany, ruin our Empire, bankrupt our country and render us a *de facto* colony of the U.S. and Israel, merely to defend Poland, which after the War was under the jackboot of Stalin? Without emotionally charged mass killing narratives, which have largely been produced cinematographically via Hollywood, such queries would be hard for officialdom to stultify.

It is compelling to see how the same fault lines which existed when Fleisher was foisting the agenda of his cabal upon the people of Japan are in existence today, with the English-language Japanese press—much of which the CIA, Japanese Communists and the Zionists seized control of after the War—demonizing the more nationalistically-oriented politicians who refuse to enact legislation which would proscribe Japanized historical narratives which undermine post-1945 victimologies. It is germane that the English-language *The Japan Times*, was actually founded partially as the result of a merger with Fleisher’s *The Japan Advertiser*, and today publishes articles sympathetic to “hate speech” laws, thus moving Japanese discourse in a direction Fleisher would no doubt have approved of.[\[31\]](#)

The central claim of the censorious proponents of “hate speech” legislation and anti-revisionist laws is that there are genocidal implications if such legislation is not enacted. But Japan is a peaceful and quiescent nation today in which no such radical outgrowths of unfettered free speech can be witnessed. In fact, a case could be made that the opposite of the aforementioned metaphysic is true, namely that there is a correlation between the lack of criticism allowed of ethnic minorities and ethnicized victimologies in a country and the level of warfare and State-murder committed by that nation. Japan poses a problem, therefore, for the enemies of truth; those of us who live in Western nations which do criminalize revisionism and non-Jewish-exceptionalist interpretations of history and politics are able to cite the Japanese dispensation as an alternative to our own. Hence, in their lust to bring to fruition a Zionist New World Order, a preliminary step for its proponents has been to attempt to have all criticism of Jews and all historical revisionism about the main historical event which enables Jewish exceptionalism, the holocaust, and World War II more broadly, to be legislated against.

My book therefore, in providing contemporaneous, indigenous, Japanese analyses of the geopolitical convulsions prior to and during the War, is intended to eviscerate the mythological edifice which enables contemporary wars and a supranationally-oriented police state. The book is intended to be cathartic in the sense that it can liberate the people of Japan, and by extension Germany, of some of the guilt they have been compelled to emote without warrant. It can, I hope, act as an indication to Japanese historical revisionists that they have friends and allies outside Japan who are keen to see the ongoing psychological battle to control the Japanese mind won by the beautiful people of the Yamato race.



# **THE SINO-JAPANESE CONFLICT: A SHORT SURVEY**

*The Foreign Affairs Association of Japan*

Originally Published: October 26, 1937

## **1. The Beginning**

Great events may have very small beginnings, and the present armed conflict between China and Japan is no exception. It originated in a very small thing—just a few shots fired by Chinese soldiers upon a small body of Japanese troops near Lukouchiao in the outskirts of Peiping. The shooting took place on the night of July 7th, when these Japanese soldiers, only 150 strong, were carrying on some inoffensive maneuver in the locality in preparation for a forthcoming inspection. The attack was altogether unexpected, and the Japanese could not reply to it until some reinforcements had arrived from Fengtai.

This was the first clash, and it might have been the last. For the Japanese made several attempts to localize the affair and arrive at a peaceful settlement. Promises were made on both sides, but, on the Chinese side, no sooner were the promises made than they were broken. Such strange and unsatisfactory dealing may not indeed have been due so much to the duplicity of those in the highest command as to insurgent younger spirits in the lower ranks, who either refused to obey orders entirely or usurped the command in order to accomplish their own ends. This hypothesis takes on greater substance when we take into consideration the fact that the offending Chinese troops were formed by part of the 37th Division of the 29th Army, which division [sic] was composed of remnants of the notoriously anti-Japanese forces of General Feng Yu-hsiang. But whatever the cause of this double-dealing, the fact remains that this first armed clash rapidly took on a form where a peaceful solution became impossible.

## **2. China's False Statement**

As soon as the news of the armed conflict in north China reached Nanking, the Chinese Government immediately launched upon a vigorous propaganda in the usual Chinese style.

*False Statement No. 1* In the first place the Nanking Government alleged that the Japanese troops were illegally stationed in north China, and that their holding any maneuvers constituted an

encroachment on China’s territorial integrity. How entirely false such a statement is becomes obvious by a glance at the Boxer Protocol of 1900 and the Notes of 1902 exchanged between Japan and China in regard to the return of Tientsin. These documents not only give Japan the right to station troops in north China, but also the right of holding maneuvers. But the Chinese did not tell their lies in vain, for they appear to have been believed in certain foreign countries who actually have their own forces in China in consequence of the same Boxer Protocol.

*False Statement No. 2* The Chinese Government also laid the blame for the first clash upon the Japanese soldiers who had been taken by surprise by the Chinese fire, and alleged that the Japanese were carrying out some premeditated plan for seizing certain strategic points in North China. This is a typically Chinese allegation, made in the knowledge that, although it may masquerade as the truth only for a while, it will yet do harm enough before it dies a natural death. Yet the allegation quickly evaporates in face of the two following common sense questions:

- (1) Supposing that the Japanese really had an ulterior motive such as the Chinese declare, would they have done anything so fantastic as to leave its execution to a small unsupported force of 150 men?
- (2) And would they have chosen for so important a proceeding the very night when their Commander lay on his deathbed, and the officer next in command was absent on a tour of inspection in Shanhaikwan?

**3. The Background**

Among the various causes that have given rise to the outbreak of hostilities in north China, the outstanding one is certainly of an economic nature. A glance at Japan’s remarkable industrial and economic development during recent years would be instructive. Take, for instance, her manufacturing industry and compare its development with that of Great Britain and the United States of America during the last twenty years, taking the year 1913 as the index for each of the three countries.

Year	Japan	U.S.A.	Britain
1913	100	100	100
1925	222	151	87
1929	297	170	97
1933	346	109	87

From the above it is seen that during the twenty years, 1913-1933, while the manufacturing industry of the United States has only an increase of 9 per cent. and that of Great Britain actually a decrease of 13 per cent. Japan’s development has been nothing short of remarkable, registering an increase of almost

250 per cent. over the same period. Therefore Japan must ask herself the very searching question, where can she find markets to absorb this astonishing increase in her manufactured goods?

Japan had attached the greatest importance to her industrialization as a means of solving her population problem and other problems arising therefrom, and also of affording her the wherewithal to buy foodstuffs and raw materials; but it has proved to be almost futile. The hard fact she is called upon to face is that since the world depression of 1929 almost all her former markets are either closed to her or protected by such high trade barriers as to make the entrance of her goods well-nigh hopeless. Indeed, it has involved her in a serious dilemma: she must either submit to be stifled within the narrow boundaries of her Island Empire or go forth in search of fresh markets in place of those that have been closed to her.

She refused to be stifled and accordingly chose the latter alternative. The new market that she fixed on as her objective appeared to be most promising both by reason of its geographical proximity and on account of the position Japan already occupies there. This was north China which, with its population of 76 million, offered almost as many prospective buyers of Japanese goods as Japan's entire population. This means that Japan's main economic advance has got to be made on the Asiatic continent with the inevitable corollary [sic] that any obstacle placed in her way will have to be removed if she is to continue to live. Absence of war alone is not peace. Fierce campaign [sic] of violence and hostility may be waged under the mask of peace, depriving nations of their very means of subsistence and their people of their lawful rights. Such has been, for years, China's actions against Japan.

#### **4. Japan's Aims in The Present Conflict**

Japan's aims are to bring about true peace, which is understanding, order and co-operation. If one would have an accurate and official statement of these aims and attitude to China, he cannot do better than turn to the address delivered by the Premier at the 72nd Session of the Imperial Diet on September 5th, 1937, from which the following is quoted:

The fundamental policy of the Japanese Government towards China is simply and purely to seek a reconsideration on the part of the Chinese Government and the abandonment of its erroneous anti-Japanese policies, with a view to making a basic readjustment of the relations between the two countries. . . . The Chinese people themselves by no means form the objective of our actions, which are directed rather against the Chinese Government and its army, who are together carrying out such erroneous, anti-foreign policies. If, therefore, the Chinese Government truly and fully re-examines its attitude and in real sincerity makes an effort for the establishment of peace and for the development of culture in the Orient in collaboration with our country, our Empire intends to press no further.

#### **5. The Trouble Spreads to Shanghai**

Those who were inclined to regard the shooting at Lukouchiao as merely one of those incidents that are always occurring in China were soon to be disillusioned. For it quickly became clear that the act was nothing less than the signal for an outburst of the hatred against Japan which had so long been cultivated and encouraged by Chiang Kai-shek and his colleagues in order to confirm themselves in power. Immediately in the wake of the Lukouchiao shooting, tens of thousands of soldiers under the Nanking Government were poured northwards obviously intent upon a major conflict.

Meanwhile, in Shanghai, the ranks of the special police or the Peace Prevention Corps, whose

number was fixed at 5,000, rapidly began to swell until it contained more than 10,000, whose various units, moreover, were fully armed with trench mortars, field pieces, armored cars, and light and heavy machine guns. The Chinese had also concentrated large bodies of regular troops at strategic points in and near the demilitarized area, although to do so was a flagrant violation of the Sino-Japanese Truce Agreement of 1932. An investigation of October last year revealed that at that time 73,000 Chinese troops were massed in the Shanghai area. By early August this year the number had increased to about 100,000, of which 9,450 were stationed in the demilitarized area.

It was under these threatening conditions that on August 9th Sub-lieutenant Ohyama and First-class Seaman Saito were ruthlessly murdered on Monument Road by Chinese troops belonging to the Peace Prevention Corps. The Municipal Council, whose function it was to deal with the case and punish the murderers, confessed that it was utterly unable to do so. The Chinese troops had clearly got out of hand, and the Council, in the words of Dr. Fessenden, secretary-general of the Council, had “no power to enforce obedience” upon the Chinese. Chinese troops pressed hard upon the part of the Settlement where 30,000 Japanese men, women and children live. They prepared to overwhelm the force of 2,500 of [sic] Japanese marines stationed there. A hundredfold Tungchow massacre was in view, if they succeeded in so doing. So 1,000 Japanese marines were landed.

Japan had entered into negotiations with Mayor Yui of the Greater Shanghai for a peaceful settlement, but nothing came of them. Nor did Japan’s appeal to the Joint Commission for enforcing the Truce Agreement of 1932 produce any appreciable result.

Then, on Friday, August 13th, Chinese soldiers in plain clothes made a surprise attack on a patrolling unit of Japanese marines on Szechwan Road. The fighting began in earnest. Even after that, at noon on the 13th the Japanese Consul General at Shanghai, through his American, British and French colleagues, proposed to the Chinese Mayor of Shanghai the mutual withdrawal of reinforcements. No reply was made by the Chinese thereto. On Saturday, August 14th, Chinese warplanes attacked, dropping bombs on the Settlement and killing and maiming [sic] more than 3,000 of their own countrymen.

## **6. Chinese Propaganda**

### *Atrocity Photos and Manipulated Films*

China immediately resorted to the weapon she so skilfully wields: deception and propaganda. For example photographs of Japanese soldiers bayonetting [sic] Chinese helplessly tied on a pole are being circulated in America. But upon examination of the alleged photos, a Japanese naval officer in New York pointed out flagrant discrepancies: the uniform of the bayonetting soldiers was Chinese and the way of handling the weapons shown in the picture was entirely different from that of the Japanese soldiers. Investigation made in Tientsin showed that photographs of the sort were fabricated and sold in packs by Chinese dealers.

Falsified news films are also used. First, splendid formation flights of Japanese bombers are shown, then the scenes of the pandemonium in Nanking Road or Great World Amusement Centre in Shanghai, where thousands were killed as the result of reckless bombing by Chinese bombers on the “Bloody Saturday” (August 14th). But the title makes no mention of who dropped those missiles, willfully creating impression [sic] that the Japanese did so in the midst of a throng of noncombatant



Chinese.

### *Bombing of Nanking and Canton*

The Japanese planes bombed Nanking and Canton. This is represented as attacks on defenseless cities, causing thousands of civilian casualties. However, they are not only heavily garrisoned and defended with fortresses and anti-aircraft guns, but are the very strategical centers of the Chinese operations. The attacking bombers took all the care in their power to obtain accurate hits even risking to fly at low altitudes in the face of anti-aircraft guns.

Present international law recognizes the right to attack armed towns at any time, yet the Japanese naval authorities took the trouble of issuing warnings to the foreign diplomatic representatives in Nanking and to all the Chinese noncombatant residents to enable them to seek shelter. The conduct of Japanese planes calls for no reproach.

### *The So-called Submarine Menace*

It was reported that Japanese submarines were working havoc [sic] in the South China Sea. Chinese fishing boats were reported to have been attacked off Hongkong. To give credence to the story, the captain of the German liner *Scharnhorst* was cited as having given an interview to this effect at Hongkong. The report was personally denied later by the captain himself at Manila, the ship's next port of call.

We will not mention the "poison gas," "dumdum bullets," "wilful choosing of hospitals and schools for targets," or "flying with Chinese insignia on airplanes"—all "classic" propaganda stories.

We will only recall that a foreign press correspondent telegraphed last September from Nanking that General Chiang Kai-shek himself called together the heads of his different services and gave orders that *only correct news should be published*, as the reputation of the Chinese had been badly damaged by the inaccuracy of the information given out by officials!

## **7. Communism in China**

Who governs China today? This may seem a strange question to ask, but, none the less, it is an important one, since the answer to it will explain, as nothing else will, the genesis and true meaning of the present conflict. The answer that most people would make to the question is that General Chiang Kai-shek governs China, for to all appearances he reigns supreme at Nanking. But, as is so often the case, appearances are deceptive. As a matter of fact, it is not he, but the extremest elements of the Kuomintang Party allied to the Communists that actually hold the reins of power both at Nanking and all over the country.

To give a brief historical summary, it was some twenty-five years ago that Sun Yat-sen administered the final push to the tottering structure of the Chinese Empire. Thus the National Party entered into power, but it experienced grave difficulties in coping with powerful warlords. In its emergency, the Kremlin came to its assistance. This was in 1927.

Evidently Russia saw here a supreme opportunity of bolshevizing China, or, at the least, of

throwing out of gear the international machinery working there; for Sun Yat-sen's three principles included the demand for the abolition of unequal treaties and foreign rights alleged to have been acquired by force.

With the aid of Russian men and money the National Party was able to overcome its opponents, but when Chiang Kai-shek felt that he and his party were well entrenched in power he broke away from his Communist associates, including Borodin and Galen (Bluecher), who had been serving him as supreme political and military adviser respectively. Thus, for the time being the bond between Nanking and Moscow was severed.

It was very soon destined to be renewed, however. The Seventh World Congress of the Comintern held at Moscow in 1935 decided upon a reorganization of its methods. Propaganda in favor of direct revolution was abandoned and in its place the more indirect method of rallying the radicals and socialists in various countries into a People's Front, which would seize control of their respective governments and thus eventually consummate the revolution. Moreover, Poland and Japan were singled out as the two countries against which special efforts should be made. The Chinese Communists carried out thoroughly the instructions received, and began to win the people of China to their side by means of the slogan, "*Fight Japan!*" As is evident from his long campaign against Chinese Red Armies, Chiang Kai-shek was at one time intent upon suppression of Communism in China—a force which used to be antagonistic to his supremacy. But after he was taken prisoner by the communist elements during the Sian incident last year, he accepted to co-operate with them. The evidence of this understanding is seen daily. The pact suddenly signed with Soviet Russia on August 21st is but one example.

Since the mainspring of this combination is complete anti-Japanism, it is not difficult to realize how it is that the little incident at Lukouchiao has been so quickly magnified into the conflict of the present scale.

## **8. The Possibility of Protracted Hostilities**

*China's Position:* Whether or not it will be possible to carry on protracted hostilities is much more China's problem than Japan's as a glance at China's budget will quickly show. Her 1936 budget amounted to 769 million yuan, of which 318 million yuan came from customs duties, and 189 million yuan from salt gabelle. This means, in percentages, that nearly half the Chinese revenue is derived from the customs duties, and that the customs duties and the salt gabelle together account for as much as 75 per cent.

When hostilities extend and China's main seaports, by the stoppage of coast navigation enforced on Chinese vessels, become incapable of carrying on their usual trade, there will inevitably be a considerable reduction in the amount of customs duties flowing into the Chinese coffers. This in itself constitutes a formidable blow to China's finance. But when the salt gabelle is also lost, as is very probable, then China will be mulcted of some 75 per cent. of her revenues. One can conceive no other result than the complete bankruptcy of the Nanking Government.

*Japan's Position:* There are some, however, who apparently prefer to doubt Japan's position rather than China's, and these have raised the question whether it is possible for Japan to stand the strain of her emergency budget of 2,600 million yen without serious difficulty. Such people evidently forget Japan's past record in such matters. They forget that 30 years ago, when Japan's national

income was not quite 1,100 million yen, she was able to put 2,000 million yen into the Russo-Japanese War. In other words, she was then able to spend twice her national income, and come successfully through the ordeal. But now Japan's national income has multiplied considerably, and stands at 14,000 million yen at least. So taking the war budget of 1904-5 as an index, a simple process of arithmetic proves that she is quite able to finance a war to the point of 28,000 million yen. If we compare the present emergency budget of 2,5000 million yen with that figure, we shall see that Japan is so far committed to an expenditure that is a mere one-tenth of what she could do. Therefore any misgivings about Japan's capacity must forthwith be dissipated.

## **THE BOLSHEVIZATION OF CHINA**

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The Sino-Japanese affair, for which the Lukouchiao incident supplied the spark, is now in fact spreading into a general armed conflict between Japan and China on all fronts. The affair has already affected not a little the course of general international relations affecting the two countries, one of the most notable instances of which is the conclusion at Nanking on August 21 this year of the Sino-

Soviet Non-Aggression Pact signed by the representatives of the two countries. The conclusion of the pact marks a turning point in the relations between China and the Soviet Union and is one that not only has a great significance in Sino-Soviet relations but is destined to exercise far-reaching influences on the relations of various Powers having interests in the Far East.

It is quite natural that China and the Soviet Union should come into a closer relationship and co-operate with each other since they suffered a heavy blow from the outbreak of the Manchurian incident and were placed in a position in which they had a common interest regarding Japan. There must be plausible reasons, therefore, for the failure of the two countries to effect rapprochement from the beginning of the Manchurian incident until recently. The Soviet Government with its diplomatic relations ruptured since the expulsion of the Communist Party in 1927 by Chiang Kai-shek's régime was in no position to take common action with China. Moreover, that Government deeming the maintenance of international peace absolutely necessary for the accomplishment of its first Five Year Plan sought to conciliate Japan by proposing a Russo-Japanese non-aggression pact. Not only that. The inauguration by Germany, after Hitler came to power at the head of the Nazis, of the campaign for the extermination of Communism meant for the Soviet Union the appearance of an irreconcilable enemy in the west, while at the same time it was forced to assume a defensive attitude on the east. Later, finding the anti-Communist campaign increase in strength and vigour, the Soviet Government as well as the Comintern felt constrained to make a revolutionary turn in their foreign policies. Accordingly the Seventh Comintern Congress, held for the first time in seven years at Moscow in July 1935, decided to abandon its policy of world revolution and adopted instead a policy of forming the so-called "people's front" with all sorts of anti-Fascist camps. It began not only to befriend the Social-Democratic parties, its arch enemies, but to unite all liberal and pacifist and various other elements which were opposed to Fascism and organize them into a common anti-Fascist front. This new policy of the Comintern and the Soviet Government must be credited with an outstanding accomplishment in the victory of the people's front in both Spain and France; but something more remarkable was achieved in the Far East.

At the Seventh Comintern Congress, the policy toward China was completely changed from that of overthrowing the Chiang Kai-shek régime and establishing a communist régime in its place to that of aiding the régime of Chiang Kai-shek, temporarily abandoning the policy of bolshevizing China. At the same time the Congress selected Germany, Italy and Japan as leading Fascist countries and, with a view to making China one of the links in the chain of the anti-Japanese front, set up for the purpose of overthrowing Japan, adopted the following resolution with regards to the policy to be pursued toward China.

The expansion of the sovietization campaign as well as the strengthening of the fighting power of Communist armies must be linked together with the development of the anti-imperialist people's front. The anti-imperialist people's front movement must be carried on under the slogan of a revolutionary fight of an armed people against Japanese imperialism and the Chinese who are serving as its tools. The Soviet must be the central force in the unification of all the Chinese people in the campaign for the liberation of the Chinese race.

In order to carry out the instruction indicated in this resolution, the Chinese Communist Party, a branch of the Comintern, issued in December of the same year a proclamation regarding the establishment of the "united anti-Japanese people's front" and also made public the following resolution.



The people of China must oppose Japanese imperialism and its tools by all means regardless of what they are, whether they are armed forces or whether they belong to any party, faction or class. In order to expel Japanese imperialism from China, overthrow the rule of its agents over China, acquire complete freedom for the Chinese people, and thereby secure the independence and territorial integrity of China, the people must rise in unison and develop the anti-Japanese people's front. Our duty is to get not only all possible basic forces of anti-Japanism but all possible anti-Japanese allies united, and to urge the entire Chinese people that influence be exerted by those who have influence, money given by those who have money, guns by those who have guns, knowledge by those who have knowledge, thus enabling all patriotic Chinese to participate in the anti-Japanese front.

In accordance with this proclamation, the Chinese Communist Party subsequently decided to discard its previous policy, and to conclude as promptly as possible a truce between the Communist army and the Kuomintang army. The party further planned to expand the movement for the salvation of the people, and asserted that the purpose of the anti-Japanese campaign should be achieved through the general mobilization and arming of all the people. All political prisoners should be freed and a federation of anti-Japanese national salvation associations organized with the establishment of national salvation associations in industrial, commercial, military, political and educational circles, and also by organizing the people of each circle for participation in war and arming and training them. Furthermore, advocating joint action of all anti-Japanese and national salvation organizations, the Chinese Communist Party issued a statement that the Chinese Communist Party would co-operate with all other parties and organizations in the task of opposing Japan and saving the country, declaring that the party hoped to work conjointly with the Kuomintang and anti-Japanese and national salvationist elements in the Blue Shirts Society.

In spite of the fact that the Chinese Communist Party and its army effected a turn in their policy in accordance with the complete reversal of that of the Comintern, decided on collaboration with the Nanking régime and the Kuomintang army and proposed the formation of a united anti-Japanese people's front, the Nanking Government did not readily make a favourable response. The Chiang Kai-shek régime, even after concluding the Tanku Armistice Agreement in 1933, continued its policy of resistance on the one hand and negotiation on the other, thus leaving room for negotiations with Japan, and devoted all its energies to the firm establishment of its dictatorial power. Since the Nanking Government is essentially a régime of the nationalistic bourgeoisie representing the rising capitalism and bourgeois class, it is needless to say that the government can never tolerate the Moscow Government and the Comintern, which are international powers founded on Communism and the proletariat, nor yet the Chinese Communist Party and its army. However cleverly the Comintern and the Government at Moscow change their colours for their own protection, however the Chinese Communist Party and its army repaint their signs and propose the formation of a united front of anti-Japanese national salvation, the Nanking Government cannot see eye to eye with them. It has been the traditional policy of the Soviet Union and the Comintern from the days of Lenin to take advantage of the anti-imperialist movement and the struggle for national liberation in China as a transitory method of giving substance to the principles of world revolution. The Chinese Kuomintang once fell victim to their machinations and had to drink a bitter cup, and therefore, though the Moscow Government and Comintern together with the Chinese Communist Party are trying once more to mislead the Nanking Government by the same wily methods, Chiang Kai-shek can hardly be won over to their side.

Of course a faction in the Nanking Government known for its pro-Soviet inclinations and comprising such men as Feng Yuh-siang, Sun Fo, Sun Ching-ling, Yu Yu-jen, Tsai Yuan-pei, Yen Hui-ching and others, had long been advocating co-operation with the Soviet Union and demanding the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact. But the distrust and fear of the Soviet Union and the

Comintern with their policy of sovietizing China made the Nanking Government reluctant to take any steps to that end. Moreover, there existed an even greater obstacle. The Soviet Union had long had Outer Mongolia under its influence; and in 1934 it entered into an alliance with Outer Mongolia in order to counter the advance of Japan following the Manchurian incident, and later, in March 1936, it concluded the treaty of mutual aid with Outer Mongolia pledging itself to extend military assistance in case the latter is attacked by a third country. Thus Outer Mongolia became essentially a part of the Soviet Union while remaining nominally a part of the Chinese Republic. The Soviet Union extended in the meantime its Turksib Railway to the border of Hsinking and steadily increased its economic and political influence over that outlying province of China. In view of these increasing inroads of Soviet influence into her territory, China must [sic], if she desired to co-operate with the Soviet Union, formally recognize these *faits accomplis*, which it was quite natural for the Nanking Government, standing as it had been for the unification and the maintenance of territorial integrity [sic] of China, to find impossible to do. No less would it be a matter of course that once China approached the Soviet Union, the influence of that country and the Comintern would infiltrate into China. In the light of the bitter experiences which the policy of co-operation with the Soviet Union and toleration of Communism had produced in the past, the government of Chiang Kai-shek could not of course light-heartedly take the hand extended by the Soviet Union.

However, the Sian *coup d'état* in November last year brought about a radical change in the situation. The intrigues of the Chinese Communist Party and Chang Hsueh-liang, by which Chiang Kai-shek was placed in confinement under duress, proved a signal success and virtually caused a complete reversal of the policy pursued by the Generalissimo toward the Communist Party. As described above, the necessary foundation had already been prepared for an alliance between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, inasmuch as the Communist Chinese Party [sic] and its army had changed their policy since August 1935 and had been declaring their support of the Chiang régime and abandonment of the policy of sovietizing China, under the banner of a united anti-Japanese front. The alliance came into being at last in March this year, and by it the Communist Party and army, abandoning their principles and policies, allied themselves with the Kuomintang as a matter of form, but in fact the Kuomintang and the Communist Party worked together for the establishment of an anti-Japanese and national salvation front.

It is clear from the foregoing paragraphs that one of the two great obstacles to rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China, namely, the problem of the Communist Party and the policy of sovietizing China, had been eliminated before the outbreak of the present Sino-Japanese affair, while the other obstacle, that is, the question of the Soviet sphere of influence in Outer Mongolia and Hsinking, remained to prevent such rapprochement. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese hostilities, however, the two countries approached each other, and on August 21 this year, the long-pending problem of the conclusion of a Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact was successfully solved. The pact signifies a fruition of the China policy which the Soviet Union has pursued since August 1935 and is evidently a diplomatic victory for their Government. As the Far Eastern policy of the Soviet Union for the past several years has aimed at driving the anti-Japanese forces of China into an armed conflict with Japan, the scheme has attained a successful result. China playing into the hands of the Soviet Union has opened hostilities with Japan. Once China has entered into a war with Japan at the instigation of the Soviet Union, it is logical that she should move at the beck and call of that country.

Why has China allied herself with the Soviet Union so hastily within a month of the opening of hostilities? The answer is simple and clear. The only Power which has the intention and ability of backing China with force is Soviet Russia. Great Britain, the United States and France though they support China morally and diplomatically with their vociferations, have no intention of risking a war with Japan and consequently there is no prospect of their armed assistance to China. It is clearly evident that China cannot cope single-handed with Japan. She must by all means obtain armed and substantial foreign assistance for the purpose. The only power that can supply it is the Soviet Union. It is, therefore, more than natural that the Nanking Government, with no time to consider future troubles, has swallowed the dose and grasped the hand of that Power.

In view of the foregoing reasons and motives, it is impossible to grasp the true significance of the Sino-Soviet Non-aggression Pact in international politics by trying to interpret only the letter thereof. A thorough study must be made of the pact with the Soviet's China policy and China's internal and external circumstances as its background. At a glance the Sino-Soviet Non-aggression Pact appears no different from many non-aggression pacts which the Soviet Union has concluded with her neighbour countries as well as with such countries as France and Italy: no distinctive feature is observable on the surface of the text.

The pact is a simple one consisting of four articles. Under the first Article the two countries reaffirm their adherence to the Kellogg-Briand anti-war treaty and agree, in order to observe the pledge made in that treaty, that each of the contracting parties will refrain from all aggression against the other. Under the second Article the two parties agree that, in case either one of them should become an object of aggression by a third country, the other party will refrain from extending directly or indirectly any aid thereto, and also from taking any action of which advantage might be taken by the third country against the party subjected to the aggression, during the period of the trouble. The third Article provides that the present pact should be interpreted so as not to affect in any way the treaties and agreements already subsisting between the two contracting parties.

The last point refers apparently to the Basic Treaty concluded in May 1924 between the Moscow Government and the Chinese Government at Peking, whereby the Soviet Union re-recognized the sovereignty of China over Outer Mongolia and promised not to engage in propaganda and other activities for sovietization [sic] of China. These written promises of the Soviet Union have long ago been turned into a scrap of paper [sic] as is now widely known. That such promises are specifically emphasized in the third Article is only to deceive the people of China and the other nations, as any one can see.

The whole world entertains no doubt as to the existence behind the Sino-Soviet Non-aggression Pact of various secret agreements or understandings. These are widely understood to contain the following provisions:—(1) supply to China by the Soviet Union of aeroplanes, and other arms and ammunition, (2) sending to China of Red volunteers, military advisors and political and diplomatic instructors, (3) formal recognition by the Nanking Government of the Chinese Communist Party and the political enfranchisement of its members, (4) the Nanking Government is not to conclude any agreement with a third country against Communism, (5) provisions for mutual assistance under which the two countries are not to work in military co-operation in case Inner Mongolia and Outer Mongolia are threatened with aggression by a third country.

Of these agreements, the one concerning the supply of arms leaves no room for doubt. It is a fact now generally known all over the world that the Soviet Union furnished the Leftist government

and the Catalonian government in Spain, since the outbreak of the internecine war in that country in July last, with numerous aeroplanes and vast amounts of arms and ammunition. It must, therefore, be a matter of course that the Soviet Union, which could supply arms on so generous a scale in the case of the civil disturbance in Spain, should send similar supplies to China to the greatest possible extent in the current Sino-Japanese hostilities in which Japan is the common enemy. And even if there were no agreement with the Nanking Government, it would be natural for the Soviet Union to extend to China as much material assistance as possible. No less understandable is the dispatching of military and political instructors to China. One may easily reach a conclusion regarding such Soviet aid in view of the fact that the Spanish Leftist government and the Catalonian government have both received the services of instructors said by the Soviet Government. Furthermore, it is natural for China, which has been enforcing the terms of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance since the end of last year, to give formal recognition to the Chinese Communist Party, whose members have already been given important posts in the Nanking Government. There is no doubt that China, in spite of the provisions of the third Article of the Sino-Soviet Non-aggression Pact, has recognized the position which the Soviet Union has already established in Outer Mongolia, the region now virtually a part of the Soviet Union.

There is, however, a doubt as to whether or not the treaty of mutual aid between China and the Soviet Union has been concluded. Recent reports state to the effect that at Nanking there have been negotiations with a view to concluding such a treaty, between Feng Yuh-siang and a military attaché to the Soviet Embassy there. The doubt remains. But setting aside the question of a formal treaty, there cannot be the slightest doubt as to the existence of an understanding of mutual assistance between the two countries. The Soviet Government entered, as above mentioned, into the mutual assistance treaty with the Outer Mongolian Republic in March last year. Having once concluded the military alliance with Outer Mongolia directed against Japan, it is certainly a logical development that the Soviet Union should enter into an alliance against Japan as their common enemy.

It has long been the policy of the Soviet Union to convert China into a part of her anti-Japanese front, because joint operations with China are absolutely necessary for the Soviet Union to encircle Japan and Manchoukuo. In view of the fact that, with the Soviet armies 300,000 strong concentrated on the Soviet Manchoukuo frontier, where they are face-to-face with the forces of Japan and Manchoukuo, the situation along the border is extremely critical, and moreover, now that China is at war with Japan, it is as clear as day that the Soviet Union and China should conclude an understanding or treaty with regard to mutual assistance.

Thus the Soviet Union has realized its long-cherished ambition and succeeded in placing China under its thumb. Fearing, however, that the association with the Soviet would adversely affect its relations with Great Britain, the United States and other Powers, China has been striving as best as it can to prevent such an eventuality. Great Britain most intensely dislikes rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China, for it is that Power that has been in deep collusion with the Chiang Kai-shek régime. For the past several years Great Britain, by extending support to, and joining hands with, that régime, has been trying to maintain and extend its rights and interests in China. That the Chiang régime has become the protégé of the Soviet Union through alliance is, therefore, a fact most disadvantageous to Great Britain, as can easily be perceived.

The Nanking Government, foreseeing the British displeasure, accordingly has taken every precaution to mollify it, and adopted the harmless and inoffensive form of a non-aggression pact. Even in the Kuomintang-Communist alliance, it is claimed that the Kuomintang has not gone into co-

operation on an equal footing with the Communist Party, but that the latter, has begged to be joined with the former. The Kuomintang and the Nanking Government, will, in order not to be deprived of the favour of Great Britain and other Powers, continue their efforts to keep undercover the influence and bolshevizing activities of the Communist Party and try to set those countries at ease. They will also exert themselves, even though they cannot expect armed assistance from Great Britain, America and France, etc., to obtain supplies of arms and goods as well as loans, and further will continue to manipulate those Powers, in order to make the League of Nations and other international conferences aide China and condemn Japan.

All these activities notwithstanding, China, by betraying the expectations of the other Powers, cannot help becoming steadily a puppet of Soviet Russia. Is not the Nanking Government, forced by the clamorous call of the Communist Party for the united anti-Japanese front, declaring that China must fight to the last man under the banner of the so-called “long period resistance against Japan”? Moreover, is not that government, under the pretext of punishing traitors, killing all patriots who sincerely believe in the necessity and desirability of friendly intercourse with Japan? A protracted war between Japan and China is exactly what the Soviet Union wants. That country is undertaking every conceivable scheme to cause China to be engrossed in a protracted war with Japan. The rounding up of the so-called “traitors” is only a part of the sinister design of the Soviet Union to render impossible the restoration of friendly relations between China and Japan. Indeed, the Nanking Government is now a tool of the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern as well as of the Soviet Union. By declaring for a long war against Japan, and by stimulating its people to a determination to fight to the last, China is closing the doors to reconciliation with Japan, and is falling step by step into the trap of the Soviet Union. And since Great Britain, France and America, etc., are not in a position to aide China by force, China cannot but rely on the Soviet Union which can give it such assistance.

The more the present hostilities are protracted and the more China is exhausted, the greater will be the Chinese reliance on the Soviet Union. Whatever the intention of the Nanking Government authorities may be, China cannot help becoming more and more dependent upon the power and influence of the Soviet Union and subject to the control of the Communist Party.

The longer the present Sino-Japanese hostilities are continued, the more thorough will be the bolshevization of China. It is a fact recognized by the whole world that the reason the Spanish civil war does not come to an end after more than a year is because of the sinister activities of the Soviet Union and the Comintern behind the governments at Valencia and Catalonia, both of which are widely known to have been completely sovietized. It must be considered as only a question of time for the Nanking Government, which has entered into an alliance with the Soviet Union, to become converted to Bolshevism and a vassal of that country. The Soviet policy toward China has been a remarkable success. That policy will be pushed on further and further under favourable circumstances and will not be stopped before China is completely bolshevized and the Chinese Government is made an essential element of the “Common Front” of Communism.



## **THE AMERICAN POSITION : CAT'S-PAW OR COMMON SENSE**

Ujiro Ohyama

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That the convening of the Nine-Power Treaty Conference has been the joint work of Great Britain and the United States is generally conceded. The British Foreign Secretary, Captain Anthony Eden, stated in the House of Commons on October 21: "The British Government has maintained close contact with the various countries concerned, notably United States, in an effort to settle the Far Eastern situation, the result of which you see in the decision to convene the Nine-Power Pact Conference." Similarly, the invitation to attend the conference issued to Japan by the Belgian Government states that the conference is being called: ". . . in accordance with the request made by the British Government with the consent of the United States."

In tracing the sequence of events prior to the convocation of the conference, it is to be observed that Britain, from the very outset of the present affair, has taken an attitude of antipathy towards Japan, and by various methods has sought to impede the actions of Japan in China. Simultaneously she has endeavoured to create world opinion hostile to Japan and has made particular exertions in this regard to the United States in order to induce that nation to join her in a campaign against Japan.

Consequently, the United States Secretary of State Mr. Cordell Hull, on July 16 issued a statement tantamount to a warning to Japan; when the North China Incident spread to Shanghai, he issued an additional statement on August 23 emphasizing that warning. On their surface these statements described the diplomatic policy of the United States in general and mentioned no particular incident or country, indicating in their phraseology great care and discretion. Yet they were obviously directed towards the China Incident and were intended as a warning to Japan on diplomatic principles, condemning as they did recourse to armed action and intervention in the domestic administration of outside countries and emphasizing the sanctity of treaties and the necessity of observing treaty obligations. On this interpretation, all observers concur.

Subsequently, when the China Affair came before the League of Nations, the League, accentuated by the desire of Great Britain to secure the consent of the United States to participate, treated it as a continuation of the Manchurian Affair of 1932 and turned it over to the advisory committee of 23 which was appointed League of the settlement of the incident. Not only did the United States send an observer to Geneva, in response to the European actions, President Roosevelt, as if in correspondence with the resolution of the League of Nations, delivered a speech in Chicago on October 5, violently denouncing Japan.

On the following day the American State Department roundly stated:

“Japan’s actions in China are inconsistent with the principles that govern international relations and violate the Anti-War Pact and the Nine-Power Treaty.” The same statement declared that the conclusion reached by the United States “agrees on all points with the decision arrived by the League Assembly.” To be sure, President Roosevelt, surprised by the unfavourable reception accorded his speech by public opinion, moderated his tone in his “fireside” address of October 12, saying that his intentions were nothing more than those which would conduce to the achievement of peace. But the dangerous attitude which he adopted filled the Japanese with grave concern.

Of particular import to Japan was the fact that League of Nations, under the direction of Great Britain and with the co-operation of the United States, transferred the China Affair to the Nine-Power Treaty Conference. The League Covenant provides for both economic and armed sanctions. If it continued to deliberate on the Affair, the League stood in danger of being forced to invoke such penalties, although neither Britain nor the United States dreamed of exercising armed sanctions against Japan, nor had they any confidence in the efficacy of economic sanctions. Thus the conclusion was reached that because the Nine-Power Treaty does not provide for sanctions, it would be safer to turn the matter over to a conference called under that pact. This, doubtless, was the reason for the transfer of the issue to the Nine-Power Conference.

When Great Britain saw that the United States was becoming more and more deeply involved in the affair, she sought to shift the responsibility for the settlement of the Incident to American shoulders by receding into the background. Thus she allowed the conference to be conducted by the United States and even tried to make the city of Washington the venue. Finally, it was decided that the conference should be held at Brussels, but inasmuch as the Belgian Government, in its invitation to the Powers to participate in the Conference, stated that it was to be convened at the instance [sic] of Britain with the consent of the United States, it is on record that the principal actors of the meeting were the United States and Great Britain. This is sufficient to show that the United States has been once again led by the latter.

What are the points on which the United States condemning Japan’s actions in China? The stipulation of the Anti-War Pact which the State Department has cited is that war as an instrument of national policy shall be renounced and that all international disputes shall be settled by peaceful means, as provided in Articles 1 and 2. The stipulations of the Nine-Power Treaty invoked are to be mainly in Article 1 which provides that the sovereignty and the territorial and administrative integrity of China shall be respected. To apply these stipulations to Japan’s actions in China, however, would be to misconstrue entirely the significance of the present conflict.

In the first place, the Anti-War Pact only constitutes a promise among the signatories not to resort to war as an instrument of national policy; it contains no promise that such war as is inevitable for the sake of national existence or one waged in order to defend oneself against grave danger shall also be renounced. Such exemption need not be stipulated in the text of a treaty, for it is implicit in all treaties. In fact, the American Secretary of State, Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, stated in his note of June 28, 1928, addressed to the Powers concerned, that the Anti-War Pact which is proposed by the United States does not restrict or damage the right of self-defense of a nation, and that the competence to decide whether war should be resorted to for the sake of self-defence rests entirely with the parties to the dispute. Now the present Affair was stated by the unprovoked attack of the Chinese troops on a Japanese garrison stationed in North China in accordance with rights clearly provided by the treaty.

The action of the Japanese troops consequent on the firing was entirely unpremeditated and absolutely inevitable if the right of self-defence was to be ensured. To call such an action a violation of the Anti-War Pact would be to distort the meaning of the treaty beyond all legitimate bounds.

It is precisely because certain necessities for self-defense measures arise which make application of the Anti-War Pact impossible that the United States, the proponent of the treaty, on her own initiative expected, from the outset, the American continent from the application of its terms. Has not Great Britain, too, reserved freedom of action in regions whose defense and security have an especial and urgent bearing on the interests of the Empire.

In regard to the Nine-Power Treaty, as in the case of the Anti-War Pact, Japan promised not to violate the sovereignty, territory or independence of China, but she made no promise to bear all things from China even when subjected to provocations, exposed to grave danger and confronted with the urgent need to self-defence. The present action was forced upon Japan by the lawless attacks on Japanese lives and interests, as clearly shown in the statement of the Imperial Government of October 27. Thus the Nine-Power Treaty is entirely out of place in the present imbroglio.

This is not the first time that such an incident has arisen. Great Britain, the United States and other Powers have frequently had to take similar steps to safeguard their own interests. Japan has merely followed in their footsteps when confronted by dire necessity. For example, excluding from mention the various cases of intervention by the United States in the affairs of Central and South American countries or British actions in Tibet, one may cite the threat to China exercised by Britain in January, 1927, by the landing of 15,000 troops at Shanghai in order to counter the anti-British movement among the Chinese which movement [sic] was at its height at the time. On that occasion Japan refused to send troops though persistently urged by Britain to do so, thus incurring the condemnation of British public opinion, which is now denouncing Japan precisely for sending troops. All this is fresh in Japanese memory [sic].

Again, in February, 1927, riots broke out in Nanking and various nationals as well as foreign shipping interests were subjected to serious danger. On the 24th and 25th, war ships of the British and American fleets bombarded the walled city of Nanking from the Yangtze. China, as usual, appealed to the League of Nations but the appeal was not taken up. Thus, if the right of self-defence is not recognized as regards China, then all these actions must be said flagrantly to violate the Nine-Power Pact. Will Britain and United States recognize their own acts to be violations of the Treaty? The very fact that Great Britain, the United States and other Powers maintain powerful garrisons in Shanghai, Tientsin and Peking clearly shows that they are determined to use armed forces in cases of emergency.

Recently, newspapers reported that on October 22 a unit of British troops on being attacked with hand grenades by Chinese troops, responded thoroughly with machine-gun fire. Again on the following day, October 23, the same unit, being similarly attacked by Chinese, retaliated with similar fire. The commander of the American Far Eastern squadron is also said to have ordered that Chinese aircraft flying over American warships be fired upon.

The foregoing reasoning is based on the assumption that the Nine-Power Treaty is still effective in all its former force. Since the Treaty has not been abrogated by any country, it cannot be regarded as having ceased operate. But the conditions in China, which, after all, are the basis of that Treaty, have undergone considerable changes since its conclusion, making it impossible to apply the same pact now in its original form. When the Nine-Power Treaty was concluded, Soviet Russia was still in the midst of its revolution, even the fate of the Revolutionary Government was considered in

doubt. The existence of Soviet Russia, in a word, was ignored. Thus the Treaty did not include that country among its signatories. Today, however, Soviet Russia numbers among the great Powers of the world, while its relations with China occupy an important position in Far Eastern affairs.

The main stipulation of the Nine-Power Treaty is to guarantee the territorial integrity of China, but Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang which occupy more than half the territory of China, have been placed under the control of Soviet Russia. The pact has been able to do nothing in this regard.

Another factor worthy of attention in this connection is the attitude of China toward the Nine-Power Treaty. Assured of her sovereignty and territorial integrity as accorded by the treaty, and made still more confident by the Anti-War Pact later concluded, China has pushed forward her traditional anti-alien movement; under the pretext of recovering foreign concessions, she has trampled underfoot the treaty rights of all the Powers. During the last ten years Japan has been the chief victim, but previously it was Great Britain and the United States that were similarly victims of this irresponsible Xenophobia. And no one can guarantee that the same thing will not occur again hereafter. In this way, China herself is destroying the sanctity of treaties.

There are, in fact, many instances of Chinese violation of the Nine-Power Pact. One glaring instance is that China is ignoring the obligation under the annexed resolution to the treaty concerning the Chinese standing army. This resolution provided that the Chinese standing army should be limited to some 1,000,000 men, but the present Chinese army, not counting irregulars, numbers some 2,500,000, of which General Chiang Kai-shek's own troops number more than 1,000,000.

These few facts suffice to show what changes have taken place in the Far Eastern situation since the conclusion of the Nine-Power Pact, and how unreasonable it is to try to apply the Treaty in its original form to the prevailing situation. If the United States, despite the circumstances here surveyed, persists in its ungrounded abuse of Japan, branding Japan as a violator of treaties and persists in considering the actions of China to be justified, then she is rash and frivolous indeed. The League of Nations condemned Japan's actions as violating treaties and at the same time expressed its morale support for China. It passed a resolution recommending to the League Powers that they refrain from any actions that would weaken the power of resistance of China and give it assistance, thus manifesting an attitude of hostility towards Japan. Simultaneously, the President of the United States and the State Department violently attacked Japan, while the State Department, in particular, declared that the conclusion reached by it agrees in all respect with the resolution of the League of Nations. Such actions on the part of the United States appear to Japanese to be extremely rash and ill-advised. Although it is fully understood that this attitude on the part of America is largely due to the skilled diplomatic maneuvers of Great Britain, the United States cannot escape at least partial responsibility.

We firmly believe that the Americans in general are advocates of peace, but we must note that there are two main currents among the pacifists. The one is negative pacifism and the other positive pacifism. The negative pacifists advocate isolation while the positive ones urge intervention. While the former group of peace-loving Americans would insist on isolation in order to avoid a clash with a foreign country and would concede much even if American interests were menaced, in order that peace may be maintained, the militant pacifists would incite the Administration to take firm steps in order to safeguard the rights and interests of the United States abroad. The secretary of state at the beginning of the North China Incident issued a statement to the effect that the United States policy is an intermediate one between these two poles, but what he has recently adopted seems to represent the dangerous policy of positive pacifism.

Granted that the United States Government has been made a cat's-paw by Britain, for what particular reason has it adopted its recent attitude toward the League and has it undertaken, with Great Britain, to become a principle in the Nine-Power Conference, which is merely an extension of the League of Nations? The Nine-Power Conference, to be sure, is not one of the League of Nations itself, but since it has been called at the request for the League it has become a sort of branch office of the League, so that in its very constitution it runs counter to the avowed position of Japan in the present imbroglio. The United States, as well as Great Britain, should have known that Japan would naturally not consent to appear before such a conference which it considers as a tribunal to try Japan as a criminal already condemned. It should also have been fully anticipated that a Nine-Power Conference in which Japan refuses to participate would yield no result whatsoever.

As a matter of fact, there are at present in United States various private organizations advocating economic sanctions against Japan. But since economic sanctions are but one step removed from war and from some points of view constitute war itself, we cannot readily believe that such a course will be adopted by the United States. Serious doubts also exist as to the practicability of such sanctions. In the face of such difficulties the conference can gain nothing. What, then, is the United States seeking to accomplish through it? Unfortunately for the idealism of the United States, Great Britain is extremely flexible and realistic in its dealings. Just now that country, influenced by the magnitude of its interests in China, is exercising extremely bad judgement and to all appearances is backing the wrong horse. Yet as soon as Great Britain realizes the impracticability of her current policy, she is likely suddenly to display her wonderful flexibility and admirable realism. What would then be the position of the United States? Is it not incumbent on her to take care that she be not left in the lurch? Would it not be more prudent from the point of view of her own interests that she renounce the hopeless Nine-Power Conference and throw back the issue to the League of Nations as quickly as possible?

At present the United States believes that the interest of Japan and those of United States do not coincide, and that if Japan's influence over China expands, the principle of American Far Eastern policy, that of the open door and equal opportunity would be destroyed and the economic development of the United States in China will be obstructed. On the basis of this serious misconception, the United States deems it necessary to maintain a strong fleet in the Far East. Very probably the naval policy of the United States is based upon this assumption, but the assumption itself is based on gross error.

In the first place, it is a serious mistake for the United States to think that Japan is opposed to the open door and equal opportunity in China. On the contrary, Japan is advocating absolute freedom of traffic and commerce throughout the world; she considers it her great mission to strive for the realization of this policy and is demanding the open door and equal opportunity in all countries. As a matter of fact, it is Japan, above all other Powers, that most keenly feels the need for opportunity for all in China. For it is Japan that has been made the scapegoat of China's anti alien movement during the past years; it is Japan that has suffered most from the closed-door policy of China.

In the second place, it is a grave mistake to think that Japan's interests in China are incompatible with those of the United States; American and Japanese interests in China as well as in all other parts of the Far East roughly coincide. The staple goods which America wishes to sell to the Far East are cotton, oil, lumber, wheat, tobacco and automobiles. In these materials Japan is not only no rival of America's but is herself a good buyer of them. Moreover, the main buyers of American

cotton in China are Japanese spinning mills in Shanghai. The raw material for the manufacture of cotton textiles, Japan's greatest export article, is for the most part imported from the United States. Also, many transactions of the United States and other countries with China are conducted through the medium of Japanese brokers and banks. In these circumstances the interests of the United States must be regarded as being in their relationship of mutual aid with the interests of Japan in China.

Furthermore, the United States is an important buyer of Japanese raw silk, and raw silk is one important raw material which the United States cannot produce. The silk textile industry in the United States, one of the largest industries of the country, is based on raw silk supplied by Japan, and a vast army of American labourers enjoy employment on the account of this industry. Thus it is seen that Japan and the United States at all times are interdependent.

What is the prevailing state of American trade with China and Japan? The United States last year exported to Japan goods to the value of more than ¥850,000,000, which represents five times the total volume of American trade with China, and imported from Japan about ¥600,000,000 worth of goods. This leaves the United States a favourable balance of ¥250,000,000. To be sure, in regard to some minor articles rivalry between Japan and the United States exist in the China market, but such trivial competition cannot be avoided in any trade relations between nations or individuals and thus provides no cause for any mutual irritation.

Nor is there cause for the United States to feel concern with Japan's advance on the Asiatic Mainland. For American trade within the sphere of Japanese influence not only is suffering no menace whatever but is actually making steady progress. This is due to the influence of Japan, in establishing peace and order where chaos ruled before, enabling industries to rise and the local buying to increase. Through this influence American business has profited to a great extent. The following figures are a case in point: Whereas American exports to Manchoukuo in 1933 amounted to only ¥28,960,000, they reached ¥35,280,000 in 1934, showing an increase in a single year of 21.6 per cent. The increase since then has been steady. These facts show how natural are the relations between Japan and the United States. There is everything to gain in the mutual maintenance in this amicable trade relationship and everything to lose by its renunciation.

Not a few intelligent Americans fully understand the situation in the Far East and Japan's position in the present struggle. They are endeavoring to promote friendly feeling between the two countries. Consequently we do not necessary despair of friendly relations between Japan and America. But if the attitude now being taken by some American statesmen should be accepted as a matter of course, and if neither the Government nor public opinion should see fit to alter its misconceptions, then the danger to friendship between Japan and United States would be appalling. Thoughtful persons in both countries should strive to weight in partially the viewpoints elucidated here, and to establish a considerate attitude based on intelligence. In this way will the disaster in the Pacific be avoided; in this way will the future remain bright.



# JAPAN'S CONTINENTAL POLICY

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## **Introduction**

Many factors determine a nation's foreign policy, of which the most fundamental is probably its geographical position. The influence of geography upon history is a commonplace, since the geographical position of a nation is so inseparable from the problem of its security that it may be regarded as the main reason of its having a foreign policy at all. The history of Great Britain is a classical illustration of this commonplace. Her geographical propinquity to the European continent requires for her safety, first, that the Low Countries shall not be under the control of a strong military or naval Power, and, secondly, a balance of power, which is described as "the guiding principle of English, and subsequently of British foreign policy"[\[32\]](#) be maintained. We have it on the authority of Sir Austen Chamberlain[\[33\]](#) that it was in order to secure the independence of the Low Countries that Britain entered on a war with Spain in the sixteenth, with Napoleon in the nineteenth and with Germany in the twentieth century.

In the same way it should be easy to understand from Japan's proximity to the mainland of Asia why she is so vitally interested in what takes place there. Willingly or not, she is bound to see to it that no strong foreign Power should dominate the mainland in order to ensure her own peace, or even her very existence. Therefore Japan cannot remain indifferent to the conditions prevailing in Russia and China and to the activities of these two countries. This is especially so in these days of rapid transmission and aviation when distance has to be measured in terms of larger units and so makes the problem of security a much more immediate one. The governing factor in the relations between Japan and the mainland of Asia has always been the problem of security, and must always be so. So, just as we cannot make a correct evaluation of Britain's foreign policy without giving due consideration to the problem of her security in regard to the continent, we cannot arrive at a correct appreciation of the forces moving in the Far East to create the present situation if we overlook for one moment the question of security for Japan.

It was for no other reason than to ensure her national safety that Japan fought China in 1894-5 and Russia in 1904-5. Indeed, it is impossible to find any outstanding event in Japan's foreign policy that has not been affected by this fundamental attitude of hers towards the mainland. Far back under the Czars the ideal of Russia's empire builders was the control of Eastern Asia; and although no newly instituted form of government ever went to such lengths in the overthrowing of the established order as the Soviet régime, the present government of Russia has not abandoned for one moment its

interest in the Far East, despite declarations to the contrary made in the early stages of its accession to power. True, with the replacement of Czarist diplomats by Soviet commissars, the methods may have changed, but the aim and substance of Russian diplomacy still remain the same. Not only that, but it would seem that Russian ideals have gathered a much greater momentum than under the Czars, so that the present dream of the Soviet in East Asia appears to be much more ambitious than that of Czarist Russia. For it is that of a Communist China, with its huge population of 400,000,000, accepting the direction of Moscow in carrying out its policies in the Far East.

In the final analysis the present Sino-Japanese conflict springs from the twin root of Chinese Nationalism and Russian Communism. In the early stages of the Soviet rule, Moscow adopted what is known as the “Asia détour” policy, the purpose of which was to strike at Western Imperialism out in Asia. The first object of the Red machinations was Great Britain, as witness the virulent anti-British campaign in China in 1925-27. The extent to which Moscow was behind the Kuomintang in its anti-British agitation is shown by the fact that the party’s slogan was the denunciation of the exploitation of China by Western capitalism raised to a higher and more violent form than had ever been known before. It was by Moscow’s aid that Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist army were able, in 1926, to advance as far as the Yangtze Valley. This success was enough to fill the Chinese mind with misplaced confidence in itself and to cause undue elation among the anti-foreign elements at what they considered as the beginning of the wholesale retreat of “foreign devils” from Chinese soil. It cannot be denied that this attitude was greatly stimulated by the British retrocession, under pressure, of the Hankow concession in 1927. The retreat of the British brought particular joy to the Chinese, for it was certainly an epoch-making event in the annals of China’s foreign relations, and so quite easily they succumbed to the dangerous illusion that, since such a powerful country as Great Britain had submitted to their threats of coercion, they could easily extort what they wanted from less powerful countries by similar methods.

And so Japan became the next object of attack. Those ambitious Chinese politicians who were impatient of all foreign privileges made it appear, honestly or dishonestly, that the existence of Japanese rights not only in China proper, but even in Manchuria, was too great an affront to their country to be endured. To Japan, however, the maintenance of her position in China proper, and especially in Manchuria, was a matter of vital necessity to be defended at all costs. Thus, the aggressive nationalism of China and the vital necessity of Japan did not comport well together. Friction was inevitable, and it culminated in the Manchurian incident of 1931.

It is true that there was a rift in the Soviet-Nationalist combination in April, 1927, when Chiang Kai-shek staged a *coup* against the Left wing of the Kuomintang, the effect of which was to send Borodin and his comrades scurrying back to Moscow. Nevertheless, the Soviet ferment had already had enough time to permeate no small section of the Chinese people, so much indeed that it had taken practical shape in the formation of Chinese Communist armies. These Red forces Chiang Kai-shek had to tackle, but only with little success. For the Communist armies, under native leaders but assisted by Russian advisers, moved northward and established contact with the Soviet forces in Outer Mongolia, which, in fact, if not in name, is Soviet territory.

Despite the temporary setback following on Chiang’s *coup*, Moscow never wavered in its faith in Communist China. It knew how to bide its time, until the coveted opportunity arrived at last in December, 1936, in the shape of the Sian episode. There is indeed a general idea, from what followed from this episode, that Russia had played, directly or indirectly, a most important part in it.

What is certainly undeniable is that, as a result of the episode, the Soviet-Nationalist *entente* was re-established. The common front on which this reunion was achieved was expressed by the slogan "Fight Japan!" This pact proved a turning point. The time of drifting was over. And China now began to move consciously toward certain war with Japan. She had 190 army divisions consisting of 2,200,000 officers and men, which huge army was further reinforced by Communist troops. Moreover, behind China and beyond the borders of Manchoukuo loomed the ominous form of the Soviet Empire, whose Far Eastern army alone was declared to be at least as large as the whole of Japan's standing army. Prior to the Russo-Japanese war Russia had been able to hoodwink the world by means of a secret treaty of alliance signed with China on the strength of which she flooded Manchuria with Russian troops. Now the same thing had come to pass again, though on a much larger scale. In this respect history certainly repeats itself. Moreover, just as her apprehensions regarding Czarist Russia drove Japan to enter into an alliance with Great Britain in 1902, so the danger of Soviet aggression drove her to see an anti-Comintern pact with Germany in November, 1937.

The present Sino-Japanese conflict started on July 7, 1937, when Chinese forces, at Marco Polo Bridge near Peking, made an attack on the Japanese troops stationed there in accordance with the Boxer protocol. Japan did everything possible to have the matter settled locally, but the Nationalist Government turned down the Japanese attempts and mobilized its forces in such a way as to leave no doubt that it considered the time opportune for translating the contents of the Sian pact into action. At Shanghai, the Japanese were even more eager to keep the peace, if that were possible, than in the North, doing everything in their power to avoid aggravating the situation. The Chinese, on the contrary, showed every determination not only to force things in just the opposite direction, but also to involve foreign interests in the dispute with the evident hope of enlisting the foreign Powers concerned on China's side. And so the inevitable finally arrived, with China as the party determined on creating trouble. Blows came to be exchanged in real earnest, leaving Japan with no alternative but to hit back swiftly and decisively.

The war aim of Japan in the current conflict is the establishment of peace on the mainland and security in East Asia. Any settlement of the conflict worth having must at least be adequate to ensure this purpose. And, since so long as Chiang Kai-shek has his headquarters intact, and directs the operations against Japan, there can be no talk of peace and security. The final and definitive collapse of his régime must be taken as the first prerequisite for the termination of hostilities. Paradoxical as it may sound, co-operation, not enmity, has always been the aim of this country in regard to China; but the forces which shape or misshape Far Eastern affairs have dragged Japan, and probably China also, into what she least desires. In no age have the Japanese ever lost their sense of respect for the classical culture of China. Neither is it less true that there are statesmen and thinkers in China, who, despite the tragic character of contemporary events, are convinced that friendship between the two countries is the only way to the salvation of Asia and its peoples. These people consider that the use of anti-Japanism by the leaders of the Nanking Government as a means of national policy and their rejection of the Japanese proffer of co-operation have been an almost irretrievable disaster for China as well as for Japan and also for Asia in general.

For the past several years, the main charge levelled against Japan has been that she has upset the balance of power in the Far East which was so laboriously built up by the joint efforts of the Powers. It is true that the so-called balance of power is certainly an admirable thing and is, in certain cases, synonymous with peace; but in other cases, it is quite the contrary. The balance of power, as

with other international institutions, is fixed and rigid thing, but is bound to shift from time to time in accordance with the forces, both internal and external, that obtain among its constituent members. In Japan's case such forces were mostly external, as witness the ever-narrowing sphere of activity, economic and commercial, into which she has been finding herself forced since the Russo-Japanese war. All the same, Japan showed herself at least as patient as Britain and the United States, in the post-Washington Conference period, in regard to the Chinese disturbances, and acted as a faithful member of the League of Nations. To quote James T. Shotwell: "Japan has established a record which should win something more than the official confidence of Governments; it should have universal recognition of the high ideals and sincerity of its international dealings with the Western world. This maintenance of an ideal standard is all the more notable when one turns to view the problems of Japan; for it is face to face with a situation which is far more critical than that of the Western Powers. There is one major fact which dominates all others, and that is that the Japanese people are increasing at the rate of about 800,000 a year and are already rapidly nearing, and apparently bound soon to outrun, the limits of their means of subsistence."<sup>[34]</sup> But as there is a limit to everything in this world, there was certainly a limit to Japanese patience.

The peace and safety—security in one word—of a nation signifies something more than the mere preservation of its homeland or even of its territories beyond the seas from external attack. This is only the beginning of security. Real security must also include the maintenance of its economic interests so that it may be able to feed its people. At the time of the Washington Conference Japan considered that that security could be made hers in regard to the world conditions then prevailing; but she was destined to be bitterly disillusioned. At that time there was no Soviet Russia as a first class military Power, nor was there China organizing anti-Japanism as a means of national policy. But the conditions soon changed and with them the established balance of power also changed. In the words of Salisbury, "politics must be studied with the help of large maps," and Japan was obliged to do this, for otherwise she would find herself a rapidly dying nation. The policy of peace and conciliation followed by Baron Shidehara became, therefore, quite inadequate to safeguard the vital interests of Japan and had to be discarded.

In the twenty-odd years between 1894 and 1918 Japan fought three wars. First, she fought China and then Russia, and in the Great War she fought on the side of the Allies. In each case some of the Western Powers saw fit to cheat Japan of her legitimate gains, most probably from the fear that she might be going faster than they thought convenient. After her war with China, Japan had to give up some of the fruits of her victory owing to the triple intervention. After her war with Russia, too, she had to put up with less than her due. In this case the West was evidently more interested in seeing Russia defeated than in seeing Japan a victor. Out of the liquidation of the Great War she came none too well, for the Paris Conference was closely followed by the Washington Conference, where "under the adroit leadership of Lord Balfour and Mr. Hughes, the American Secretary of State," writes Sir Arthur Willert in *The Empire in the World*, "the United States and Great Britain had one of their all too rare spasms of complete and effective co-operation. They arranged the Far East to suit themselves and their ideals. Japan was deprived of her alliance with Great Britain. Then under Anglo-American pressure suavely applied Japan saw her position in China disappear, her special rights in Shantung, which the Peace Conference had confirmed, given up, her claim to preferential treatment in China denied in the Nine Power Treaty, and finally her navy limited in the Washington Naval Treaty to the tune of three large ships for every five which the English-speaking Powers allowed themselves each

to possess.”[\[35\]](#)

Looking back over what has happened in the Powers' attempts to call a halt to Japan's legitimate growth and advance, we cannot help putting the following queries to ourselves: First, if the Chinese Government had not felt encouraged by the sympathy evinced toward it by the Powers who attended the Washington Conference, would it have become so bold as to venture a challenge to Japan's position in Manchuria? Again, would anti-Japanism in China, even with the Soviet machinations behind, have assumed such serious proportions at [sic] is has, but for the misguided egotistic activities of the League Powers? And finally, would the present hostilities have started at all or continued so long with such disastrous results for the Chinese, except for the support, covert or overt, of certain of the Powers?

## **Early Relations With the Continent**

In these times, when things move with such bewildering rapidity, people are apt to lose sight of what lies behind each event. But events, political, economic or otherwise, do not take place of themselves. On the contrary they are the creation of prevailing forces, and thus in order to locate them in their proper place in the evolution of society, it becomes necessary to examine into the formative causes. It is for this reason that, in the following paragraphs, we intend to cast a backward glance on Japan's early connections with the mainland.

### *Empress Jingo's Korean Expedition*

The geographical proximity of Japan to the continent of Asia has, first of all, determined the racial make up of the people of these islands. Though the present knowledge of ethnology does not enable us to enumerate all the racial elements of the Japanese people, it can be safely assumed that streams of migration came from the continent chiefly by way of the Korean peninsula, after the Yamato race had taken over the practical control of the country. Among the emigrants from the continent may be counted Chinese, Mongols and, of course, Koreans. There are also strong strains of Malay blood traceable in the people, apparently due to early immigrations from the south sea islands. Thus the Japanese race did not start from one stock, but is a combination of races. Yet, in spite of the diversity of the racial elements which went to make up the Japanese people, a racial homogeneity had been achieved comparatively early in its history. In this manner, nearness to the mainland helped to a large extent make the Japanese people what they are today. Naturally, intercourse with the mainland was promoted, and this in its turn invited conflict.

In China the warring principalities had been welded together into one empire in the third century B.C., under the dynasty of Han. With unity came prosperity; and with conquests, trade. Caravan routes to the West were opened, and products from Central Asia, and even from the outposts of the Hellenistic world, reached China; while, as a byproduct of these contacts with the West, came Buddhism from India. It is an irony of history that these overland routes through Central Asia which had long been forgotten and fallen into disuse except for local purposes, should again in these latter days have become China's important channels of communication and contact with the outside world, through which war supplies are flowing from Russia into North west China.

The history of the Korean expedition undertaken by the Empress Jingo, of which the date is



traditionally placed in the year 200 A.D., bears witness to the existence of considerable intercourse, both peaceful and otherwise, between Japan and the Korean peninsula about this time and most probably long before. The *Nihongi* relates how the Empress carries her expedition into Silla; how the neighbouring Kings of Kōkuli and Paikché, awe stricken by the rapidity with which Silla succumbed, tendered submission without ever coming into conflict with the Japanese army; and how the peninsula continued for many years after that to send tributary missions to Japan. It was not only tribute, however, that came from the peninsula to Japan, but in the wake of the expedition, Confucianism began to be introduced into this country from the peninsula where it had taken firm root. With it came Chinese culture together with all its accessories. In the centuries that followed, the relations between Japan and China became so intimate that ambassadors were sent from this country to the court of the Celestial Empire, and this further accelerated the importation of things Chinese into Japan, who considered that she had much to learn from her neighbour. This was only natural, for at that time China was at the acme of her glory, economically and culturally.

### *Continental Culture Imported*

Buddhism had reached Korea in the second half of the fourth century of the Christian era. In the year 552, the King of Korea made a present to the Court of Yamato of an image of Buddha and several sutras. Eager to learn things new, the upper classes enthusiastically took to the new religion and, once espoused by them, it soon began to be popular among the masses. The introduction of Chinese civilization and Indian Buddhism synchronized with the material and cultural growth of national life in Japan. “The advance of civilization,” writes Professor M. Anesaki in his *History of Japanese Religion*, “was made possible chiefly by the universal religion of Buddhism, with its arts and literature, and by the civil morality of Confucian ethics, with their educational methods and legal institutions, all introduced from the Asiatic continent.”[\[36\]](#) But it is a great mistake to suppose that Japan took no trouble except just to import these things and implicitly obey their teachings. On the contrary, Japan, having imported these new influences, did not surrender herself completely to them, but proceeded to refine and adapt them to her own needs, thus stamping them with the mark of her genius and making them her own. It is for this reason that both Confucianism and Buddhism, which are extinct or nearly so in the lands of their birth, have prospered and are prospering in this land of their adoption. Dr. Anesaki accordingly asks: “When the Buddhist missionaries introduced the civilization of the Asiatic continent into these islands, how could they foresee the future of their religion, which after almost perishing in its home, has been preserved in the Island Empire and remains a living force of new Japan?”[\[37\]](#)

All the same, there is no denying that Japan grew greatly in civilization under the influence of the continental culture, art, philosophy and legislation imported into this country together with Confucianism and Buddhism. But the Chinese are over-reaching themselves when they declare, as a recent writer puts it, that the Japanese are merely “vulgar upstarts, ungrateful and unprofitable pupils.” Nor is there much substance in the popular Chinese view that Japan has little or her own save military vices and modern evils. To this body of rabid and morbid censure it is enough to say in reply that if the Japanese were mere copyists, as it would like to make them, they could not possibly be what they are today. Classical Chinese culture is regarded in Japan much in the same light as classical European culture is in modern Europe. Japan regards it neither as exclusively Chinese nor



Japanese, but rather as the common heritage of the Oriental peoples, just as Europe regards its classical culture as the common property of all. Modern European culture is essentially a synthesis of Greek philosophy, the Christian religion and Roman jurisprudence.[\[38\]](#) But it would certainly not be exact or true to say that modern Greece, for instance, is the sole or even principal heir to classical European civilization. The same is true with classical Chinese culture. For this reason, if for no other, there exists a unity in Oriental culture, just as in the case of Occidental culture. Pan-Asianism, at least in its cultural sense, therefore, is no fantasy, but a living reality.

### *Three Important Events*

In August, 1937, a Shanghai periodical[\[39\]](#) took Hideyoshi Toyotomi severely to task, because this Japanese warrior-statesman of the sixteenth century wrote to the King of Korea to say that it had long been his desire to conquer the Ming Dynasty and that he hoped that Korean troops would join the Japanese when the proper moment came for action. In justice to Hideyoshi and to historical fact, it ought to have been added that, in his letter to the Korean King, Hideyoshi reminded the latter of the fact that Japan was only demanding reciprocity for the favours China had been enjoying from Japan for about three centuries past. Mutilations of fact and history, whether intentional or not, often go unchallenged and do untold evil. But that is not the point which we would stress here. What we want to point out is the fact that Hideyoshi's letter throws light upon the intimate relations existing between Japan and China from before Hideyoshi's own time. In our continental relations, however, Hideyoshi's expedition to Korea in the sixteenth century was an important event, as important as the Mongol invasion in the thirteenth century and also the arrival of Europeans in the sixteenth. These events all left upon this country effects of lasting consequence in one way or another.

### *The Mongol Invasion*

First in order of date comes the Mongol invasion. It was the boast of Genghis Khan, the founder of the Mongol or Yuan Dynasty, that he could ride over the vast plains of Asia and Eastern Europe without his horse stumbling once. He might well say that, for his Empire stretched from the shores of the China Seas to the Dnieper, and from North Manchuria to the frontiers of Annam. Manchuria was then, as it has been many times since, the cockpit of Asia. Kublai Khan, grandson of Genghis, took over the throne of China and established himself in Peking. Marco Polo Bridge, where the Sino-Japanese conflict started in July, 1937, bears the name of the Venetian "adviser" to Kublai.

Kublai Khan, the formidable ruler of the Mongol Empire, came to the conclusion that Japan ought to accept his authority, although it is highly problematical if he had any substantial reason to reach such a conclusion. The odds are that he merely thought the existence of Japan as an independent nation within what he considered his realm unbearable and inimical to his earthly glory. Anyway, in the year 1268, A.D., he sent to Japan a letter very patronizing in tone, intimating what had happened in Korea, evidently with the purpose of aweing Japan into submission, and asking that a goodwill mission be dispatched to his court. In this matter the King of Korea acted as the intermediary. But when the Mongol ruler failed to impress properly his importance or fearfulness upon the Japanese, who coolly rejected this "diplomatic offer," to use modern jargon, he quickly showed himself in his true colours, and sent to Japan this time a fleet of 1,000 vessels bearing 40,000 Mongol and Korean

troops. But the expedition was as much a failure as the diplomatic offer. This brought the Mongol ruler round to the view that the second method adopted was too expensive, with the result that he reverted to using diplomatic pressure again. So he dispatched to Japan further envoys, who were, however, executed as soon as they reached her shores. So in the year 1281 the infuriated despot sent an expedition, far more formidable than the first, to teach the “impudent” Japanese a lesson. When the reports of its approach reached Japan, her domestic quarrels at once ceased and the nation was united as one man. The forces of nature came in aid of the Island Empire and there arrived a great typhoon—the “divine wind”—which completely destroyed the invading armada. The effect was tremendous both internally and externally. Externally, it was the last time that Japan saw any Mongol invasion, and, internally, the victory has ever since remained in Japan’s national consciousness and given her the conviction that she can never be conquered by foreign invaders.

### *Hideyoshi’s Korean Expedition*

Now turning to the Korean expedition of Hideyoshi, it must be first remarked that the Japanese had not forgotten Japan’s historical association with the Korean peninsula dating back to the Empress Jingo’s expedition. Despite occasional periods of hostility, Japan and Korea in the main had continued in a fair degree of friendly intercourse. During the enfeebled rule of the Ashikaga Shogunate, however, the Korean King had seized the opportunity to stop paying the annual tribute long paid him to Japan. So we see that as early as 1587 Hideyoshi, who had stepped into the shoes of the Ashikagas, complained to the Korean court of its failure to send ambassadors to the court of Kyoto. But, as might be expected, the diplomatic correspondence which followed was not altogether amiable, and the Koreans played fast and loose with Hideyoshi. This served to exasperate him and finally, in his famous letter, Hideyoshi told the Korean King of his intention to return the Mongol compliments of three centuries before, and called upon the Koreans to co-operate with him in the expedition. On the refusal of the King, which was well anticipated, Hideyoshi despatched, in 1592, an army of 300,000 men to Korea.

According to the Jesuit theory, Hideyoshi’s motive in carrying war into Korea was his desire to acquire land outside Japan where he could accommodate the Christian daimyos and their men in order to keep them quiet. Hideyoshi, who had about that time subjugated the whole of Japan, probably found it far easier to subdue the local daimyos than to rule them in peace. This may have been one reason why Hideyoshi undertook the Korean expedition, but certainly it was not the only reason. A much more fundamental one is to be found in his desire to avert before it was too late any possible invasion from the continent and anticipate it, if that was possible.

“However much this peasant-born ruler may be accused of militaristic aggressiveness in his Korean campaigns,” writes Captain M. D. Kennedy, the author of *The Military Side of Japanese Life*, “it is only fair to remember that his desire to force Korea to acknowledge him as paramount was undoubtedly due in part to his recognition of the danger to which Japan would always be exposed of a possible repetition of the Mongol invasion, so long as the peninsular nation remained too weak to safeguard its own sovereign rights. It was exactly this same ever-present danger that led Japan to declare war on China three centuries later and to fight Russia in 1904, and it is well to recall in this connection that, even prior to the Mongol invasion of 1281, the national gods had, time and again, been invoked to lend their aid to ward off threatened attacks by enemies operating from the Korean

coasts. Korea, on account of its inability to guard its own rights, was, in fact, from the very earliest times, a source of constant uneasiness and danger to Japan. If this fact is borne in mind, the real strategic aim of Hideyoshi's expeditions against the peninsula at once becomes clear.”[\[40\]](#) Viewed from that perspective, it will be seen that Hideyoshi's Korean enterprise was essentially a measure of self-preservation.

### *Arrival of Europeans*

We now come to the third event—the arrival of Europeans to these shores. The pacification of the land, which had been practically accomplished by Hideyoshi, was thoroughly completed by Iy yasu, the founder of the Tokugawa Shogunate. For some decades before his assumption of the government of Japan, there had been coming to Japanese coasts ships flying different European flags. The Westerners who came to this country were of different nationalities, mental qualities and diverse professions. Among them there were groups of men who were very politically minded and mixed themselves up in the domestic affairs of the country. The activities of these men, together with other causes, gave rise to the Catholic Revolt of 1636, which alarmed the Tokugawa Shogunate into adopting a policy of seclusion. The policy once adopted continued for more than two centuries. In contrast to the foreign policy of Hideyoshi, which was “positive” in that it envisaged the continent as one of its factors, the Tokugawas followed the “negative” line by sealing the country against foreign intercourse. The policies were quite opposite, but the underlying motives were much the same in both cases—the safety of the land against foreign inroads.

The struggle of Western nations for the Pacific, which commenced in the eighteenth century, continued with ever increasing intensity. The course of the struggle followed three different routes. The first was by way of the Cape of Good Hope and India, the second by way of the western route, i.e. *via* America, while the third was through the Northern, i.e. Siberian, route. European colonization in North America, which started at the Atlantic seaboard, reached the Pacific coast by the middle of the nineteenth century. Also the Russians, in their eastward march, reached the Sea of Okhotsk in 1638 and the North-American coast by the end of the eighteenth century.

But it was not until about the middle of the nineteenth century that real contact, and with it the clash, between the Western and Far Eastern cultures began to take place in earnest. The Opium War of 1840-42 was an event of tremendous importance in the history of the peoples of Asia. The objects of the British expedition against China were declared to be, in the first place, to “obtain reparation for the insults and injuries offered to Her Majesty's Superintendent and Her Majesty's subjects by the Chinese Government; ” secondly, to “obtain for the merchants trading with China an indemnification for the loss of their property incurred by the acts of violence offered by persons under the direction of the Chinese Government; ” and thirdly, to “obtain security that the persons and property of those trading with China should in future be protected from insult and injury.” Ten years of constantly increasing strain, friction and complaint had led to that war. “There were much more important things at stake in the Opium War,” said Sir Austen Chamberlain before the China Association, London, in September, 1925, “than the question of opium. The boycott, the restriction of the liberty and the imprisonment of British citizens, and, finally, the expulsion of all the merchants from Canton; these were the questions which led to the war and which found their solution in the treaty of Nanking in 1842, the first of those unequal treaties of which China complains today. I wish that I could persuade

some Chinese of historical knowledge, of statesmanship, and of authority with his own people to explain that all this system of the unequal treaties was not of our choosing. We did not desire it. It was the minimum that we should ask of a China that repelled the foreigner, that would not give him justice in the courts, or secure for him the ordinary advantages of civilized and orderly government.”[\[41\]](#)

During the period, when Great Britain carried away from China concessions, rights and privileges by the Nanking Treaty and the treaties which followed, France followed the example set by Britain and succeeded in wresting from China some of its southern provinces and in founding therewith her Indo-China colonial empire. In 1852, Commodore Perry appeared off the coasts of the Japanese islands with an American squadron, demanding that Japanese ports be opened to American-European trade. These indeed proved to be busy days for the Japanese. They had been rudely shaken out of their peaceful slumber lasting for about three hundred years. They rubbed their eyes hard and began to look around only to find that China, Japan’s helpless neighbour, was being squeezed by the British and the French from the south and by the Russians from the north. This, they were told, was the result of the Opium War; and the lesson thus learned they have ever since kept constantly in their minds. Thus the contact of the Japanese with the Western world was marked with the conviction driven into the Japanese mind that in order to be able to escape the fate of China, they must be at all costs prepared with sufficient means of defence. So began the process of Japan’s modernization and her army and navy building.

### **The Wars With China and Russia**

Geographical and political necessity as well as historical association impels Japan to take due note of whatever happens on the continent of Asia. She has always to be on the watch against anything inimical to her existence that might arise there. Thus, in the final analysis, she has either to help shape events on the mainland or else herself become the passive victim of those events. The significance of the Sino-Japanese War, 1894-5, the first foreign war fought by Japan, becomes very clear when viewed from this angle. It was fought on the Korean issue, because the peninsula, in the hands of a hostile Power, would be a dagger pointed at the heart of Japan; and there was then certainly such a Power threatening the very existence of the Hermit Kingdom. This was Russia, who, during the second Opium War, had taken possession of the left bank of the Amur, seized Vladivostok two years later, gaining control of the Maritime Provinces of Siberia, and was continuing her southward march at a tremendous pace. This was one Power that Japan had to deal with.

#### *The Sino-Japanese War*

But there was another Power which was threatening the peninsular kingdom more immediately than Russia, namely, China. In the meantime the Korean Government had become rotten to the core or, more exactly, the Kingdom’s very existence was at stake, because those who should have governed were guilty of such misgovernment that its capacity to resist any outside Power dropped almost to nothing. To make matters worse, the reactionaries there had the backing of China, while the reform party looked to Japan for sympathy and encouragement. This naturally brought about tension between China and Japan. Something, therefore, had to be done to relieve the strained

situation and so the Tientsin Treaty of 1885 was entered into by the two countries. But the restoration of goodwill and friendship was more apparent than real, for a rebellion of the Tong Haks, a reactionary band of fanatics, broke out in 1893, and China, taking advantage of the turmoil, despatched troops to Korea. Now the Treaty of Tientsin provided, among other matters, that “if there should again arise in Korea any disturbance or matter of importance, and if it should seem necessary for both Japan and China, or either of them, to despatch troops, they should first communicate mutually on the matter, and then when the trouble had subsided, the troops should be withdrawn and not permanently stationed there.”

The Chinese Minister in Tokyo, however, informed the Japanese Government on June 7, 1894, that the Korean Government, unable to suppress the Tong Haks, had appealed to China for aid, and that Li Hung-chang had, by the order of the Emperor of China, despatched troops to Korea to restore order in the tributary state. Japan had been watching China's designs on the peninsula with growing concern and her anxiety was, therefore, intensified at the turn which the affairs in the peninsula was taking. Among other things she took the strongest exception to Korea's being regarded by China as her tributary state.

While China was thus sending troops to Korea, Japan was busily engaged in laying a foundation for the welfare of the Koreans and the establishment of an orderly government in that country. So when the Tong Haks were suppressed, Japan lost no time in proposing to China that the two countries join in setting Korea on a firmer basis, financially and politically. The Peking Government, however, turned down the overtures. Thereupon Japan informed that government of her intention to proceed with Korean reforms on her own responsibility, since the Koreans were evidently incapable of working out their own salvation; and also that the troubled conditions in the peninsula, inviting as they did the intrusion of foreign Powers, were inimical to the very existence of the Island Empire. Then China, evidently under Czarist influence, took to obstruction and even threatened to send a large army to Korea in order to drive the Japanese out of the peninsula, with the result that the two countries confronted each other on the battle field. During the war, which lasted eight months, Japan carried the campaign into South Manchuria, where sanguinary battles were fought in different localities.

### *The Shimonoseki Treaty*

The Treaty of Shimonoseki, signed on April 17, 1895, concluded the Sino-Japanese War. By it China ceded to Japan the Liaotung Peninsula, Formosa, and the Pescadores. China also recognized the independence of Korea, and agreed to pay an indemnity of two hundred million taels. But before the treaty was formally ratified, that is, on April 23, Russia, France and Germany made representations to the Tokyo Government, saying in substance that, they, ever eager for the preservation of peace in the Far East, deemed it highly advisable that Japan should not acquire any territory on the mainland. Coerced by such a formidable array of Powers, Japan had nothing else to do but retrocede the Liaotung Peninsula, which was one of the rightful fruits of her victory. This triple intervention was not exactly a bolt from the blue. Soon after the opening of the Sino-Japanese hostilities, Li Hung-chang adroitly began to sound the foreign diplomats in Peking with a view to enlisting Occidental Powers into a concerted action against Japan. There is no doubt that this was a piece of the customary Chinese “let barbarians fight barbarians” principle. The scheme evidently did not work to the full



satisfaction of Li Hung-chang, but at least he succeeded in getting the three Powers to intervene in China's favour in regard to Liaotung. But that these Powers did not act out of sheer altruism was proved before long, for soon China had to lose Manchuria to Russia and Shantung to Germany.

### *Russia Comes to China's Aid*

Russia, one of the three interventionists, had long posed as a friend of China. When approached by the Chinese Government, however, for assistance, she discovered in it a prime opportunity for killing two birds with one stone. She could render China the coveted service on the one hand and realize her ambitions on the other. So she lost no time, in conjunction with France and Germany, in exercising pressure upon Japan so as to make her disgorge one of the fruits of her victory. There is no question that this placed China under a great obligation to Russia, which was still further increased when Russia made it possible for China to raise an indemnity loan on the French money market. Count Witte, the Russian Finance Minister, agreed to pledge Russia's resources as security for the Chinese loan. Not only that, but he even went the length of taking charge of the loan negotiations himself. The relations between China and Russia thus cemented received their finishing touch by the Li-Lobanov Treaty of 1896, which opened the flood gate to Russian penetration into Manchuria and thus brought on the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Li Hung-chang, the first dignitary of China who had signed the Shimonoseki Treaty on behalf of the Chinese Empire, proceeded to Russia in the same year to represent his country at the coronation of Czar Nicholas II. That such a high dignitary as Li Hung-chang was sent to Russia was no doubt to express China's appreciation of the rôle played by Russia in connection with the triple intervention and the indemnity loan.

### *The Li-Lobanov Treaty*

In the meantime the great Trans-Siberian Railway, the construction of which was being pushed forward with French money, had reached the Transbaikalia, and then the question arose as to the course which the railway should follow from there. Li Hung-chang, while in St. Petersburg, was approached by Count Witte with the suggestion that the two countries should sign a treaty of alliance directed against Japan, and that there should be included in the text a provision whereby the Chinese government would concede to Russia the right to build a railway across North Manchuria to Vladivostok so as to obviate the circuitous route along the Amur. "In my conferences with Li Hung-chang," writes Witte in his *Memoirs*, "I dwelt on the services we had recently done to his country. I assured him that, having proclaimed the principle of China's territorial integrity, we intend to adhere to it in future; but, to be able to uphold this principle, we must be in a position, in case of emergency, to render China armed assistance."[\[42\]](#)

So he argued that it was necessary for Russia to have a railway running along the shortest possible route to the Pacific littoral, i.e. a straight line from Chita to Vladivostock. In his informal talks with Count Witte, Li Hung-chang reiterated his advice to Russia that she would be ill-advised to go south of the straight line between the two points, for any movement southward on the part of Russia might result in unexpected perturbations which would be disastrous both for Russia and China.

Count Witte had conducted the preliminary negotiations, and the treaty was signed in its final form by Prince Lobanov Rostovski, the Russian Foreign Minister. The signing took place on May 22,



1896, but secrecy was specially enjoined on the signatories. To quote Witte's own words: "Not the slightest information penetrated into the press regarding our secret treaty with China. The only thing Europe learned was the bare fact that China had agreed to grant the Russo-Chinese Bank a concession for the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway, a continuation of the Trans-Siberia."[\[43\]](#) Only after the lapse of fifteen years, or after the treaty lost its force, for it remained in force for fifteen years, the London *Daily Telegraph* got wind of it and published a so-called text of the agreement in its edition of February 15, 1910, but that text was not a full one. In fact, it was not until the Washington Conference of 1921-22 that the secret treaty was acknowledged by China and the full text came to light.

The authentic text of the agreement dated, Moscow, May 22, 1896, ran as follows:

Article I Any act of aggression directed by Japan, whether against Russian territory in Eastern Asia, or against the territory of China or that of Korea, shall be regarded as necessarily bringing about the immediate application of the present treaty. In this case the two High Contracting Parties engage to support each other reciprocally by all the land and sea forces of which they can dispose at that moment, and to assist each other as much as possible for the victualling of their respective forces.

Article II As soon as the two Contracting Parties shall be engaged in common actions, no treaty of peace with the adverse party can be concluded by one of them without the assent of the other.

Article III During the military operations all the ports of China shall, in case of necessity, be open to Russian warships, which shall find there on the part of the Chinese authorities all the assistance of which they may stand in need.

Article IV In order to facilitate the access of the Russian land troops to the menaced points, and to ensure their means of assistance, the Chinese Government consents to the construction of a railway line across the Chinese provinces of the Amur (i.e. Heilungkiang) and of Kirin in the direction of Vladivostok. The junction of this railway with the Russian railway shall not serve as a pretext for any encroachment on Chinese territory or for any infringement of the rights of sovereignty of His Majesty the Emperor of China. The construction and exploitation of this railway shall be accorded to the Russo-Chinese Bank, and the clauses of the contract which shall be concluded for this purpose shall be duly discussed between the Chinese Minister in St. Petersburg and the Russo-Chinese Bank.

Article V Russia shall have the free use of the railway mentioned in Article IV for the transport and provisioning of her troops. In time of peace Russia shall have the same rights for the transit of her troops and stores, with stoppages, which shall not be justified by any other motive than the needs of the transport services.

Article VI The present treaty shall come into force on the day when the contract stipulated in Article IV shall have been confirmed by His Majesty the Emperor of China. It shall have from then force and value for a period of fifteen years. Six months before the expiration of this term, the two High Contracting Parties shall deliberate concerning the prolongation of this treaty.

### *The Carving Begins*

Thus it will be seen that China and Russia were on more than intimate terms in keeping up a common front against Japan. This explains why Russia easily acquired the practical control of Manchuria and slipped into the Liaotung Peninsula out of which she had so recently evicted Japan. But in justice to Russia, it must be said that she was not alone in making inroads into Chinese territory. Thus as compensation for the murder of two missionaries in Shantung, Germany acquired in March, 1898, the lease of Kiaochow for ninety-nine years, with the right to build railways and to work the coal mines of the province. Then followed in order of date, the Sino-Russian Convention of March, 1898, by which Russia acquired by lease the Kwantung Province, the southern part of the Liaotung Peninsula, including Port Arthur and Talienwan, "for the purpose of ensuring that the

Russian naval forces shall possess an entirely secure base on the littoral of northern China.” The right to extend the Chinese Eastern Railway to South Manchuria was acquired by Russia by the same convention. It needs no reminder that, on the ground of preserving China’s territorial integrity, Russia had forced Japan at the close of the Sino-Japanese War to withdraw from the Liaotung Peninsula.

Then in April, 1898, the French hoisted their flag over Kwangchow Wan in southern China, which was to serve as a naval station. Great Britain, not to be outstripped by other Powers, felt, or said she did, the need for a balance to Russia in the Liaotung Peninsula, and so, on July 1, 1898, signed a convention with China by which Weihaiwei was leased to her “for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia.” In 1899 Italy, coming late into the race for carving China, attempted to obtain a naval base on Chinese soil, but this miscarried. China was moreover required by France, England, and Japan, during the years 1897-98, to issue declarations of non-alienation of certain regions vital to their respective positions. Thus the verifiable dismemberment of the Celestial Empire appeared well on its way.

### *The Boxer Trouble*

But the seizure of China’s territory by European Powers under one pretext or another, flimsy or otherwise, profoundly aroused Chinese public opinion, the most violent form which popular discontent in China assumed being the Boxer Rebellion. The avowed object of the Boxers was to save China from Western encroachment by expelling these “barbarians.” The trouble started in Shantung, but soon spread northward under the secret assistance of the Chinese Government which was in deep sympathy with the movement. So the Boxers increased in force as they marched northward and in the summer of 1900, they laid siege to the Legation quarters in Peking. A state of wanton outrage lasted for about four months before the beleaguered foreigners could be rescued by an international expedition consisting of contingents of different nationalities, when it became evident that there was no hope for the rebels. Early in 1901 the Chinese Government sued for peace and the famous protocol was signed on September 7, 1901, liquidating the rebellion and all that was attendant upon it. Of the 20,000 foreign troops who relieved the Peking legations, 2,500 were American soldiers, sailors, and marines. America, among other Powers, has now her troops stationed in North China and is co-operating with these Powers in protecting the legations and also guarding the railway from Peking to the sea.

Foreign troops are maintained in North China originally on the authority of the following article of the Boxer Protocol:

Article VII The Chinese Government has agreed that the quarter occupied by the legations shall be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside and which may be made defensible.

The provision was made more exact in the protocol annexed to the notes exchanged between China and the Powers on January 16, 1901, by which China recognized the right of each Power to maintain a permanent guard in the said quarters for the defence of its legation. The said provision runs as follows:

Article IX The Chinese Government has conceded the right to the Powers in the protocol annexed to the letter of 16<sup>th</sup> of January, 1901,

to occupy certain points, to be determined by agreement between them, for the maintenance of open communication between the capital and the sea. The points occupied by the Powers are: Huang-tsun, Lang-fang, Yang-tsun, Tientsin, Chun-liang, Ch'eng, Tang-ku, Lu-Tai, Tang-shan, Chang-li, Ch'in-wang tao, Shan-hai kuan.

### *The Spanish-American War*

In the meantime there was fought the Spanish-American War (1898), which introduced a sudden change in the political outlook of the Pacific. Had the United States decided either to return the Philippine Islands to Spain or to allow the islanders to work out their own salvation at that time and not to wait, as she did, until 1934, her Far Eastern policy need not have been regarded as essentially changed and the political outlook in the Pacific would have remained in the main what it had been before. But the retention of the islands by the United States, with the endorsement of Downing Street, came to involve her in the affairs of the Far East, and this had far-reaching effects upon Far Eastern politics. A few months after the American acquisition of the Philippines, John Hay sent to Germany, Great Britain, Russia, France and Japan his first notes on the “open door” principle, enunciating the outlines of the United States’ policy regarding China. During the Boxer Rebellion in the summer of 1900, he despatched to a group of Powers a circular note of similar content as a further declaration of American policy in this part of the world.

### *Russia's Manchurian Adventure*

But we must now return to the Boxer Rebellion and narrate how it affected the situation in Manchuria. The rebellion or part of it naturally spread to Manchuria, whereupon Russia lost no time in occupying the three provinces, ostensibly for the purpose of quelling the revolt. But it was an open secret that, from the very beginning of the campaign, Russia's desire was more to annex Manchuria permanently than to see the Boxers punished. So when the Boxer Rebellion ended, the Chinese Government resumed its seat in Peking, but Russia remained in Manchuria.

“On the day when the news of the (Boxer) rebellion reached the capital,” says Count Witte in his *Memoirs*, “Minister of War Kuropatkin came to see me at my office in the Ministry of Finance. He was beaming with joy. I called his attention to the insurrection being the result of our seizure of the Kwantung Peninsula. “ ‘on my part,’ he replied, ‘I am very glad. This will give us an excuse for seizing Manchuria,—We will turn Manchuria into a second Bokhara’”[\[44\]](#)

Thus Russia had embarked upon her Far Eastern adventure, supported by an alliance with France, while Japan had the backing of Great Britain, with whom she had concluded a treaty of alliance in January, 1902. Not only in Europe but in Asia also, Britain had been Russia's principal rival. The South African War, with its continental repercussions, was a severe strain upon Britain, and, moreover, the maintenance of the two power standard, an axiom of British naval policy, was becoming increasingly difficult, because of the rapidly growing strength of the German navy.

### *The Russo-Japanese War*

At the close of the Sino-Japanese War, the British Government had wisely refused to join with Russia, France and Germany in forcing Japan to renounce one of the fruits of her war with China. This evidently paved the way for the rapprochement of the two Island Empires. Also there was closer

agreement between Britain and Japan than between any other Powers during the Boxer Rebellion; and finally the Russian menace which was directed on every side, but specially to the Far East and Britain's possessions there, was beginning to get beyond the grasp of both Japan and Britain. So the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaty of January, 1902, was concluded to last for five years. In case of unprovoked attack on either of the contracting parties, it was agreed (Article II) that the other should "maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining the hostilities against its ally." And if any other Power should join in hostilities against that ally, the other agreed (Article III) to "come to the assistance and to conduct war and peace in common." Thus the ground was cleared, as it was later proved by fact, for a collision between Russia and Japan, which duly took place in 1904. Japan had been conscious, since the Russian seizure of the Liaotung Peninsula, that so long as the Czarist Government continued its aggressive policy in Eastern Asia, she would one of these days be called upon to defend her existence with her blood.

The war ended. And by the treaty of Portsmouth signed in September, 1905, Japan acquired from Russia, subject to the consent of the Peking Government, the Russian holdings and the other rights in Manchuria as provided for in the following articles:

Article V The Imperial Russian Government shall transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, with the consent of the Government of China, the lease of Port Arthur, Talien and adjacent territory and territorial waters and all rights, privileges and concessions connected with or forming part of such lease, and they also transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan all public works and properties in the territory affected by the above mentioned lease.

The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Chinese Government mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

Article VI The Imperial Russian Government engage to transfer and assign to the Imperial Government of Japan, without compensation and with the consent of the Chinese Government, the railway between Changchun (Kuancheng-tzu) and Port Arthur and all its branches, together with all rights, privileges and properties appertaining thereto in that region, as well as all coal mines in the said region belonging to or worked for the benefit of the railway. The two High Contracting Parties mutually engage to obtain the consent of the Government of China mentioned in the foregoing stipulation.

The necessary Chinese consent mentioned in these articles was secured in bilateral agreements dated Peking, December 22, 1905.

Had the Russo-Chinese secret treaty of 1896 been known when the Portsmouth Treaty was concluded, Japan would have demanded, and been perfectly entitled to do so, more substantial contributions from China. But as it was, the treaty was a sealed book till much later and this evidently dispossessed Japan of what she could have acquired with perfect propriety. But the facts that the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 had been largely fought on the plains of Manchuria and that she again fought Russia in 1904-5 in the same region, gave Japan a position there which nobody could contest, either morally or materially.

### *The War and the United States*

In the Russo-Japanese War the United States gave Japan not only her moral support but active assistance. The United States, while officially neutral, was in reality something more than neutral. The extent of President Roosevelt's support of Japan was not generally known, until it was disclosed twenty years after by Tyler Dennet in his volume on *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* (1925). The President wrote to Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Ambassador, on July 24, 1905:

As soon as this war broke out, I notified Germany and France in the most polite and discreet fashion that in the event of a

combination against Japan to try to do what Russia, Germany and France did to her in 1894, I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length war necessary on her behalf. I of course knew that your Government (Great Britain) would act in the same way, and I thought it best that I should have no consultation with your people before announcing my own purpose.

Tyler Dennet also reveals in his book how an American-Japanese memorandum was drawn up during Taft's visit to Japan in July, 1905. In that "agreed memorandum," the Secretary of War assured Premier Count Katsura that, whenever occasion arose, appropriate action on the part of the Government of the United States, in conjunction with Japan and Great Britain, could be counted on quite as confidently as if the United States were under treaty obligations.

Unfortunately, however, American and Japanese policies began to diverge after the Russo-Japanese War. The schism became gradually wider owing to both internal and international reasons, but it was not so hopelessly bad immediately after the war. Tyler Dennet quotes a letter which Roosevelt wrote to his successor, President Taft, on December 22, 1910, in which he says:

Our vital interest is to keep the Japanese out of our country and at the same time to preserve the good will of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese, on the other hand, is in Manchuria and Korea. It is therefore peculiarly our interest not to take any step as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them, or a menace—in however slight a degree—to their interest.

The quotation shows that the United States, while she was determined to reverse her policy of allowing immigrants unrestrictedly into her shores, was perfectly willing to give Japan a chance to develop in Korea and Manchuria.

### **The Washington Conference and After**

As was mentioned in the preceding chapter, Japan fought two wars within a span of ten years, one with China over the Korean issue and the other with Russia over the position in Manchuria. These were not wars of her own choosing, but had been forced upon her. In so far as she made any choice at all, it was to live rather than to be crushed, or at least not to have her existence made intolerable by foreign pressure.

#### *Japan's Interest in Manchuria*

So after the war with Russia the preservation and development of her interests in Manchuria became a matter of vital importance, for that part of Asia continued even after the war to be the pivot around which the whole East Asian situation rotated. Once in Manchuria she had to stay there and stay well, for the authority of the Chinese Government hardly reached as far as there, and there were a hundred and one factors detrimental to Japan's best interests which had arisen either of themselves or of deliberate intention. Thus it was from the fear that her position might be irrevocably ruined that she had to turn down Knox's proposal, in 1909, for the internationalizing of the railways in Manchuria. For the same reason she had to oppose the construction, by foreign interests, of railways parallel to the South Manchuria lines. Again, it was with the same end in view that Japan came to a series of understandings with Russia, her erstwhile foe, about 1907 regarding spheres of influence in Manchuria. It may be gathered from this how great Japan's fear was lest her position there should be made untenable by foreign pressure and influence, and finally her very existence menaced. The truth

of this will be more fully apparent when it is realized that despite such seeming rapprochement with the Czarist Empire, it was necessary for Japan always to be on guard against a threatened war of revenge on the part of Russia. The situation showed signs of becoming worse from month to month, and it was to forestall the dreaded event, therefore, that Japan made Korea an integral part of her Empire in 1910.

When the World War came in 1914, Japan entered the conflict on the side of the Allies, though the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, as revised in 1911, imposed no positive obligation on her to do so. She rendered invaluable services to the Allied cause, of which a true evaluation can be made by asking the question: "What would have been the effect if Japan had stood aloof in the conflict?" It is true that her position in Eastern Asia was strengthened due to the war and her participation in it, but, as Viscount Grey observes in his *Twenty-Five Years*, "What Western nation with a population feeling the need for territorial outlet would have used such an opportunity with more or even with as much restraint?" [45] But this falls short of revealing the full truth, for it was more the forces or the combination of forces prevailing in this part of the globe than Japan's own doing that brought her whatever advantages she gained. For instance, but for the obstructionist policy, so persistently pursued by the Chinese authorities, both central and local, the so-called twenty-one demands of 1915 would never have been presented. The demands were presented because Japan considered a precautionary measure to be necessary *vis-à-vis* the situation obtaining in China and what was threatening in the near future.

### *The Washington Conference*

The Washington Conference of 1921-22 was called in order that two distinct purposes might be achieved. The first was to put a limitation on naval armaments, and the other was to seek a solution of the Far Eastern situation. The conference adopted, as regards naval armaments, the famous 5-5-3 ratio for Great Britain, the United States and Japan. When disputes should arise, so the theory ran, British policies would prevail in the British area, American policies in the American area, and Japanese policies in the Japanese area. America made the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance a *sine qua non* for the adoption of the Naval Treaty. In the debate in the United States Senate on the Four Power Pact, Senator Lodge said: "The chief and most important point in the Treaty is the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. That was the main object of the treaty". Again, he declared: "It is sufficient to say that in my judgement the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was the most dangerous element in our relations with the Far East and the Pacific." [46] With the removal of the German menace, what reasons were there, so felt the British, for them to continue the alliance? And the Great War had brought the United States into such pre-eminence that Great Britain could ill afford to give her any cause for suspicion. So the bargain was struck and the alliance was speedily brought to an end.

The Washington Conference, so far as Far Eastern questions were concerned, devoted itself almost exclusively to the consideration of Chinese affairs. In the conference Japan made important concessions, including the restoration to China of those rights in Shantung which she had obtained not from China but from Germany. Also a number of agreements (the Nine Power Treaty among others) and resolutions were adopted at the conference. The policy imposed by the Washington agreements was perhaps inevitable, in view of the political and economic changes which the Great War had made



in the international situation; but it was none the less a policy of dangerous experiments, which, as events have proved, was foredoomed to failure.

Westel W. Willoughby, who served as technical expert to the Chinese Delegation, saw fit to administer a warning to China. “After all,” he writes in his *China at the Conference*, “upon her (China) will rest the greatest responsibility for what the next years are to bring forth in her part of the world. She is now to have the opportunity to give substance to her claim to sovereignty and reality to her administrative integrity. A State that claims that its sovereignty and independence shall be scrupulously respected by other States gives the implied assurance that it is able to exercise a reasonable amount of effective political control over the territories and peoples which it claims as its own. China cannot, therefore, ask of these States that they exercise a forbearance towards herself for a longer period than is reasonably necessary for her to place her own household in order, and thus to be in a position not only to fulfill her own international obligations but to promote the welfare of her own peoples. At any rate it is necessary that she make steady even if only slow political progress. Thus there now rests upon China the immediate duty of reducing her military forces to a reasonable number and of bringing them into due subordination to the civil authorities; of creating and operating efficient administrative services; of purging her politics of corruption; and, in general, of establishing a stable Central Government which will command the respect and obedience of all of her millions of people.”[\[47\]](#)

The Chinese, however, did not live up to the expectations of the Powers gathered together at Washington. They did not reduce their army. Nor did they create administrative unity. Not only that, but they fell under a dangerous illusion—an illusion which was ruthlessly exploited by the Communists—that they were free from responsibility, whatever they did, with respect to the rights and interests of other nations. The decade after the conference was one of disappointment, disorder, and even calamities—the harvest of the seeds sown at Washington.

### *Japan's China Policy*

In the post-conference period, Japan's policy toward China was decidedly conciliatory. Certainly, regarding China's customs autonomy and the abolition of extraterritoriality, she was, to say the least, as conciliatory as any other Power. Speaking before the Diet in 1926, Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister, laid down the following four points as the guiding principles of Japanese policy toward China:

- (1) To respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and scrupulously avoid all interference in her domestic strife.
- (2) To promote solidarity and economic rapprochement between the two nations.
- (3) To entertain sympathetically and helpfully the just aspirations of the Chinese people and co-operate in their efforts for the realization of such aspirations.
- (4) To maintain an attitude of patience and toleration in the present situation in China, and at the same time protect Japan's legitimate and essential rights and interests by all reasonable means.

But Baron Shidehara's policy, laudable as it was, was soon found to be utterly unworkable. The so-called rights recovery movement was launched by the Chinese under the misguided idea that the conciliatory or even the patronizing attitude of the Powers at the Washington Conference was a proof that the Chinese could do what they liked with impunity. The movement was first directed

against Britain and then against Japan. In this, China evidently pursued her old policy of making barbarians fight barbarians, leaving herself to reap whatever benefits were left on the field. She persisted in turning a deaf ear to Baron Shidehara's repeated overtures for a friendly solution of Sino-Japanese problems. Not only that, but his policy of conciliation was interpreted by the Chinese as a sign of weakness, and merely served to encourage them in acts of provocation. Had the Chinese known how to appreciate the Japanese policy, a quite different history of the Far East would have been written. But that they would not do. On the contrary, they believed that the Japanese could be ousted from China and even that the Japanese rights in Manchuria could be cancelled through foreign intervention. It was China herself, and not the Japanese militarists, as is usually believed, that destroyed Shidehara's chance of success. Says Ernest H. Pickering in his *Japan's Place in the Modern World*: "The Manchurian authorities had shown themselves quite incapable of controlling, or, maybe, of even wishing to control, the turbulent Chinese elements, and that was the real issue. Here the baron (Shidehara) showed considerable warmth, as if he felt that he had been badly let down by the Chinese authorities. He had all along been striving for peace, while they had actually connived at war. The Japanese wanted no more than order and security, and they were denied both. Yet it was they who had brought prosperity to Manchuria, who had made their investments under treaty-guarantees by the Chinese, and whose enterprise had served to swell the coffers of the Chang warloads [sic]."[48]

### *Japan and the United States*

In the meantime the United States Senate repudiated President Wilson's idea of entering the League of Nations. This was wholly in accord with the American tradition. The American policy of isolation is older than the Monroe Doctrine, which may be regarded as a logical corollary to the policy of isolation. But the anomalous fact is that the United States insists on the open door in Asia, while she keeps her own doors closed against the Orientals. At the Paris Peace Conference, Wilson turned down the Japanese proposal for racial equality. As Prince Saionji stated at that time, specific discrimination applied to the Japanese wounds "our normal human pride," although nothing is farther from Japan's intention than to suggest to another country how it should regulate its own affairs. The racial equality issue was raised not in order to force our immigrants upon the United States or any other country which does not desire them, but to establish the principle that all races are equal before the law and should not be treated discriminatorily on account of supposed superiority or inferiority. This idea was the motive behind Japan's proposal at the Paris Conference and still is governing her international action.

In 1906 there took place what goes by the name of the San Francisco "school incident." After that, in order to assure smooth relations between the two countries as regards the immigration problem, the Japanese and American Governments entered into negotiations and arrived at a "gentlemen's agreement" in 1907. By that agreement Japan undertook to stop by her voluntary act the emigration of labourers to the United States. A similar agreement was entered into later with Canada. The basic principle which underlies the "gentlemen's agreements" is that whatever emigration needs to be checked, will be done so by Japan's autonomous will, not by the discriminatory legislation of other countries. This was quite in keeping with the basic principle stated in the above paragraph. The arrangement worked well, for Japan loyally kept her part of the agreement. Tranquillity prevailed,

which promised well to develop into further cementing the good relations of the two countries. But then came the Immigration Law of 1924 as a great tragedy in American-Japanese friendship. To quote from a recent publication on this old theme:

Is it surprising that the Japanese become nettled over the persistent demand of the Western nations for the open door in the Orient, when the Westerners maintain the closed door and inequality of treatment for Orientals, including the Japanese, in their own countries? They ask, in their naive way, why, if America is for Americans, should not the Orient be for Orientals?[\[49\]](#)

### *Japan's Fundamental Problem*

The problem of Japan is in its fundamentals very simple. It is no more than a question of providing subsistence for a population which, already too large for its small insular territory, goes on increasing at the rate of 800,000 to 1,000,000 a year, and which is debarred from seeking a livelihood except in the regions nearer home. The average density of population for the whole country is 400 per square mile, which makes Japan one of the most densely populated countries in the world. The density, when calculated per square mile of cultivated area, is 2,500, which is twice as great as that of Belgium and four times that of Great Britain. Necessity has taught the farmer to struggle with determination against the law of diminishing returns. In Japan, rice fields not only fill the valleys but also the hill sides. There is now no prospect visible in the island territory of materially increasing either the productivity of the soil or the area under cultivation. So, for better or worse, Japan has been obliged to look around and accept the conclusion that the only way open to her is to bring about a change in her economic structure and become a highly industrialized nation. She has realized that in order to maintain her national well-being, there will be no way but to develop her external trade, both inward and outward. But no sooner was the process begun than her poverty in raw materials came into prominence. The export of manufactured goods presupposes the supply of raw materials, which in Japan's case is mostly dependent upon foreign sources. Japan is, therefore, risking economic disaster, for she is really at the mercy of foreign countries for these materials. At the Washington Conference, the United States and Great Britain had arranged Far Eastern affairs to suit themselves. The treaties made and the resolutions passed there were intended primarily to put a check upon Japan's development in her part of the world. No nation or group of nations, however, can be regarded as entitled to compel another nation to starve. A little while before the conference, Mr. Hara, the Prime Minister, had an article on "Reflections on Lasting Peace" printed in the *Gaiko Jibo* (Diplomatic Review, Tokyo), in which he stated:

It is the chief duty of every Government today to open wide its economic doors and to extend to all peoples free access to what is vital to existence, and thus to save the more unfortunate from unnatural misery and discrimination. . . . The open door and the abolition of world barriers must be our policy, as it is the first principle of a lasting peace. We Japanese in particular are suffering from the increasing difficulty of living, attributable to our ever-waxing population and our ever-waning resources. Were any people to reach a point where its entire energy for attaining higher spiritual and cultural ideals, that people would be facing a very dark future. We tremble to think that our people are often threatened with uncertainty regarding even the barest necessities of life. Their condition ought to be remedied and greater freedom be given, if the world expects Japan to be the keystone to the arch of peace of the Far East, and a faithful supporter of the welfare of the world. Thus, even a single example shows beyond a doubt the absolute dependence of lasting peace upon the open door. By "open door" I do not mean a complete throwing down of national boundary stones. What I have in mind is the removal of the economic insecurity of some peoples by extending to them the opportunity for free access to the world's resources, eliminating other artificial economic barriers, and adjusting as much as possible the insecurity arising from the earlier discriminations of nature and of history.[\[50\]](#)

### *False Assumptions*

The assumptions upon which the Washington Conference proceeded were false ones as regards Russia no less than China. When the conference opened, Bolshevik Russia was an outcast among the nations, and had no government recognized by the Powers assembled at Washington. So the conference was misled into creating an artificial balance in Asia, that is, a balance between land power and sea power, which rested on an assumption that Russia was permanently done for. When John Hay declared the open door principle in China, the door he had in mind, as Owen Lattimore[51] has remarked, was the front door to China, a door opening to the sea. Should a land Power not signatory to the Washington treaties reassert her influence over China through the back door opening on land frontiers, the whole situation would at once be upset. The unstable equilibrium created at Washington was doomed, when once the Soviet menace, in any form whatever, began to loom again over the Far Eastern horizon. The self-denying ordinances adopted at Washington, therefore, provided no guarantee of peace to Japan.

A word on Japan's "special interests" in China may not be out of place here. The terminology had found a place in a number of treaties or understandings, notably the Anglo-Japanese Alliance Treaties of 1902, 1905 and 1911, in the Franco-Japanese agreements of 1907, and also in the Ishii-Lansing agreement of November 2, 1917. The United States, in a chapter of her diplomatic history, recognizes in substance a Far Eastern parallel with her traditional policy in the Pan-American sphere. Also in the wording of the 1917 agreement, the Governments of the United States and Japan recognized that the latter had special interests in China, particularly in the parts to which her possessions were contiguous.

But shortly after the Washington Conference, that is, on April 14, 1923, the Ishii-Lansing agreement was terminated by the exchange of notes. In reality the agreement was little more than a mere statement of Japan's geographical position. So long as the Japanese position in Eastern Asia is geographical, that position cannot in itself become the object of either recognition or abolition. Whatever happened to that diplomatic instrument, therefore, the axiomatic elements in the agreement remain. "Our own right to protect our nations," writes Charles Evans Hughes in his booklet on *Our Relations with the Nations of the Western Hemisphere*, "is quite distinct from the Monroe Doctrine. We have the right to protect American lives and property when endangered in circumstances and areas where governments have ceased properly to function, and this principle is applied although there may be no prospect of American interference and no occasion for applying the Monroe Doctrine." [52]

### **From Manchuria to Manchoukuo**

At the Washington Conference Japan signed away, in favour of China, Shantung and the better part of the rights acquired by the so-called twenty-one demands, and put her seal upon the Nine-Power Pact and the now defunct Naval Treaty. To all appearances, a new era had dawned and Japanese policy *vis-à-vis* China, in keeping with the spirit of the times, became one of conciliation and friendship, and this in a far greater degree than the other Powers concerned. Also in domestic politics the post-conference period was one of retrenchment and reform. The army was reduced by four divisions, manhood suffrage adopted, and party government more or less on Western lines was being firmly established. All in all, the country was well disposed toward "liberalism." Especially it

was argued from the commercial point of view that there was every reason to stretch the policy of conciliation towards foreign countries, especially toward China, to its farthest limits. Japan's attitude toward China, even during the Tanaka régime (May, 1927—July, 1929), which is often erroneously represented as a period of aggressive policy by the uninformed, was still that patient conciliation.

### *Japan in Manchuria*

Notwithstanding Japan's friendly attitude, or rather because of it, China became bolder and more aggressive. Boycott after boycott was staged with a view to crippling Japan's trade and thus weakening her position in Eastern Asia. The boycotts were not economic measures, pure and simple, but political, for they were the expression of a hostile attitude and employed as instruments of national policy. Moreover, the really responsible party for the boycotts was no other than the National Government, since the Kuomintang party, which was the directive force of the movement, was a constitutional organ of the State and not an ordinary political party in the Occidental sense. Nor did the anti-Japanese movement stop at this. The Government at Nanking introduced anti-foreignism, especially anti-Japanism, into the school curriculum. The abolition of foreign rights and the unilateral denunciation of "unequal" treaties became the declared aims of the Kuomintang party, which did not hesitate to resort to "direct action" whenever a supposedly favourable opportunity for doing so presented itself. And finally, as if to give a finishing touch to the movement, legislation was carried which decreed that the Kuomintang's "revolutionary" foreign policy should be vigorously put into practice both in spirit and letter. This was a sign that all China had been mobilized for anti-foreignism. Japan was a greater sufferer from this than any other Power, for she had more at stake in China than the other countries.

Japan possessed in Manchuria important treaty rights, natural and acquired rights, and the security of her existence, but above all it represented national sentiment. "To the Japanese," observes *The Lytton Report*, "the fact that Russia, France and Germany forced them to renounce this cession (Liaotung Peninsula) does not affect their conviction that Japan obtained this part of Manchuria as the result of a successful war with Russia, and thereby acquired a moral right to it which still exists." As the *Report* further says, "the war with Russia will ever be remembered as the life and death struggle fought in self-defence against the menace of Russian encroachments. The fact that a hundred thousand Japanese soldiers died in this war, and that two billion gold yen were expended, has created in Japanese minds a determination that these sacrifices shall not have been made in vain."[\[53\]](#)

### *Anti-Foreignism Staged*



To Japan, therefore, the protection of her rights and interests as well as the maintenance of tranquility in that region were matters of vital importance. It was for this reason that Japan, during the disturbances of 1925 started by General Kuo Sung-lin, a subordinate of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, despatched a limited number of troops from Kwantung and Korea to Mukden for the purpose of reinforcing the railway guards. Warm appreciation was expressed by the foreign community at Mukden and elsewhere, including Americans and British, of the step taken by Japan and the efforts she made generally to guard foreigners and foreign interests there during the Chang-Kuo hostilities. When the revolt collapsed, the Japanese reinforcements were withdrawn, thus speedily restoring the *status quo ante*.

However, with the extension of the authority of the Southerners (Nationalists) to Central and North China, a very important change came over the Chinese situation. An anti-British campaign broke out in the Yangtze Valley in 1926 and led to the despatch of British troops to Shanghai. In April, 1927, a part of the Nationalist army which was turning northward invaded Shantung. This caused the Japanese Government to send troops to Tsinan for the protection of the lives and property of our nationals. In the early part of 1928, the Nationalist troops made a drive on Peking to oust the forces of Chang Tso-lin who had established himself there. Unless something was done by Japan, it appeared practically certain that Manchuria would be thrown into the turmoil of China's civil war. In the circumstances, the Japanese Government, headed by General Baron Tanaka, sent on May 18, 1928, identical notes to Nanking and Peking, in which it stated:

The Japanese Government attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria and is prepared to do all it can to prevent the occurrence of any such state of affairs as may disturb that peace and order or constitute the probable cause of such a disturbance. In these circumstances should disturbances develop further in the direction of Peking and Tientsin and the situation become so menacing as to threaten the peace and order of Manchuria, Japan may possibly be constrained to take appropriate, effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria.

### *The Kellog Pact and Manchuria*

About this time, negotiations for the conclusion of the Kellog Pact were going on among different Powers. In the British note of May 19, 1928, Sir Austen Chamberlain stated that the proposed pact excluded from its application "any action which a State may be forced to take in self-defence." Also he considered it advisable to remind Mr. Kellog that "there are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our (Britain's) peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with these regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self defence." Then the British Foreign Secretary referred to the "comparable interests" the United States had in the Pan-American sphere. "His Majesty's Government believe, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States Government." Comparisons are odious, but we are obliged to make them, since it is often alleged by foreigners that this country acted in a most unwarrantable manner and also in violation of the Kellog Pact when she took precautionary measures to save Manchuria from civil war. At no time since 1905, was there any concealment on the part of the Japanese Government of its conviction regarding its special position, both strategic and economic, in Manchuria. So this fact ought to have been widely known among the Powers. From Japan's point of view, her rights and interests in that region were as defensible, in the same manner and for the same reason, as Great Britain's position in



Egypt, or that of the United States in the Caribbean.

Manchuria always occupied a separate position, historically as well as geographically, in relation to China proper. Japanese relations with Marshal Chang Tso-lin, the *de facto* ruler of the three eastern provinces, had been on the whole satisfactory, but had got increasingly out of gear toward the end of his life, solely due to his failure to fulfil his promises and agreements. A short period of uncertainty prevailed at Mukden on the marshal's death in June, 1928, as if the Mukden authorities had been in doubt as to the direction of the policy to be followed by them. Within two months, however, Chang Hsueh-liang, the young marshal, who had succeeded his father as dictator of Manchuria, was negotiating with Nanking for a rapprochement. In December, 1928, the white sun flag of the Nationalists was seen flying over the government buildings at Mukden. Japan's relations with Chang Hsueh-liang could not but be strained.

### *The Manchurian Incident and After*

After the rapprochement of Mukden with the National Government, the encroachments of the Manchurian authorities upon the Japanese rights and interests became increasingly frequent and flagrant. This was only natural, for the National Government was working up the people for reasons sufficient to itself into an anti-Japanese frenzy, and Manchuria could not but catch the fever. A past-master in the art of agitation, it coined a number of slogans, such as "Down with imperialism!" "Down with Japan!" "Save the country from unequal treaties!" etc, which were taken up in Manchuria with such zeal that the maintenance of the Japanese position there became increasingly difficult. In these circumstances, the amazing fact is not that the conflict came at all, but that its coming was delayed so long—until September, 1931. Thus the aggressive proceeding of the Kuomintang carried out through the instrumentality of the National Government and supported by the misguided activities of the League Powers, has lost Manchuria for China.

Under the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol signed on September 15, 1932, Japan has undertaken the responsibility for the defence of Manchoukuo. From Japan's standpoint this was a responsibility which she would not have assumed at all if her safety had not been threatened from that direction or the newly born State had been strong enough to afford such security to Japan. So the responsibility is one of necessity, rather than choice. In the meantime Manchoukuo set out to work out her own salvation, assisted by the Japanese. An efficient system of national as well as local administration has been introduced, and law and order has gradually replaced misgovernment and chaos. To facilitate communications and transportation, thousands of miles of railways and roads have been newly built. The Russian interest in the Chinese Eastern Railway has been purchased, and improvements have been made. Moreover, firm foundations have been laid for a healthy development of trade and industry, though all the hopes entertained in the early days of the establishment of Manchoukuo could not be and have not yet been, in the nature of things, realized.

"In one way," writes William Seaver Woods in an article on "The Case For China," "Japanese rule has done wonders in Manchoukuo, and some Japanese spokesmen claim it would do as much for China. Manchuria was in a sad state of political graft and corruption, disorder, banditry and distress, and the Japanese began house-cleaning with ruthless thoroughness. They were harsh, but efficient. They put the currency on a sound basis, lowered taxes, built new roads and railways, opened schools, and set up measures for public health. In 1933 Manchoukuo had only 8,200 miles of

motor roads; in one year 2,500 more were built, and the program is 31,000 miles. Mail, express and passenger services have been instituted on eight air routes totaling 1,500 miles, and the new schools have 600,000 pupils.”[\[54\]](#)

In sharp contrast with China, Manchoukuo has already succeeded in achieving the epochal task of abolishing extraterritoriality. It has to be remembered that, while Japanese foreign policy was in the hands of Baron Shidehara, Japan was perfectly prepared to make transitional arrangements with a view to the total abolition of the system in China. This China failed to get, due to the Kuomintang’s aggressive policy, which totally alienated Japanese sympathy for China, but Manchoukuo got it. The new State has been given formal recognition by Japan, Salvador, Italy, Germany and the Franco Government, and is well on her way to becoming a prosperous and independent State.

### *The Tangku Truce Agreement*

As long, however, as North China was under the control of the unfriendly Kuomintang, Manchoukuo was far from being, in any true sense, secure. The work of bringing order and normal conditions into the country had already been much retarded by the untoward activities of the remnants of troops and bandits. In addition “volunteers” from within the Great Wall joined hands with these troublesome elements to prevent the work of pacification; and while the guerilla warfare still continued, the Chinese garrison opened fire on the Japanese troops stationed on the Manchoukuo side of that boundary. This led to the bombardment by the Japanese of Shanhai-kuan on January 1, 1933. The military operations that followed resulted in the Tangku Truce Agreement on May 31, 1933, which provided among other matters the following:

1. The Chinese army shall withdraw to the west of the line connecting Yen-ching (north of Peiping). . . .and Lutai (a few miles north of Tangku). They shall not march into the area within this line, nor shall they carry on provocative acts against the Japanese in the said area.
2. The Japanese shall have the right to use aeroplanes and other means in this area to ensure that the Chinese carry out the terms of the agreement. China shall offer protection and facilities to Japan in connection therewith.

By this agreement a demilitarized zone was established within the Great Wall, in the Province of Hopei. A serious situation, however, developed in North China during 1935 in consequence of anti-Japanese activities or outrages perpetrated by Chinese Blue Shirts, and thinking people had begun to discuss seriously the possibility of something being done to alleviate the tension at least. Meanwhile, the establishment of an autonomous anti-Communist régime (the East Hopei Government), headed by Yin Ju-keng was proclaimed in the demilitarized zone, for the purpose of “freeing the district from the tyranny of Nanking and of co-operating with Manchoukuo.” The Ho-Umezu Agreement was also signed in October, 1935, between Ho Ying-chin, the Chinese Minister of War, and General Umezu, the Commander of the Japanese forces in North China, which laid down the rule among other important matters that the Chinese Central Government troops should not move north of a certain line. Finally toward the end of 1935, the Hopei-Chahar Council, a semi-independent régime for the Peiping-Tientsin area, came into existence.

### *The Status of Outer Mongolia*

When the Japanese talk of national safety in relation to the continent of Asia, they more usually have Russia in mind than China as a possible menace. "While the Communist creed and Communist propaganda," observes a writer, "served to imbue Japan with deep distrust of Soviet Russia, it was not until 1929 that Russia once more loomed up as a serious military menace and to arouse Japanese anxiety on the score of national defence." When Manchoukuo came into existence, the Japanese people thought that an effective dam against Russian inroads into this part of Asia had been set up. In thinking so, however, they were mistaken, for the march of events was such that the tableland of Mongolia, theoretically Chinese territory, was turned into a Russian province by means of Red activities.

Russia had always been interested in Outer Mongolia. Immediately after the Great War there existed an anti-Bolshevik régime in Outer Mongolia, but it was soon overthrown with the help of Soviet forces, and a revolutionary government, supported by Russia, came into existence. In 1924 Outer Mongolia declared itself a republic under the name of the Mongolian People's Republic. There is no denying that the real ruler of this region is Russia, not the Mongols themselves. This can be proved, if proof is necessary, by the protocol entered into by the Russian and the Mongolian Governments in March, 1936. This provides that "in the event of a threat of attack upon the territory of the U.S.S.R. or the Mongolian People's Republic by a third State, the two Governments undertake immediately to consider jointly the situation that has arisen and take all measures which should be necessary for the protection and security of their territories." The two countries also undertake "to render each other assistance including military assistance in the event of military attack upon either one of them." Thus to all intents and purposes, Outer Mongolia is now Soviet territory, if not in name. And since a Power that controls Sinkiang and Mongolia also controls China, the Soviet domination of Mongolia constitutes a serious menace to the security of the Japanese position not only in Manchuria, but in Eastern Asia in general. Russia who was obliged to retreat beyond the Amur in Manchuria is now again casting a covetous eye upon it and Japan's position there from across the Mongolian deserts.

Among Western publicists the question is often asked whether the current Japanese activities on the mainland are the result of a deep-laid design or the result of political circumstances. A parallel case to the present one is the Manchurian incident, of which an analysis as to its genesis was given in the preceding chapter. In both cases the entire truth is not known to the outside world and only half truths or complete falsehoods are being circulated.

### *The "Tanaka Memorandum"*

One will remember that during the Manchurian controversy much capital was made out of a document purported to have been written by Baron Tanaka in 1927. Although the document was a proven forgery, yet [sic] the Chinese delegates at Geneva declared it to be authentic evidence of the existence of a settled programme of aggression upon the mainland on the part of Japan. But what were the real facts of the case as recorded by an acute observer, who was in Japan at the time and was in close touch with Japanese official and unofficial sources? "At the start, Japan's only idea," writes Captain M. D. Kennedy, "was to teach Chang Hsueh-liang and his friends a lesson and to ensure respect for the rights that she claimed. Little by little, however, Japan was forced further and further

into the arms of the reactionaries by the unfortunate handling of the whole question at Geneva, which merely served to inflame national sentiment and make Japan increasingly truculent and intransigent, in much the same way as the British were affected by the almost universal hostility displayed towards them by the world at large at the time of the South African War.”[\[55\]](#) To quote another writer, P. H. B. Kent: “If the truth could be established, it would not improbably be found that Japan’s actions in the autumn of 1931 in their inception represented a combination of resentment and determination to put an end to causes of friction in Manchuria.”[\[56\]](#) As late as 1936 Guenther Stein writes: “Every observer of Japan, however, who tries to be objective must confess that he is at a loss if confronted with these questions (regarding Japan’s political aims). For it is more than likely that there are no definite answers even in the Japanese mind itself, neither among responsible military and naval men nor among Japanese politicians.”[\[57\]](#) Thus external threats and pressure had had inevitable repercussions on Japan. And exactly the same thing can be said of the present controversy with China.

### *Conflict Instead of Co-operation*

In the present conflict China, as in the case of the Manchurian incident, most probably counted upon [sic] the intervention of the “remoter barbarians.” But that this was an entirely mistaken policy, has been proved by subsequent events. Had the Powers, instead of holding up the mirage of “concerted action” before the Chinese eyes, told China in China’s interests that it was best for her to come to reasonable terms with Japan, and had China, acting upon such advice, decided upon a policy of co-operation with Japan, she could have easily entered into some sort of arrangement with this country. Certainly in that event Japan’s course on the mainland would have been quite different from what it has been. But China’s one idea was to defeat and humiliate Japan through foreign intervention, just as she did immediately after the Sino-Japanese war. It was impossible for Chiang Kai-shek, who was exploiting anti-Japanism with the ulterior motive of consolidating his own position in his country, to meet Japan half way for a settlement of the outstanding Sino-Japanese difficulties. Thus it will be seen that Chiang Kai-shek’s policy of playing off his people against the Japanese and *vice versa* was after all a suicidal one.

The immediate occasion of the conflict was the exchange of shots between Chinese and Japanese troops at Marco Polo Bridge near Peking on July 7, 1937. Japan was perfectly within her rights when she carried out manoeuvres in the vicinity of the bridge. So long, however, as the Chinese and Japanese positions remained fundamentally irreconcilable, as stated above, incidents were certain to occur somewhere, sooner or later. The question, therefore, as to who fired the first shot is after all of minor importance.

Throughout the early period of the conflict, Japan did everything possible in her power to urge upon Chiang Kai-shek to reconsider the policy of his Government towards this country before it was too late. But Chiang Kai-shek refused to listen to Japan’s advice, and the answer he gave to this country was decidedly in the negative, namely, a declaration of prolonged conflict with Japan. Thereupon there was no choice left to this country but to be drawn into extensive military operations. The outbreak of hostilities found Japan ready to pay the fullest respect to the rights and interests of third Powers in China and this attitude has been maintained throughout the conflict, except where it was absolutely impossible to do so. This proved to be an extremely onerous task because of the presence of Powers resorting to a policy of encouraging or even supporting China in her resistance

against Japan. It is true that the military operations involved certain unpleasant happenings, as they would in any case, but it is a matter of common knowledge that this country has made every effort to minimize the damage to foreign lives and property in the area of hostilities.

### *Japan's Aims*

Paradoxical as it may seem to some, Sino-Japanese co-operation remains the settled policy of this country, which is ever alert to catch the first opportunity to come to terms with China, if she overhauls and amends her present attitude. In the meantime the Provisional Government of China was proclaimed in Peking in December, 1937, to be closely followed by the establishment in March, 1938, of the Renovation Government in Nanking. The Government of a new China arising through the union of the two régimes, with perhaps the addition of other elements, is expected to be capable of carrying out the task of the political and economic rehabilitation of the country. But the emergence of a new China, anti-Communistic in nature and ready to co-operate with Japan as well as with other countries, cannot be considered as fully assured, unless and until the Chiang régime, responsible for the present disastrous conflict, gives way to another which is able to pursue a new course without being trammelled by the past. It was in line with this way of thinking that on June 18, 1938, the Provisional Government at Peking and the Renovation Government at Nanking issued a joint declaration, urging the Chiang Kai-shek administration to give up its opposition to Japan. The same thing can be said of the formal declaration made by the Japanese Government in the early part of this year, saying that it would have “no dealings” with Chiang.

Peace, order, and stability in Eastern Asia are of overwhelming interest to Japan. Under conditions of chronic disorder and unrest in China, trade in and with that country cannot naturally be expected to prosper. The volume of China's foreign trade is surprisingly small, considering the vastness of that country and the immensity of her population. Few will dispute that the most important factor responsible for this state of things is China's internal insecurity, or a condition of chaos, which cannot but damage the industries and the purchasing power of her people. It has long been a matter of common knowledge that no improvement can take place in China's trade, industry and general conditions, until effective measures are taken to curb the activities of the military forces of her war lords. A nation that cannot rule itself is always a menace to other countries. It is for this reason that an international trusteeship under the cloak of altruism has, from time to time, been suggested for China. Unless peace and order prevail in China, foreign enterprise and investment cannot be made secure. And peace certainly cannot prevail there unless some sort of harmony between Japan and China is first of all assured.

### *The China Dreams Dissipated*

Fifty years ago, it was generally believed that China would one of these days offer a vast market for foreign goods—a faith which has survived from the Age of Discovery. Little by little, however, that faith has been dissipated, and today the poverty of the Chinese people has become proverbial. Nevertheless China is still conceived by some of the trading nations as constituting one of the most important remaining fields for exploitation. Hence the complications that arise. But how large is American trade, for instance, with China? The most significant thing about it is the smallness

of the amount in comparison with the United States' foreign trade as a whole. This is in direct contradiction to the prophecies of fifty years ago advanced by Secretary of State Seward. At present more than 40 per cent. of American Far Eastern trade is carried on with Japan, while China makes but a poor showing, accounting for only 15 per cent. Japan is America's third best customer, exceeded only by Canada and the United Kingdom—a fact not always adequately appreciated.

For foreign investments and enterprises in China, peace and order, or to say the least, the security of life and property, are the prerequisites. It is a foregone conclusion, therefore, that economic and industrial progress cannot be achieved under threats of Nationalist agitation and Communist disturbances. Where Japanese influence extends on the mainland, or in other words, where these troublesome elements are excluded, the market for foreign goods is, as a matter of actual fact, expanding. The reason is not far to seek: commerce cannot well be carried on except under conditions of order and stability. It is not only the area, resources and population of a region that determine its commercial importance. There must also be the conditions which make these factors capable of being utilized to the full. Manchoukuo can be cited as a typical instance in this connection. Since 1931 the trade of other nations than Japan with Manchoukuo has steadily increased, and American trade in particular has roughly doubled, with the balance much more favourable to the United States than in previous years.

The establishment of order and security in China is the minimum requisite for the progress of foreign enterprise and trade in and with that country. It becomes the more necessary since the idea of an unlimited Chinese market constitutes an economic illusion for the Powers. As to the industrial resources, scientific exploration has destroyed earlier expectations. But however poor the resources be in themselves, they possess a much higher marginal utility for a country hard pressed by economic needs, such as Japan, than for such "haves" as the United States and the United Kingdom. This is because the needs of such a nation are far more insistent than those of others. That this country adheres to the principle of the open door, as it has always done, has been reiterated by General Ugaki in a statement given to foreign correspondents soon after his assumption of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. He declared that the open door in China was a basic policy of Japan, that the equal rights of the Powers would be fully respected, and that this country thoroughly welcomed foreign investment in China. But economic considerations are not of course the only determinant factors in the formation of foreign policy.

### *Japan as Stabilizing Influence*

Not many months ago, Mr. Sumner Welles, the United States Under-Secretary of State, in a statement which he made in New York, uttered a warning to non-American Powers, declaring that any attempt on their part "to exert through force their political or material influence on the American continent would be immediately a matter of the gravest concern not only to the United States but to every other American republic as well." He would by no means underestimate, he said, the extent to which propaganda of a type alien to "our Western civilization" had been spread on the American continent. But if Fascism is alien to American civilization, Communism is certainly no less so.

What would happen if the stabilizing influence of Japan were to be withdrawn from Eastern Asia? In that event, Russia would be left the sole dominant Power in this part of the world. There would be nothing to check the Sovietization of China and finally of the whole of Asia, supposing that



Russia does not forego her present policy of Red penetration. It would be difficult to see what benefit Britain or any other capitalist country would derive, if such a thing should come to pass. Japan, brought to her knees, would no longer be in a position to exert her influence as the one Power ready to check the extension of the Soviet system to East Asia. The present conflict in China is not solely between Japan and that country. It is in many respects a conflict between Capitalism and Communism. Could it be seriously maintained that the cause of real democracy is advanced by aiding and abetting Communism? Again, it should be borne in mind that any war between major capitalist Powers would only serve to benefit Communist Russia.

At the time when the Washington treaties were being concluded, Soviet Russia was still a pariah among nations, isolated by a *cordon sanitaire*. It was not foreseen at that time that Russia would come back so soon into the comity of nations. Neither was it at all expected that Nationalist China would ally herself with that Power in an anti-Japanese front. But since change is the law in human as well as in international affairs, it would benefit little to complain of the altered situation. But still it must be stated as an historical fact that the Washington treaties, designed as they were to secure peace in the Pacific, sadly failed to provide a guarantee of safety for Japan. "Not one of the Washington treaties," says Mr. Stimson in one of his pronouncements, "can be disregarded without disturbing the general understanding and equilibrium which were intended to be accomplished and effected by the group of agreements arrived at in their entirety."[\[58\]](#) The "general equilibrium" must, however, be understood in a larger setting.

### *The Anti-Comintern Pact*

Germany and Japan have long been recognized as bulwarks against the advance of Communism in Europe and Asia. The pact signed between the two Powers in November, 1937, is directed against the machinations of the Comintern. The terms of the agreement provide for consultation and the exchange of information between the competent authorities of the two countries in regard to whatever Red activities may be directed against them. A year later, Italy announced in a separate protocol her adhesion to the German-Japanese pact. It is hardly necessary to say that the signing of the anti-Comintern agreement does not affect relations with the other Powers. "As regards Great Britain," declared Mr. Hirota in the course of his statement before the Diet in January, 1938, "there has been no change in the policy of the Japanese Government, which aims at the maintenance of the traditional friendship between the two countries." In these words the former Foreign Minister hoped that the British Government and people, in view of the importance of the Anglo-Japanese relationship, would show themselves willing to understand Japan's position in Eastern Asia and to co-operate for peace and stability. And what is true with Great Britain also holds good with other Powers.

The issue of maintaining peace and prosperity in Eastern Asia is a vital one for this country, since its security largely and directly depends upon it. It is necessary, therefore, that Japan should fight for it when such becomes unavoidable. The problems of Eastern Asia cannot possess for the Western nations the importance they have for the Japanese. For a country like the United States, whose security is little short of absolute, the only danger is that of being involved abroad. Japan, however, is not in that fortunate situation. Moreover, the security in her case is not only political but also economic. To understand correctly the Japanese position, it is necessary to keep in mind what

thoughtful students of Eastern Asia never forget: the growth of Japan's population, her limited natural resources, her growing need for raw materials and markets, the restrictive commercial and immigration policies of many foreign countries. A deeper understanding of Japan's problem than at present prevails may serve to emphasize the need for a more realistic approach to affairs of Eastern Asia.

### *Evolution in International Relations*

Historically, the present turmoil in this part of the world has grown out of the impact of the West upon the East. As change is the law of human existence, it is impossible to expect nations to remain without change. The problem, therefore, is not to ensure that change should not take place—which is inconceivable—but to see to it that the regional change is so made as not to involve a worldwide conflagration. A world-wide upheaval would be no solution for the underlying difficulties of a particular region. It is most important not to lose sight of the fact that we are living in a changing world and that the world is now evidently passing through a period of great change. Thus the present Sino-Japanese trouble may even prove, when looked back on by historians, to be no more than a phenomenon in the evolution of new international relationships.

The situation in Eastern Asia is decidedly far more complicated than can be solved by a general formula conceived in the Western fashion. The remedy must suit all circumstances. It would, therefore, seem that no possible use can be served by apportioning praise or blame for what has happened. The thing that must be done is to probe into the fundamental causes lying behind these happenings and help remove those causes. In spite of the immense difficulties which lie in the way, it should not be beyond the power of statesmanship to devise adjustments which, taking into due consideration the changed and changing circumstances and also being based upon broader conceptions of equity, should be reasonably satisfactory to all concerned.

# TOTALITARIANISM VERSUS DEMOCRACY

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Speaking before the Birmingham Unionist Association on March 17, 1939, Mr. Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, unconditionally confirmed his faith in democratic government. "There is hardly anything I would not sacrifice for peace," he stated, "but there is one thing I must except, and that is the liberty which we have enjoyed for hundreds of years and which we will not surrender." Although he emphasized that he was not prepared to pledge his country to new and unspecified commitments, he added that no greater mistake could be made than to imagine that Great Britain would not resist to the utmost of its power any challenge to its fundamental principles and institutions. "For that declaration," he concluded, "I am convinced that I have not merely the support and sympathy and confidence of my own countrymen, but the approval of the whole British Empire and all other nations who value peace indeed but value freedom even more."

The occasion of this speech was the latest German move toward Czechoslovakia which has brought about that country's disappearance as one of the independent states to emerge from the Versailles Treaty settlement at the end of the World War.

I am of the opinion that the present-day attitude toward the struggle between the Totalitarian States and the Democracies is fundamentally erroneous. It may seem strange to present the argument that however undemocratic and aggressive the Totalitarian States may be in other respects, the fact remains that at the present stage of world history, they are the actual champions of liberalism and democracy in the best sense of those terms. Liberalism and its correlative, democracy, are certainly among the greatest assets of mankind, but so far they have been realized only in an intranational sense, not internationally. In other words, at the present time, liberalism and democracy have developed only upon a national basis, mainly in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but so far no achievements have been accomplished toward placing these ideals upon an international standing. But in recent years history has been profoundly changed in its technical aspects, and the intranational relationships of the past are becoming less important than the international relationships among countries. This fact is obvious from the budgets of the leading Powers. Defence appropriations are overwhelmingly high, while all the items of a more or less intranational or domestic nature are reduced considerably. This is indicative of the decline in importance of the internal aspects of national life and the rise in importance of the external aspects.

However paradoxical it may sound, the Totalitarian States, rather than the Democracies, are taking the initiative in the historically inevitable movement of applying liberalism and democracy to the international aspects of life. One might be inclined to think that it should be the mission of such Democracies as Great Britain or America to achieve the internationalization of liberalism and

democracy. But the seemingly natural methods of history do not always operate in fact. Only thus can we identify and understand the process by which ancient Greek civilization first gave way to Roman and later to Germanic culture. The torch of civilization has hardly ever been carried in the same hand for any indefinite length of time, but successively passes from one nation to another, as one bearer becomes too old to function efficiently.

What constitutes this oldness is by no means mere longevity, but a habit of life which has become too inflexible. This attitude often degenerates into selfish indifference towards the destiny of one's neighbours, a situation which is fatal if those neighbours happened to suffer by this selfishness and are energetic enough to fight against it. I do not mean for a moment that either the United States or Great Britain are old in the sense of mere longevity, but unless they realize the consequences of selfish indifference toward their neighbours, they will find themselves and their civilizations classified by historians in the old category referred to above.

Mr. Chamberlain insisted upon the preservation at any cost of the "liberty which we have enjoyed for hundreds of years." He would even fight for this liberty, for he says that those for whom he speaks may value peace but they value freedom even more. Here is precisely the point that requires the most careful attention in order to understand the present situation. England and its people have certainly enjoyed liberty for hundreds of years, a most beneficent experience, for liberty is the one thing that represents all possible human good. But Mr. Chamberlain should adopt a little more social view in regard to the value of liberty. Mr. Chamberlain might ponder as to whether one of the greatest nations of Europe, Germany and her people, have also not enjoyed liberty for hundreds of years. If he were aware of the fact that liberty has not been an Anglo-Saxon monopoly, he would not try to impress us with such a degree of complacency. Liberty and freedom are, after all, relative terms. The British definition might not be acceptable to the German, while the Germans conception of liberty and freedom might seem strange to others. This does not mean, however, that one may possess the substance while the other does not.

In regard to the relationship of liberty between the Totalitarian States and the Democracies, it should be pointed out that this ideal had its origin in nationalism. In other words, there has been a direct connection between liberalism and democracy on the one hand and nationalism on the other. Nationalism in its first manifestations meant an intensification of life. This phenomenon made its appearance in Europe about the sixteenth century with the decay of medieval cosmopolitanism. The medieval conception of life has become unworkable with the advent of modern science, for science means efficiency. Thus the dawn of science had inevitably to break down the old system of cosmopolitanism which still prevailed. But in the first stages of change, science was too weak to deal with the vast medieval structure. In brief, the medieval cosmopolitan community was too large a body politic for the primitive scientific power to operate against. It was nationalism which finally succeeded in splitting up the vast medieval community into homogeneous groups based upon race, language, customs, and traditions.

Nationalism thus came into being as an intensification of life, and liberalism and democracy, however remote they may appear to be from anything utilitarian or pragmatic, had much to do with this process. In the beginning, modern liberalism was profoundly indebted to the great handicraft movement which characterised this period. There is thus a fundamental connection between science and liberalism in modern history. And on the other hand, democracy was deeply indebted to industry. In its modern forms, industry has ever tended to equalize and fraternize people as is inevitable from

the very nature of methods of production and consumption which shift responsibility from the individual to the mass.

We can safely say that nationalism in modern history had the prime mission of intensifying life and rendering it more efficient. Not only science and its subsequent manifestation, technology, but also liberalism and democracy contributed to the process of nationalism. But Science, by means of technology, has entirely changed the whole world situation, so that now the primitive nationalism of previous eras is no longer adequate to intensify and render efficient the life of any people. Science and technology therefore demand an infinitely wider range than that provided by the nationalism of yesterday. Science knows no discrimination, no boundaries, for it is the recognition of the world as it is. It is the most universal of all principles, because it is purely objective and its methods are those of conception as against any primitive methods of perception. At the same time, liberalism is the basic principle of social individuals, that is, personalities. So long, therefore, as society exists, and so long as individuals do not cease to play a part in society, the ethical reasons for the existence of liberalism remain unshaken and ineffaceable. And like science, liberalism in its own way knows no racial discrimination or boundaries. Liberalism is the great human identity, the other aspect of which is the aggregate of individual personalities. Any liberalism which ignores national, international, and the whole social welfare of mankind is not real liberalism, just as any democracy which possesses only the mere mechanical forms of majority rule is not genuine.

If we view the contemporary situation of the world in this light, no person can deny that those complacent liberal and democratic countries are really far from being entitled to call themselves by such terms. They are in fact quite the contrary. They are blindly eager to preserve the existing order of the world where their own territorial interests are at stake, regardless of millions of human beings of other nationalities who actually suffer because of the obsolete form of nationalism which does not reflect the present state of the world, but living conditions of days gone by. A real nationalism today must reflect a real liberalism and a real democracy so that they may be carried out as they should be under present-day conditions.

Before deploring the dangerous alignment of the Powers today, one should realize that the present Democracies are far short of realizing democracy in its most intelligent form. The Totalitarian States should know their mission as clearly as possible so that they may be more intelligently encouraged. If the development of intelligence could lead to a state of peace where wars and wartime systems, such as are now reflected in the Totalitarian States, were unnecessary, this would be most desirable. But if such is impossible, the inevitable conflict must be supported by a higher reason, the results of which will produce the least possible sacrifice and the maximum good.

At the present time the factor that determines the type of government in a sovereign state is nationalism, and when a modern state of this nature suffers economic disadvantages particularly in respect to owning or controlling resources, it also suffers political humiliation. This humiliation will naturally react on the entire life of the state, both individually and collectively. If liberalism means personalism, as certainly it does, such a state of affairs cannot be tolerated, much less encouraged, by any person or state professing liberalism.

The so-called Totalitarian States are no doubt struggling to achieve a state of liberty for their own national members, and viewed in this light their behaviour is not against the basic principle of liberty. In an age of nationalism this is quite a normal development, though this struggle may inconvenience other nations in the course of its self-realization. But if other nations think only of their

own position and well-being, disregarding the condition or the suffering of their neighbours, they are not entitled to complain if those nations which suffer handicaps attempt to assert their own national liberty in their international relations. The former group of self-satisfied nations might be regarded as an already established nationalism or imperialism, while the latter is still to become established. There is essentially no difference between them in the light of their basic objectives. Therefore, Mr. Chamberlain's position is not so strong ethically as he seems to presume.

Nevertheless, the old-fashioned imperialism must be discarded by present-day nations, chiefly for the reason that the progress of science and its technological aspects has come to bridge the nations. Liberalism in its genuine form, being nothing but personalism or personal and social individualism, ought not to know any geographical or ethnological boundaries. And democracy, in its most fundamental aspects, being nothing but the strongest humanism, ought not to exclude anything within the human realm. Before the technical means for bridging the nations is achieved, liberalism and democracy, which are still largely confined to life within individual nations, are not necessarily gross errors. Up to now liberalism has never been able to manifest itself except within the national boundaries of individual states, but as scientific changes remove the old barriers of such states, the scope for its application will become unlimited.

Seen in this light, the present Totalitarian States may possibly be the major social forces which are introducing into world history what should be called international liberalism and democracy. The methods which they have so far taken and may continue to take are far from conventional. But in some respects these methods are similar to those primitive methods first pursued by modern liberalism and democracy which at the time were markedly revolutionary. And in another sense, they may also remind us of the invading progress and expansion of the once barbaric Teutonic peoples when they superimposed themselves upon the declining Roman Empire.

It is not my intention to single out individual democratic nations for such criticism, especially a country which is still as young as the United States, which still retains the idealistic and revolutionary characteristics of the American Revolution, and which has a vast land empire still capable of indefinite development and exploitation. But unless the democratic nations collectively acquire a broader social conscience—expanded both in terms of space and time—there is the grave danger that they will reach a condition far removed from the creative revolution which they originally started.

The torch of culture in the history of human progress has never been carried for long in the same hand. There is something about this which is both sad and encouraging. Today nations are shifting into larger groups, chiefly along the lines of geographic contiguity. I would call this either an international regionalism or a greater nationalism. The Monroe Doctrine of the past and the Good Neighbour policy of today reflect this grouping tendency. As long as liberty and democracy in their best sense can only be expected within the confines of individual nations, it is necessary to encourage this process of national amalgamation.

But over and above these new greater nations or nationalisms which must be created there should be a ruling sense of humanism, a real cosmopolitanism, the most important principle of which is personalism, the permanent and central aspect of all human creativeness. And finally, of no less importance is the necessity that culture be appreciated and improved, not on the former national lines, but universally.

It is therefore well at the present juncture of history for both the Totalitarian States and the



Democracies to know clearly and exactly what their positions are toward each other. In both groups of states there has been considerable misunderstanding fostered by the assumption that the roots of their antipathy lie in some form of ideological difference in their respective political systems. Actually, however, these apparent differences are merely deceptive surface manifestations, beneath which both groups of states share the same aspirations.

## **THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMON FRONT**

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Since hostilities broke out between Japan and China in July, 1937, the writer has seized every opportunity to bring home to the Japanese nation the important fact that not only the Soviet Union, but Great Britain and the United States as well stand behind China, for both Britain and America are perfectly united, so far as the China affair is concerned.

Unsophisticated Japanese have a partiality for wishful thinking in international politics, though this failing is not a monopoly of the Japanese alone. A survey of the vicissitudes of relations

between Japan, Great Britain and the United States since the first World War shows that Britain and America as well as Japan have fallen an easy victim to wishful thinking. The prevailing *impasse* in their relations has been caused by a series of incidents, punctuated with short-lived understandings. The Japanese first thought that the Soviet Union was behind China in its conflict with their country. With the development of Japanese military operations in China, however, acts of obstruction, openly committed by British authorities and nationals against the Japanese forces made Japanese people cast suspicion upon Great Britain. The armed clash between Japan and China was indeed an inevitable outcome of policies, consistently pursued by Great Britain since the latter half of 1935, or to be more exact, since the visit of Sir Robert Leith-Ross to China, which resulted in Great Britain's success in carrying out China's currency reform to her own advantage. Great Britain regards Chiang Kai-shek as a great leader who has succeeded in unifying the so-called Republic. She desires to help China, as unified by Chiang Kai-shek, become a modern state in an effort to make it a bulwark against Japan's advance to the Asiatic continent. An implication to that effect was made by Neville Chamberlain, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, in an address, delivered in October, 1931. The assistance extended to Chiang Kai-shek is a manifestation of Britain's deep-rooted national policy, not sentimentalism or a local clash of interests.

This was not appreciated by unsophisticated Japanese. Even many persons who were engaged in politics were not aware of it. But now even unsophisticated Japanese have come to see that Britain's anti-Japanese policy towards China is deep-rooted and at complete discord with the policy Japan is pursuing.

The Japanese may now understand the true attitude of Great Britain, so far as her China policy is concerned, but they still fail to see that both Great Britain and the United States have a common position as well as a common objective.

The American Government in its notes to the Tokyo Government has charged Japan with violations of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Anti-War Pact. As pointed out by some Japanese, America is apt to take a legalistic view of the situation, because of her lack of understanding of Far Eastern affairs. It is contended by them that heart-to-heart talks with America will eventually result in her understanding Japan's position, though Britain would seem incorrigible. Both the Japanese people and Government have been victims of such wishful thinking, whereas Great Britain and the United States have a common position and policy in the China affair.

When hostilities started between Japan and China, the Japanese Government issued a statement—an unsolicited declaration—pledging its respect for the rights and interests of third Powers in China. The British Government responded by addressing an official note to the Japanese Government, demanding compensation for any damage suffered by Great Britain and British nationals as a result of Japanese military operations. A few days later, identical notes were sent to the Japanese Government by France and the United States.

At that time, Captain Anthony Eden, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of Commons that it was extremely fortunate in the Sino-Japanese conflict that the British Government was keeping in constant touch with the United States, by taking parallel, if not joint, action with the latter, and furthermore that Great Britain would be ready to go not only to Brussels but to Melbourne or any other place with the United States in regard to this question. In the China affair, the Anglo-American positions and views are identical. Great Britain has strenuously endeavoured since the very beginning of hostilities to involve the United States in the affair or to influence the

American Government and people on her behalf. Such an analysis may offend most Americans, but it has been the national policy of Great Britain, based on the consensus of British opinion since the first World War, to win over the United States to her side, to secure American co-operation in all her vital international issues, to involve the United States in all important international complications, and, if possible, to make the United States take the foremost place, by casting away her own traditional isolation.

The first manifestation of such a British policy appeared at the Washington Conference. As revealed in an article written a few years ago by an official who held a responsible post in the British Foreign Office, the Washington Conference represented the joint efforts of Britain and America to dispose of Far Eastern issues to their own advantage. The rewards of Anglo-American diplomacy show that co-operation and joint action between the two countries have never been so well achieved as at the Washington Conference. The conference resulted in the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which had so displeased the United States. Japan was bound by the Nine-Power Treaty. She was forced to waive all her claims to interests in Shantung, which had been recognized by the Versailles Peace Treaty. Under the supervision of Great Britain and the United States was held a subsequent conference between Japan and China at Washington, with the result that Japan was compelled to return Shantung outright to China. Furthermore Japan was tied down to an inferior naval ratio of 5:5:3. The British Foreign Office official concluded that the Anglo-American joint programme had worked splendidly.

Since the first World War, Great Britain has consistently followed her policy of friendship and co-operation with the United States, or speaking more plainly, of utilization of the United States, which she has believed to be essential for the maintenance of the *status quo*. She realized it was impossible to protect her vast territorial and economic interests in the Far East or east of the Suez single-handed even before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-5. Hence, her conclusion of an alliance with Japan.

After the termination of the Russo-Japanese War, which ended in a signal victory for Japan, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was still necessary to Great Britain for securing her Empire's defence against Germany. After the war, Japan entered into a convention with Russia. In 1907, Great Britain followed suit. Now that Russia had been defeated by Japan, Great Britain turned her attention to Germany, whom she wanted to crush by utilizing her alliance with Japan. Therein lay the *raison d'être* of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance for Britain.

This fact was frankly but innocently admitted by Sir Edward Grey, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, when the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was renewed for the third time in 1911. He told Baron Kato, Japanese Ambassador, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was not so popular as before, but it was very useful in Great Britain's defence against Germany. This point was recognized by British political circles and therefore the Foreign Secretary added that Great Britain was extremely agreeable to a renewal of the alliance, by revisiting its provisions so as to conform with the new situation before its term expired. The new situation, as referred to, concerned relations between Great Britain and the United States. And it was the intention of Great Britain to revise the provisions of the alliance so as to free her from obligations as ally in case Japan came into an armed clash with America.

Great Britain had hitherto protected her vast territorial and economic interests in India, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific, mainly by means of her alliance with Japan and to some

extent by diplomatic operations based on friendly relations with the United States. During the first World War, a Japanese naval detachment proceeded as far as the Mediterranean Sea to protect British shipping. But still Britain sacrificed the alliance with Japan for co-operation with the United States, which she regarded as essential for maintaining her national existence in view of a change in the world situation. By terminating her alliance with Japan, Britain sought to tighten her friendship with America, which was absolutely necessary even from domestic considerations. This accounts for her joint action with the United States at the Washington Conference.

Great Britain is ready today to sacrifice Japan's interests in order to secure co-operation with the United States. She is driving hard for joint action with America, which she now finds is absolutely necessary not only in the Far Eastern question, but in world issues.

The United States, however, feels somewhat shy of this vigorous and British approach. America does not have such a large interest in the Far East as Great Britain. To be sure, it is the fixed policy of the United States since her war with Spain in 1898-99, which resulted in her acquisition of the Philippines, to advance to the Far East, but her Far Eastern interests are comparatively small and to many do not warrant the assumption of unnecessary obligations across the Pacific Ocean.

American investments in China, including the property of missionaries, barely comes to \$200,000,000, one-tenth of British investments. The United States thus takes a strong legalistic position, as observed by Hachiro Arita during his tenure of office as Foreign Minister, but she possesses no large material interests in China to defend. American interest in the Far Eastern question is based on ideals with an eye to future developments. Great Britain is realistic, as she desires to maintain her large interests in the Far East. It is obvious that she is defending these interests against Japan, whom she regards as her hypothetical foe in the Far East. Japan is a formidable rival in British eyes. Even during the Manchurian incident, the British were inclined to rely on America. And the meetings of the League of Nations, Sir John Simon, Britain's chief delegate, was evasive at every crucial moment. He was anxious to find a meeting-ground with Japan, so that he took a lukewarm attitude toward the question. When economic sanctions were proposed against Japan during the League discussions, Great Britain failed to support them on the ground that the United States would not give her support. On a later occasion, Foreign Secretary Eden admitted that Great Britain was not in a position to support economic sanctions against Japan, because the two great nations interested in the Far East were not resolute enough and in a position to enforce such a measure in connection with the Manchurian incident. Through realization of her weakness in the Far East, Great Britain is eager that the United States protect her interests there.

During the Manchurian incident, Lloyd George and General Smuts made memorable addresses, advocating the vital necessity of co-operation between Great Britain and the United States. Stanley Baldwin, then Prime Minister, on one occasion went the length to declare that peace in any part of the world could be safeguarded, if the two Powers joined together. Such appeals from British statesmen failed to elicit any favourable response from the United States, who had an unpleasant remembrance of the lukewarm attitude taken by Great Britain in the early stages of the Manchurian incident, contrary to American wishes.

The situation between the two Powers, however, has presented an entirely different picture since the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict. The United States has fallen in line with Great Britain, who on her part has done everything possible in her power to involve America in the China affair in order to restrain Japan in accordance with her China policy, vigorously pursued since 1935.

President Roosevelt apparently takes more easily to British ideology and propaganda than Woodrow Wilson did, as was pointed out by a certain American writer. It took President Wilson a full two years to make the United States enter the World War, but a large section of American opinion today fears that President Roosevelt might involve the United States in war at any moment.

In short, Great Britain has achieved a fair success in forming a joint Anglo-American front against Japan. The writer has taken every possible occasion to point this out in his writings and lectures, but the general public has failed to appreciate the close co-operation between Great Britain and the United States in the China question. Even now there is a considerable animosity towards Britain in Japan, but singularly enough, no patriotic organization or association advocating vigorous diplomacy has ever adopted such a stiff attitude toward America. Some Japanese are still labouring under the notion that the United States may be alienated from Great Britain or that a definite split may occur in their joint camp.

In this connection, it must be noted that neither Great Britain nor the United States has ever made secret of what they wanted to seek in their policies toward the Far East. Secret diplomacy does not prevail in those two countries. Look at British newspapers or discussions in the Houses of Lords and Commons, and the policies and attitude of Great Britain will be clearly seen. So it is with the United States to an ever greater extent. From the very beginning of the Sino-Japanese conflict, the United States has brought continuous pressure to bear upon Japan. But no form of pressure has been enforced without notice. A warning of several months or several weeks at least has been given in each case. The American abrogation of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation was described here as a surprise measure taken without notice, but if one had taken the pains to read American newspapers, the American action would easily have been foreseen.

In terminating this treaty, the United States was actuated by the desire to ban exports of war materials to Japan with a view to rendering it impossible for her to keep up military operations in China, because the United States believed that Japan had been dependent upon her for the supply of her war materials.

Senator Key Pittman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, who represented the Administration, first introduced an anti-Japanese war materials embargo bill in the Senate, which, however, was opposed by Senator Vandenberg, a Republican leader, as a violation of the Commercial Treaty with Japan. Expert opinion in the State Department was in favour of a resolution for denunciation of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation.

These circumstances were not known to Japan, where a strong desire was voiced for the conclusion of a commercial *modus vivendi* with the United States. It was a foregone conclusion, however, that the United States would never enter into such an arrangement as would defeat the aim of the abrogation of the Commercial Treaty.

It must be noted too that America's action was also designed as a demonstration against Great Britain's alleged submission to Japan in the Tientsin issue, whereas the Tientsin arr was not an agreement at all, but a mere formula, as pointed out by Prime Minister Chamberlain in the House of Commons. The Arita-Craigie formula, which was reached in July, 1939, recognized that the large-scale military operations are being conducted in China and that the Japanese forces find it necessary to take certain measures for their own safety in the occupied areas. This formula did not recognize Japan's belligerent rights as stipulated by international law, nor did it affect Great Britain's pro-Chiang policy at all. Even after the conclusion of the Arita-Craigie formula, Great Britain continued

extending financial assistance to Chiang Kai-shek *régime*, as evidenced by the active traffic which has been going along the Burma route since the Tokyo conference of July, 1939. Nevertheless, some Japanese rejoiced over the Anglo-Japanese arrangement which they regarded as a diplomatic victory, while the American and British press denounced it as the Far Eastern Munich. The bitter tone of press comments stirred the American Government to action. The result was the abrogation of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation, which was carried out to curb Japan's action in China. A member of the British Embassy staff in Tokyo reported to have regretted that the American action had come two weeks later according to an article published in Britain. The British official apparently implied that Great Britain would not have made such a concession as the Tientsin formula if the United States had denounced her Commercial Treaty with Japan a fortnight before. Everytime Great Britain has made a concession evidently in favour of Japan, the United States has stiffened her attitude toward the Island Empire.

A few months before the outbreak of the war in Europe, the United States made a gesture toward the European Powers, to impress them that she would hold Japan in check should hostilities occur in Europe. Since war started in Europe, the United States has persistently looked upon any concession granted Japan by European Powers, including Great Britain, with disfavour, and has urged Great Britain, France and others to go ahead with their joint punitive expedition against Germany, with implied assurances that there would be no occasion for worry about Japan.

The first action which the United States took in this direction was, as mentioned before, her denunciation of the 1911 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan. The second one was her mammoth rearmament programme, adopted immediately after the spectacular success of Germany's *Blitzkrieg*, which resulted in the easy collapse of Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. When France entered into an arrangement with Japan for the closure of the French Indo-China route, Great Britain was obliged to follow suit, by closing the Burma road for three months, from July 18, in view of the sudden turn of the European situation. The United States was chagrined and at the alleged weak-kneed attitude of Great Britain and France, and taking advantage of the heavy shock dealt the world, including the United States, by Germany's brilliant *Blitzkrieg*, President Roosevelt launched his gigantic rearmament program which called for a 70 per cent. increase in American naval strength within six years in addition to the naval building plans already approved, and expansion of the army and navy air forces to 40,000 or 50,000 planes, and the organization of a standing army of 2,000,000 strong. This mammoth rearmament plan is predicated upon industrial mobilization on an unprecedentedly large scale, and thus national resources must be used primarily for rearmament and secondarily for Britain's assistance. Such a situation now looks the United States in the face, and it must be remembered that her gigantic rearmament plan also serves to bring pressure upon Japan.

Legislation has been enacted by the American Government for conserving national resources in connection with the rearmament programme by enforcing a license system for exports of aviation gasoline, high-grade heavy oil for making aviation gasoline, tetraethyl lead, iron, steel and scrap iron and steel. This legislation has been effective since August 1. It is ultimately intended to bring economic pressure on Japan in such a way as to render it impossible for her to continue military operations in China. This is a manifestation of American dissatisfaction with the Anglo-French submission to Japan in connection with the closure of the Burma and French Indo-China roads as well as of the American assumption of a self-imposed task to hold Japan in check for herself, Britain and France. If the situation continues, Japan must be prepared for a total ban on all American exports of



not only aviation gasoline and ordinary gasoline but petroleum as well. Thus the more pressure Japan brings to bear upon Great Britain, the stiffer will be the American attitude toward Japan.

The Anglo-American front against Japan is not limited to the China affair alone, but is also extended to the South Sea question. Germany's successful *Blitzkrieg* in Europe has imparted a powerful impetus to Japan's southward policy, which, in the eyes of Great Britain and the United States, has been deliberately pursued, by taking advantage of Great Britain's difficult position. Indeed, Britain's plight is very grave. The British Isles are virtually besieged by the Germans. As recently voiced by a responsible American statesman in Congress, it is apparently the consensus of opinion in the United States that there is no hope of holding the British Isles and that the British Government must ultimately flee to Canada. The United States is now concerned not so much over the rescue of Britain as over the fate of the British fleet. America believes that everything in her power must be done to prevent the British fleet from falling into German hands, because of a serious possibility of Germany's penetrating into Latin America following her successful conquest of the British Isles.

The intelligent classes of the United States have long seen the relations between the United States and Great Britain in a correct light. They have appreciated the strength of the British fleet which has enabled the United States to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. With the Atlantic dominated by the British fleet, the United States is in a position to send all her naval forces to the Pacific to bring pressure against Japan and even to menace Japan with the possibility of transoceanic operations. In other words, Great Britain, or rather the British fleet, is the sentinel or first line of American defence. In assisting Great Britain, the United States has so far been animated by kinship, mingled with ideas of justice and chivalry. Now, however, an entirely different idea stimulates the United States to action for the sake of Great Britain. Germany conquered France in less than a month, with the result that even the British Isles are now in imminent danger. Should the British fleet fall into Germany's hands, it would seal the fate of not only Great Britain, but that of the United States. Both the American Government and people have now fully realized that the United States and Great Britain are bound to stand or fall together. America's generous assistance to Great Britain, the Anglo-American union, is now a self-defence measure for the United States, not a manifestation of mere American chivalry, friendship or kindness.

On the part of Great Britain, she is fully prepared to sacrifice everything to save herself. Even if the European war ends in a victory for Great Britain, the British Government will be in the hands of the working classes, rather than men of high class or the intelligentsia as in the past. Indeed, within two hours of the start of the battle in Flanders, Great Britain turned into a totalitarian State of a leftist complexion, by requisitioning through unanimous Parliamentary action the entire resources of the country, private property and personal freedom for the prosecution of the war. Again, on the eve of France's collapse, the British Government submitted to the French proposals for an Anglo-French union. The proposals, however, were rejected by the French Government, which regarded them as reducing France to the status of a subject nation. Now, Prime Minister Winston Churchill openly declares in Parliament that he is ready to discuss proposals for an Anglo-American union. In order to escape defeat in the current war, British statesmen assert that they are prepared to reduce their Empire to the status of a dominion under the leadership of the United States.

Just as Winston Churchill has handed over leadership at home to the Labour Party, he must handover leadership of the Anglo-Saxon Empire to the United States, which, forming a scion of the

Anglo-Saxon family, as it were, has grown stronger and richer than Great Britain. For the past several centuries, Great Britain has been mistress of the world, but she is now prepared to acknowledge American leadership in the envisaged Anglo-Saxon *bloc*, one of four *blocs*, into which the world is likely to be divided.

The United States flatters herself that she must be leader of the Anglo-Saxon *bloc*. The Americans contend that totalitarianism, as represented by Germany and Italy, is a morbid phenomenon, because the true aspect of European civilization lies in liberalism and democracy, democratic government and free economy. It is further contended that the struggle now going on in Europe is not a war, but a revolution. From such an ideological viewpoint, the envisioned Anglo-American union is not limited to a joint front between Britain and America in the China question, but on the contrary is extended to the entire world situation. The United States may thus attempt to protect the vast British territorial and economic interests not only in the Straits Settlements and the Netherlands East Indies, but throughout the entire Pacific area east of the Suez, by using Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia and New Guinea as naval and air bases jointly with Great Britain.

Should the British Government flee to Canada, failing to defend the home country before the German onslaught, the British fleet would not surrender to Germany or be scuttled. Recently a number of British islands in the Atlantic were leased to the United States for ninety-nine years as naval and air bases, while the American Government has entered into joint defence arrangement with Canada. It would thus appear that the British fleet will undertake to defend the Atlantic, while the Pacific will be left to the defence of the American fleet. Should the British fleet be compelled to flee from the British Isles, however, the writer has a presentiment that its main force will move to Singapore instead of seeking refuge in Canadian ports, for in Europe there is no German navy sufficiently strong to meet the British fleet, well the Italian navy has not succeeded as yet in securing mastery of the Mediterranean, though it may harass and has often harassed the British fleet with attacks from the air as well as by special service craft.

Both Great Britain and the United States now think they feel a direct menace from Japan's southward advance. They fear that Japan may attempt to create a Greater East Asiatic sphere of common existence and prosperity, including not only French Indo-China, but the Netherlands East Indies, British Malaya, other British possessions in the South Seas and even Australia. Should Japan be successful in creating such a Greater East Asiatic sphere of common prosperity, they fear that Japan would set up an imperialistic *bloc*, far greater than any imperialistic one ever established, for that part of the world produces all the resources necessary for modern Powers, including oil, tin, rubber, iron and bauxite.

One of the writer's friends calls that part of the globe the "Mediterranean of Asia." Europe has an old saying that any country which has obtained mastery of the Mediterranean will become mistress of Europe. The "Mediterranean of Asia" lies at the confluence of the Pacific and the Indian Oceans, surrounded by continents and groups of islands, which are rich in natural resources. The writer's friend believes that any Power which has dominated the "Mediterranean of Asia" will become mistress not only of Asia but of the whole world. The writer himself also subscribes to his view. No wonder that the Japanese people are so much interested in their southward advance, which both Great Britain and the United States are making frantic efforts to thwart. It should be remembered, too, that, with the exception of Singapore, there is no naval port in the British Empire, excluding the British Isles, large enough to accommodate the largest fleet in the world. This consideration alone

will be a strong inducement for the British fleet to concentrate at Singapore rather than flee to Canada.

It is because of these world-wide considerations that Japan views with something more than casual interest the Anglo-American union now in process of formation. Indeed, time and circumstances have brought Japan to a great turning point in her history.

### **THE THREE POWER PACT**

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The tripartite treaty concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy on September 27 has been received with various adverse criticism, especially in those countries which have found it annoying or at least inconvenient from their own viewpoints. In some cases, tension and excitement have been caused, all of which is utterly unwarranted, however, as may be seen upon close examination of the true character of the treaty.

In the first place, as has been indicated clearly by the Imperial Rescript and the Foreign Minister's statement thereon, the Japanese-German-Italian pact is not directed against any other particular Power, nor is it to be construed in any way as having been concluded for the purpose of waging war against any one particular Power. Another noteworthy thing is that none of the three signatories entered into this treaty by choice. It is the natural development of historical processes imposed upon them. In other words, it is merely a Concrete expression which has been given to a historical inevitability. We feel, therefore, secure in the belief that no country rightly can raise any

objections thereto.

Then what has brought about this agreement? It is the outcome of mutual ideological antagonism between those Powers which seeks to maintain the old political, economic and other structures and those which are dissatisfied with the injustice of the old order and are determined to bring about a fundamental reform in the existing international and national structures. Recent intensification of this antagonism has been so great that it finally lead to the conclusion of the treaty in question as nothing but a natural outcome. The Powers upholding the old order virtually formed a league of their own, and, in order to preserve what they have, they kept opposing the rightful claims of the nations hitherto treated unfairly in international affairs. Consistent efforts were made to bring political and economic pressure to bear upon the latter countries. Finding their positions intolerable under the series of pressures, the reformist Powers felt that the only way of survival and future growth for them was in a firm combination on the basis of their ideological similarities. What actually has developed into the three Power pact, therefore, is the result of forced circumstances and was a historical necessity.

Such being the real background of the treaty, it would be well for those who cling to the old structure and who are inclined to cast all sorts of aspersions and criticism on the treaty to recall that its very causes sprang from their own attitudes and policies. The principle of cause and effect by no means is confined to physics alone. After all the tripartite treaty did not emerge out of nothing.

As has been mentioned, the special feature of the treaty is its ideological aspect. Since history began, hundreds of treaties have been made and re-made between nations and peoples, but not one has been marked so distinctly by ideological factors as the present treaty. Heretofore, alliances and treaties have been based chiefly on the interests of the participants. When those interests faded the agreements were conveniently forgotten or openly discarded. Present treaty, of course, embodies the interests of the three signatories, but its fundamental spirit lies in the unity of thought and ideology. Therefore, it may be applied in complete disregard of the material interests of the participating parties as the occasion demands. Its overwhelming power and influence lie in the very fact that it was not signed for temporary gains or effects, but was conceived rather with a definite conception of human life and of the world and how men and nations should live therein. This may be said to be the distinctive characteristic of the Japanese-German-Italian pact. It is a concrete expression of the irrepressible demands inherent in the peoples of the three countries. Any Attempt to check or to suppress these demands from a viewpoint of life and the world based on the old concept of national and international structures clearly is doomed to failure, for it would be opposed by the irresistible forces of evolutionary human progress.

If the Japanese-German-Italian combination harboured any intention to bring the entire world under its control after the fashion of the Anglo-American Powers, which established and now are trying to maintain financial hegemony over the world, the mutual antagonism between the two groups inevitably would become stronger, regardless of the peaceful attitude of the former. That would mean merely replacing one kind of world hegemony for another. Happily, however, the objective of the tripartite pact, with its ideological origin, is not so aggressive as to attempt to bring the world within its grasp. It opposes emulating the Faults of the old order. The Pact has as its chief objective the establishment of the most natural geographic, economic and racial spheres and the liberation of the peoples of these respective regions from the shackles of controlling influences which heretofore have prayed on them from the outside. One cannot but be struck by the similarity between the present treaty

and the position of the United States, which is doing its utmost to create solidarity among the nations of the American continents on the basis of Pan-Americanism and the Monroe Doctrine, although there is an admitted difference in the fundamental ideas. no one openly attacks the Monroe Doctrine as such, and it follows logically that there is no reason why the aims of the tripartite agreement should be made the butt of adverse criticism. As the pact envisions the establishment of a sphere of common prosperity in Greater East Asia, as well as the establishment of a new order in Europe under Germany and Italy, it would be well for its critics to postpone their unwarranted attacks until after they have exhausted their verbal ammunition against the Monroe Doctrine, lest their arguments sound hollow with inconsistency.

It is regrettable that the world at present is wholly lacking in stability. War is the general order of things and peace is merely an ideal. Even in time of peace, there is hardly any sense of security among mankind and most nations prepare feverishly for the next war. Such conditions are suicidal for humanity. It would be good and well if peace and well-being could be secured for mankind. This can never be, however, until the old order of politics, entrenched as it is in financial control of the world and directed solely toward the continuation of such control, has been eradicated, because it constitutes the fundamental cause of world unrest. To do away with this old structure and restore world peace on a new and lasting foundation is the ultimate purpose of the three Power pact.

Let us now consider the situation in Greater East Asia, whose peoples comprise more than half of the total world population. The Western plutocracies have forced their influence upon them and have caused them to suffer through the exercise of financial control. Under such conditions there never can be stability in East Asia. Without stability in East Asia, there can be no security for Asia at large and, consequently, the world in general cannot become tranquil. Even if there were some kind of stability, in all probability it would be more apparent than real. Properly speaking, territorial sovereignty should belong to the people who have inhabited the land for a long time. Seeds of trouble are sown when this sovereignty is usurped by outsiders and even by absentees, as has been done on many occasions. Unless these causes of trouble are removed, the chaotic condition of the world can never be remedied. With such conditions prevailing, any apparent calm may be just the forerunner of a future storm.

The Greater East Asia sphere of common prosperity, whose establishment we earnestly espouse, means nothing more than the restoration of the lands, peoples and sovereignties inherent to East Asia to their original and therefore natural status. Now that the peoples of East Asia have awakened to the facts, this demand must be made and, in fact, already has been made. As this demand is inherent to the peoples of East Asia, it must and will be fulfilled, despite all obstacles and pressure that may be brought against it. Unfortunately, until recently its fulfilment has been prevented by various political, economic and diplomatic factors. But with the world turning toward and epochal change, the long pent-up demand has taken a practical turn. It is the rôle of the Japanese-German-Italian Treaty to mould and give definite shape to the aspirations of the peoples of East Asia for their satisfaction.

A perusal of history shows that in the beginning nations and peoples enjoyed mutual amity and trust, but after passing through various stages of development they entered upon an era of individualism, which is anathema to human harmony. This individualism has now come to the end of its rope. Regarded in its extreme form, individualism aims at the satisfaction of self to the sacrifice of others-in other words, the complete isolation of self from other members of society. In such a society

no one is subject to any control. Individualism therefore contains in itself a suicidal element and, for this very reason, has come to its present *impasse*. It now appears that a new era is about to dawn on the history of mankind and that nations are to enter a period in which they once again may enjoy mutual amity and concord. With liberalism and democracy, which are akin to individualism, thrown into oblivion in the turmoil of great world changes, there is every indication of the approach of an era of international amity in which the instinctive aspirations of various nations will find a field for their fullest satisfaction. The Reformation is self-explanatory, because it is essentially a phenomenon of instinctive activity. It is our belief that the world now is about to enter a phase of such instinctive activity and that such a view is the proper interpretation of history as it is being unfolded today. This is the reason why we consider the three Power pact to be truly a literal expression of historical inevitability.

## **GENESIS OF THE PACIFIC WAR**

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**Imperial Rescript**



We, by grace of heaven, Emperor of Japan, seated on the Throne of a line unbroken for ages eternal, enjoin upon ye, Our loyal and brave subjects:

We hereby declare war on the United States of America and the British Empire. The men and officers of Our army and navy shall do their utmost in prosecuting the war, Our public servants of various departments shall perform faithfully and diligently their appointed tasks, and all other subjects of Ours shall pursue their respective duties; the entire nation with a united will shall mobilize their total strength so that nothing will miscarry in the attainment of Our war aims.

To insure the stability of East Asia and to contribute to world peace is the far-sighted policy which was formulated by Our Great Illustrious Imperial Grandsire and Our Great Imperial Sire succeeding Him, and which We lay constantly to heart. To cultivate friendship among nations and to enjoy prosperity in common with all nations has always been the guiding principle of Our Empire's foreign policy. It has been truly unavoidable and far from Our wishes that Our Empire has now been brought to cross swords with America and Britain. More than four years have passed since China, failing to comprehend the true intentions of Our Empire, and recklessly courting trouble, disturbed the peace of East Asia and compelled Our Empire to take up arms. Although there has been re-established the National Government of China, with which Japan has effected neighbourly intercourse and co-operation, the régime which has survived at Chungking, relying upon American and British protection, still continues its fratricidal opposition. Eager for the realization of their inordinate ambition to dominate the Orient, both America and Britain, giving support to the Chungking régime, have aggravated the disturbances in East Asia. Moreover, these two Powers, inducing other countries to follow suit, increased military preparations on all sides of Our Empire to challenge us. They have obstructed by every means our peaceful commerce, and finally resorted to a direct severance of economic relations, menacing gravely the existence of Our Empire. Patiently have We waited and long have We endured, in the hope that Our Government might retrieve the situation in peace. But our adversaries, showing not the least spirit of conciliation, have unduly delayed a settlement; and in the meantime, they have intensified the economic and political pressure to compel thereby Our Empire to submission. This trend of affairs would, if left unchecked, not only nullify Our Empire's efforts of many years for the sake of the stabilization of East Asia, but also endanger the very existence of Our nation. The situation being such as it is, Our Empire for its existence and self-defence has no other recourse but to appeal to arms and to crush every obstacle in its path.

The hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors guarding Us from above, We rely upon the loyalty and courage of Our subjects in Our confident expectation that the task bequeathed by Our Forefathers will be carried forward, and that the source of evil will be speedily eradicated and an enduring peace immutably established in East Asia, preserving thereby the glory of Our Empire.

The 8th day of the 12th month of the 16th year of Syowa.

*Imperial Sign Manual.*

*Imperial Seal.*

On December 23, 1783, the very year in which the independence of the United States of America was officially recognized by the Government of the mother country, the Daniel Parker and Company of New York, proprietors of the ship *Empress of China*, wrote a letter to the Continental Congress informing it that the vessel was due to sail for Canton in the near future, and asking it, at the same time, to patronize this endeavor in order to open commerce with a distant country like China by granting to the commander, Captain John Green, such letters-patents as were needed for the protection of his ship. The *Empress of China* left New York on February 22, 1784, and sailed directly to Canton with Samuel Shaw as supercargo, bearing the United States flag. She stopped at the Cape Verde Islands for water and repairs, rounded the Cape of Good Hope, and then steered a straight course for the Straits of Sunda, where she met two French warships and in company with them proceeded to China, anchoring at Whampao on August 28, 1784, spending six months and six days in the voyage. And when this pioneer vessel returned from Canton, Secretary of State John Jay informed Samuel Shaw on June 23, 1785, that "Congress feels a peculiar satisfaction in the successful issue of this first effort of the citizens of America to establish a direct trade with China, which does so much honour to its undertakers and conductors." Soon afterward, Samuel Shaw was appointed the first American Consul at Canton. Thus began the era of American-Chinese commerce, which, however, even after a period of about a century and a half failed to yield appreciable benefits to the United States, inasmuch as its annual average of Oriental trade between 1931 and 1935 showed that only fourteen per cent. of its commerce was with Hongkong and China, while forty-three per cent. was with Japan.

In February, 1830, the Rev. David Abeel and the Rev. Elijah C. Bridgman, the first two American missionaries to China, arrived at Canton. They were sent out with the assistance of D.W.C. Olyphant, an American merchant conducting trade in China. The Rev. Abeel returned to the United States at the end of the same year. His brief stay in the Far East, however, made him interested in China, with the result that he became a staunch advocate of mission work in Cathay. The Rev. Bridgman, on the other hand, settled down in Canton and became the first American to learn the Chinese language. In May, 1832, he started the publication of the famous periodical *The Chinese Repository* and continued it for a long number of years under the patronage of Olyphant who guaranteed the expenses, besides donating a building. In 1833, the Rev. Bridgman was joined by Samuel Wells Williams, who was to prove one of the great scholars of the missionary body and was later to give his Government years of service on its diplomatic staff. The year 1834 saw the arrival of the first medical missionary to China in the person of the Rev. Peter Parker, who was trained in medicine as well as in theology. He opened an ophthalmic hospital in Canton the year after his arrival. He and Williams were the members of the Morrison expedition to Japan in 1837. Along with the Rev. Bridgman and the Rev. Williams, he acted as one of the interpreters for Caleb Cushing in 1844. The following year he was appointed Chinese secretary and interpreter to the newly created American legation, finally being appointed Commissioner in September, 1855, the only American Commissioner or Minister ever appointed to China who could speak, read or write the Chinese language.

From the days of Dr. Robert Morrison down to 1851 no less than one hundred and fifty Protestant missionaries had arrived in China. Of this number, fifteen came from the European continent, forty-seven from Britain and eighty-eight from the United States. Such a large advent of American missionaries aroused a sentimental interest in China facilitating the formation of a public

opinion conducive to America in the country. Its immediate effect on the American policy was the demand for a further opening up of the "Celestial Empire." Meanwhile, the Rev. Parker, as American Commissioner, embarked on a scheme of bringing Formosa within the sphere of direct influence of the United States. It would be but fair to say that quite a number of missionaries were, for the most part, in sympathy with the Taiping Rebellion, and that to them the authority of the Manchu Dynasty seemed much less important than the opening of doors to evangelization. The Americans made much of the fact that in the United States a marked separation existed between Church and State, and yet in China missionaries Bridgman, Parker and Williams negotiated the Treaty of Wanghsia, while the Rev. Parker entering the diplomatic service rose to the highest rank. In fact, missionaries Bridgman, Parker and Williams transacted the greater part of America's official business with the representatives of the Chinese Government for nearly forty years. Not only the prime-mover of the Taiping Rebellion accepted a garbled version of Christianity from the teachings of the missionaries, but in 1860 the Rev. Issachar I. Roberts, an American missionary and the chief rebel's teacher, actually proceeded to Nanking and, donning the yellow robe and a crown, became the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the insurgent camp.

## II

On November 24, 1852, Commodore Perry, who had been commissioned by President Fillmore to open the doors of Japan, sailed from Norfolk, Virginia, in the steam frigate *Mississippi*. His course lay *via* Madeira, St. Helena, Capetown, Mauritius, Point de Galle, Singapore, Macao, Hongkong, and then to Shanghai. In Shanghai his squadron of six vessels was assembled. He then visited the Loochoo and Bonin Islands. Thereafter, on July 8, 1853, with four of his warships, he entered the Bay of Yédo and anchored off Uraga. The instructions given to Commodore Perry by Acting Secretary of State C.M. Conrad contained the following very significant paragraph:

The recent events—the navigation of the ocean by steam, the acquisition and rapid settlement by this country of a vast territory on the Pacific, the discovery of gold in that region, the rapid communication established across the Isthmus of Panama which separates the two oceans—have practically brought the countries of the East in closer proximity to our own; although the consequences of these events have scarcely begun to be felt, the intercourse between them has already greatly increased and no limits can be assigned to its future extension.

At the time when the instructions were issued it was expected that Commodore Perry's squadron would consist of five steamers and six or more sailing vessels—by far the largest American fleet that had ever appeared in Eastern waters. This formidable fleet was to be used as a "persuader," a term which was enunciated by President Fillmore at a subsequent date. It was assumed that "arguments or persuasion addressed to this people (Japanese), unless they are seconded by some imposing manifestations of power, will be utterly unavailing." It is obvious that such instructions admitted of a very wide latitude in interpretation, and that Commodore Perry was "invested with large discretionary powers." Surely in pursuance of the of the "persuader" project, on February 13, 1854, Commodore Perry was "invested with large discretionary powers." Surely in pursuance of the "persuader project, on February 13, 1854, Commodore Perry's fleet, now enlarged to nine ships,

returned to the Bay of Yédo. The Japanese Government had by then decided to meet the returning expedition with conciliation, and as a consequence, the first treaty with the United States of America was signed on March 31, 1854. Although by this treaty Commodore Perry gained very little, he nevertheless felt that he was laying the foundation of a Pacific empire for the United States. He appears to have been the first American in official position to view not merely the commercial, but also the political problems of Asia and the Pacific as one ordered whole. He looked into the future and considered American interests in the Far East from the standpoint of a naval strategist. In one of his dispatches he went so far as to speak of the necessity of extending the "territorial jurisdiction" of the United States beyond the limits of the Western Hemisphere. "I assume," he wrote, "the responsibility of urging the expediency of establishing a foothold in this quarter of the globe (in the Pacific), as a measure of positive necessity to the sustainment of our maritime rights in the East." He designated three points where he wished to see a beginning made. They were the Bonin, Loochoo and Formosa Islands. He also intimated that the United States ought to extend its "national friendship and protection" to Siam, Cambodia, Cochin China, parts of Borneo and Sumatra, and many of the islands of the Eastern archipelago. No American before his time, and a few after him, every had such an extensive ambition.

On the outward voyage from the United States, Commodore Perry evolved a plan, which he laid before the Secretary of the Navy in great detail. He suggested the occupation of the Loochoo Islands "for the accommodation of our ships of war and for the safe resort of merchant vessels of whatever nations." This, he thought, "would be a measure not only justified by the strictest rules of moral law, but what is also to be considered by the laws of stern necessity." On his first visit to Japan, he made the Loochoo Islands the rendezvous for his squadron and successfully negotiated for a coal depot at Naha which had the best harbour. Just before his second visit to Japan, he wrote to the Secretary of the Navy (January 25, 1854) reaffirming his intention of placing the Loochoo Islands under the American flag. In addition, his plan embraced the Bonin Islands, which lay in the direct path of navigation between Honolulu and Shanghai. Before arriving in Japan, he personally visited these islands and really purchased for the Navy Department a "suitable spot for the erection of offices, wharves, coal-sheds, etc.," at Port Lloyd on Peel Island. He defended this action, as well as his other hostile acts to Japan on the ground that it was necessary "to work on the fears of the rulers of Japan."

The conciliatory spirit in which the Japanese Government met Commodore Perry on his second visit robbed him of most of the reasons for his earlier declared policy. When Japan in 1862 proposed to assert a claim to the Bonin Islands, which ante-dated by centuries the claims of both Great Britain and the United States, both Powers relinquished all pretensions to the islands. Commodore Perry concluded a "compact" with the King of Loochoo (July 11, 1854) a few months after signing the first American treaty with Japan, and the document was duly ratified by the Senate a few days after the ratification of the Japanese-American Treaty. This compact treated Loochoo as entirely independent of both Japan and China. When in 1872 Japan reasserted its claim to the islands, the United States merely stipulated that Japan should become directly responsible to the United States for the maintenance of such rights for Americans as the islands had conceded by treaty to the United States. Earlier, as the American squadron was being dispersed after its second visit to Japan, Commodore Perry ordered one vessel each to proceed to Manila and Formosa. The object in visiting the latter place was to investigate the reported discovery of coal mines. And, indeed, coal of good quality and in abundance was discovered. No active steps were taken at that time, but upon

Commodore Perry's return to the United States, he recommended to his Government that "the United States alone should take the initiative in this magnificent island." His ambition in respect of Formosa was succeeded by the Rev. Parker, missionary, eye-doctor and diplomat.

### III

Had the Opium War between China and Great Britain (1839-42) been settled by a purely commercial treaty, the Far Eastern question might have remained for the time being a commercial one. However, the British occupation of Hongkong impelled other foreign nations from that time onward to deal with the Far Eastern question as a political one. Caleb Cushing negotiated the Treaty of Wanghsia in 1844 with one eye on the political establishment of Great Britain at Hongkong. Commodore Perry in 1853-54 mapped out a still-born Far Eastern political programme. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the struggle of the Americans to secure Shanghai as an international rather than a British port at the very time of Commodore Perry's visit to the Far East, was more political than commercial. The relations of Great Britain, France, Russia and the United States in the negotiations of the treaties of Tientsin in 1858 were very far from being purely commercial. The "co-operative policy" and the entire course of the first ten years of America's diplomatic relations with Japan were actuated by political considerations. The first American efforts to open Korea were of the same character as will be seen from the fact that William H. Seward, the greatest American Secretary of State, so far as the Far Eastern matters are concerned, since Daniel Webster, proposed a joint armed expedition in partnership with France, in November, 1866, into Korea.

It is transparent that the Americans clearly foresaw that some day their trans-Pacific commerce would be very great. This expectation reacted on Washington's policy in the Far East in two ways. In the first place, it made the Americans increasingly alert to see that no other Power should take any step which would later become a handicap to American interest; this is the so-called open door policy. But it did more. It raised questions as to how this expected great commerce with the Far East might in future years receive an adequate protection. Consequently, it sent Americans into the Pacific to look for harbours, to Japan for open ports, and to Formosa for coal mines which were deemed necessities for the success of steam navigation. America's Far Eastern policy was an important subject of national politics in the decade which preceded the American Civil War, and again it assumed an absorbing interest with the occupation of the Philippine Islands in 1898. The American people were moving westward, and so that part of the world, which viewed from London and Paris was called the Far East, had become to them not the East at all but the Farthest West—the goal of the great American national movement. A subjoined catalogue of the mere places and dates along the Pacific seaboard would suffice to make vivid the association of American domestic problems and American foreign policy with the Pacific and the Far East even at such an early period extending from the Opium War to 1867:

1843: Lord George Paulet seizes the Hawaiian Islands and the United States refuses to join Great Britain and France in promise never to take possession of these islands.

1844: The Treaty of Wanghsia between the United States and China is signed and the Witman colonization expedition to Oregon is undertaken.

1845: The Freemont exploring expedition to California takes place, and Texas is annexed.

1846: "Fifty-four-forty-or-fight" dispute with Great Britain terminates in the settlement of the Oregon question by a division of territory at forty-ninth parallel. America occupies Monterey, Mexican capital of California. The American-Mexican war breaks out. The

- treaty with New Granada (Columbia) granting to the United States the right of communication by any from across the Isthmus of Panama, in return for which the United States guarantees the neutrality of the route and establishes a protectrate [sic] over it in the interest of New Granada, is concluded.
- 1847: Gold is discovered in California.
  - 1848: The treaty of peace with Mexico, making Rio Grande the southern boundary of the United States, is signed. The authorization of surveys for a trans-continental railroad and also for a trans-isthmian canal is approved. The beginning of an agitation for steam navigation in the Pacific is made.
  - 1849: The first American treaty with the Hawaiïan Islands, which follows immediately a French intervention at Honolulu, takes place.
  - 1850: A contract between the Panama Railroad Company and the Columbia Government is signed, and a very serious dispute occurs with Great Britain over the island of Manzanillo. They Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is installed.
  - 1851: A decision is reached to open the doors of Japan.
  - 1853: Gadsen purchase becomes an accomplished fact.



1854: The first treaty between Japan and the United States is signed. An attempt is made to annex the Hawaiian Islands.

1856: The Rivas-Walker Government in Nicaragua is temporarily recognized.

1867: Alaska is purchased. The first proposal is made to open Korea. William Seward favours under certain contingencies the annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.

## IV

On March 30, 1867, the United States purchased Alaska from Russia. While the motives which inspire the purchase were carefully concealed at the time of negotiations, it is difficult to resist the conclusion that Secretary of State Seward saw in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands a way of “extending a friendly hand to Asia.” Indeed, his son, F. W. Seward, stated definitely that the motive back of the purchase of Alaska was the desire for acquiring “advanced naval outposts” in the northern Pacific such as had been lacking in the West Indies during the recent Civil War. The United States took possession of the Midway Islands in August, 1867. On September 12, 1867, Secretary of State Seward wrote to the American representative at Honolulu that “a lawful and peaceful annexation of the islands to the United States with consent of the people of the Sandwich Islands is deemed desirable by this Government.” He also gave approval and support to the proposal to connect America with Asia by means of a telegraph line through Alaska across the Aleutian Islands and down the coasts of Asia to the mouth of the Amur River.

On February 17, 1872, Commander Meade of the U.S.S. *Narragansett* entered into an agreement with Maunda, great chief of the Bay of Pago Pago in the island of Tutuila, whereby the latter granted to the American Government the exclusive privilege of establishing in that harbour a naval station for the use of its vessels. On May 22, 1872, President Grant communicated this agreement to the Senate for its favourable consideration. The Senate, however, took no action on it. Then on January 16, 1878, a treaty between the United States and Samoa was concluded at Washington, by which the United States was granted “the privilege of entering and using the port of Pago Pago and establishing therein and on the shores thereof station for coal and other naval suppliers.” By the Berlin Conference of 1889, the Samoan Islands were placed under the joint protection of Germany, Great Britain and the United States. But it soon became evident that the tripartite protectorate system in the islands was impracticable. Germany proposed a partition of the islands among the Powers. Great Britain, having the assurance from Germany of territorial compensation in other directions, acquiesced in the proposition. As the trade of the United States with Samoa was very inconsiderable and as its chief material interest in the islands was the use of the harbour of Pago Pago as a naval station, an agreement was concluded on December 2, 1899, among the three Powers, giving to the United States the island of Tutuila and its outlying islets and to Germany all the other islands.

By the treaty of December 6, 1884, the United States of America was granted by the Hawaiian Government the exclusive use of Pearl Harbour as a naval base with rights to improve and fortify it. On January 17, 1893, when a revolution broke out in Hawaii and the monarchy was overthrown, a provisional administration was established with Judge S.B. Dole, born of American parentage, as its head. President Harrison at once recognized the provisional set-up and signed a treaty on February 14, 1893, providing for the incorporation of the Hawaiian Islands into the territory of the United States. But no action was taken on the treaty by the Senate. On June 16, 1897, a new treaty, similar to one made in 1893, was signed and sent to the Senate for its consideration and action. While the treaty

was still pending in the Senate, the United States declared war against Spain on April 19, 1898, and after Admiral Dewey's victory in Manila Bay it was recognized that the occupation of the Hawaiian Islands had become a military necessity. There being some doubt as to acquiring the necessary two-thirds vote in the Senate for the approval of the treaty of annexation, it was decided to follow the precedent established by the annexation of Texas and bring about the required result by means of a joint resolution of the two Houses. The terms of the treaty were thereupon embodied in such a resolution and, after a brief discussion in each chamber, it was passed by more than two-thirds vote in both Houses. It became a law on July 7, 1898, and the sovereignty of the Republic of Hawaii was transferred to the United State on August 12, 1898.

The year 1898 signposted a dramatic departure from the hitherto "cloistered" policy of America. With the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, the United States entered into the arena of world politics, naval rivalry and expansionism. In fact, it became as Asiatic Power. The idea of taking the Philippine Islands was first conceived by Theodore Roosevelt. And really it was he who took the initial action that led to its annexation. Until 1898, few Americans had ever heard of the Philippine Islands. Admiral Dewey's dramatic victory over the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay (May 1, 1898) apparently converted the Americans overnight to the need of occupying these islands. Scarcely had the smoke of the battle cleared than the business clique, so far hostile toward the war, began to take an interest in the markets of the Far East and petitioned the President to retain the Philippines. Memorials poured into the State Department from business groups and chambers of commerce all over the country, stressing the value of the archipelago to the United States, especially as the key to the markets of Eastern Asia. The mission work, too, received a new inspiration. Almost without exception, the publications of mission houses of all denominations in the Far East came out strongly in favour of the Philippine annexation. The author of *God's Hand in Recent American History* wrote that "we have been morally compelled to become an Asiatic Power. Every American missionary in Asia, from whom I have heard in recent months, has thanked God that the American flag has entered the Far East."

President McKinley hesitated for some time to follow the national clamour, but at last decided to annex the Philippines. Senator Caffery queried the economic value of a Far Eastern outpost. Senators Chilton, Spooner and Hoar warned that the United States might be drawn into Far Eastern political entanglements by the annexation of the Philippines. But their appeals failed to sway the decision of Washington. "The Philippines are not contiguous?" challenged Beveridge. "Our navy will make them contiguous," he declared. And a motion to promise the Filipinos ultimate independence was defeated by the casting vote of the Vice-President. When the final count was taken on February 6, 1899, ratification was secured by the narrow margin of one vote above the required two-third majority. By the treaty of peace signed on December 10, 1898, the Philippine Islands, together with the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrones, became an American territory. This policy of expansionism triumphed, because of a politically strong group of expansionists led by Theodore Roosevelt, Captain Mahan, Henry Cabot Lodge and Albert J. Beveridge, had become ambitious to follow the example of Great Britain in chiselling out a colonial empire. As fate would have it, within eight years' time Theodore Roosevelt, foremost of the annexationists, was wishing he could be rid of the Philippine Islands. "They are," he wrote to his Secretary of War in August, 1907, "all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous. I think that to have some pretty clear avowal of our intention not to permanently keep them and to give them independence would remove a temptation

from Japan's way and would render our task easier." Clearly, the annexation of the Philippine Islands committed the United States to keep an anxious watch over the political developments in the Far East.

## V

On February 27, 1900, Assistant Secretary of State Hill informed Mr. Page that "the United States claims jurisdiction over the atoll, known as Wake Island, the possession of which was taken by the U.S.S. *Bennington* on January 17, 1899." Before this happened, the Brooks or Midway Islands, situated about 1,100 miles west of Honolulu and within the limits assigned by the map to the Hawaiian group, were formally occupied by Captain William Reynolds of the U.S.S. *Lackawanna* on August 28, 1867. On April 18, 1900, Acting Secretary of State Hill wrote to Messrs. Perry, Mason & Co. to the effect that besides the Philippines, Hawaii, the Alaskan and Pacific coast islands, Guam, Tutuila and other Samoan Islands east of long. 171° W. of Greenwich and the various Guano Islands, the United States "claims jurisdiction over the Brooks or Midway Islands lying 1,100 miles west of Honolulu and Wake Island." On December 13, 1900, the United States Minister in Tokyo sent a dispatch to the home Government that he had addressed a note to the Japanese Government saying that the Midway Islands "cannot be regarded by this Government as affording any basis for a claim to the islands by the Japanese Government." Thus the American advance into the Pacific was pursued systematically and swiftly, and an island bridge was created across the Pacific Ocean to the mainland of Asia.

With the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, the United States, emulating Great Britain, turned Manila into a *bona fide* Hongkong, with a view to challenging its competitors in China by a display of naval power. Consequently, public opinion in the United States began to take for the first time an interest in naval problems. Admiral Alfred T. Mahan in his books preached the necessity of a strong American navy, so that America might not be at a disadvantage in international politics, which mainly implied Chinese politics. "He who understands China," said John Hay in 1890, "holds the key to international politics for the next five hundred years." From the American standpoint, it is obvious that the annexation of the Philippines and Hawaii was merely a means to penetrate into China. Every strategical position that America won in the Pacific served only one end: the protection of China's integrity until America became strong enough to control it single-handedly. America, it is true, did not share in a division of spheres of influence in China, because it considered the whole of China as its own special zone of influence and was absolutely convinced that, if there was "fair play," the entire Chinese market would be open to American industry. This interpretation of the American doctrine of open door in China was announced in the Hay notes of September 6, 1899, and in State Secretary John Hay's circular of July 3, 1900, concerning the integrity of China. Like the Monroe Doctrine, the Hay doctrine is a manifesto of "counter-colonization" directed against the colonial ambitions of the great Powers of Europe and, like the former, the latter conceals an offensive spirit under a defensive façade. On November 19, 1900, John Hay executed the surprising *volte face* in telegraphing the subjoined instructions to Mr. Conger, American Minister in Peking:

Strictly confidential. Secretary of the Navy earnestly asks, in view of the importance of a naval station on the Chinese coast in the event of future war, that you take first favourable opportunity to obtain for the United States free and exclusive use of Samsa Bay in the Province of Fukien as a naval port with the additional pledge that a circular zone twenty nautical miles in radius with its centre at the east point of Crag Island shall not in future be alienated to, controlled or use by any other Power, nor fortifications be erected therein by the Chinese Government.

In this manner, the United States proposed to obtain a naval base on the China coast similar to those secured by the European Powers in 1898. Japan's interests in Fukien, however, were tardily acknowledged by America, as evidenced from the fact that on December 7, 1900, it sent the following telegram to Mr. Buck, American Minister in Tokyo: "The Navy greatly desires a coaling station at Samsa inlet north of Foochow. Ascertain informally and discreetly whether the Japanese Government would see any objection to our negotiating for this with China." The Japanese reply of refusal, handed to John Hay on December 11, 1900, concludes with the following words:

The Japanese Government harbours no territorial designs upon China; its policy is directed to the maintenance of her territorial integrity; and it has noted with entire satisfaction the declaration made on several occasions by the Secretary of State that the United States is also anxious to preserve the territorial integrity of that Empire. That desired end may be best attained by those Powers which entertain similar views refraining from accepting any advantages which might give other Powers a pretext for territorial demands. For these reasons, the Japanese Government confidently hopes that the United States Government will definitely abandon its above-mentioned project.

The erstwhile champion of Chinese integrity had actually forsaken that policy and tried to enter the concession scramble.

Twice more, in December, 1901, and in May, 1902, Secretary of the Navy urged this project on John Hay, but it was not realized owing to Japanese objections. During this last World War, while the other great Powers were absorbed in the turmoil, the Bethlehem Steel Company tried to obtain a contract from the Chinese Government to improve the harbour of Samsa Bay as an American naval station. Again the Japanese Government protested against it and Secretary of State Bryan on March 23, 1915, pledged to Mr. Chinda, Japanese Ambassador in Washington, that "the United States Government has no desire to secure a coaling station on the border of Fukien, especially not with a knowledge of Japan's feeling on the subject—a feeling not so unnatural when one remembers that Fukien is opposite to Formosa.

The Anglo-American rivalry in the Pacific manifested itself in violent disputes on the accesses to the Pacific, that is, the Panama Canal. In accord with the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, Britain reserved the right to make the future Panama Canal a joint undertaking of the two nations to be carried through on a parity basis as far as defence and control were concerned. However, half a century later Britain was compelled to surrender to the Americans not only the commercial but also the military control of the Panama Canal by virtue of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty of 1901. The period covering the conclusion of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty engendered America's ambition to carve an Oriental colonial empire of its own as revealed in its acquisition of the Philippines and the Hawaiian Islands.

On November 3, 1903, the American agent of the Panama Railroad Company organized a revolution in Panama and three days after (November 6) the *de facto* Government of Panama was recognized by the United States. President Theodore Roosevelt's object in such a hasty recognition of the new régime was to make the Panama route an accomplished fact before Congress should meet. On November 18, 1903, a treaty was signed with the *de facto* Government of Panama, under which the United States was granted in perpetuity a zone of land ten miles wide for the construction of a canal. The construction of the canal was at once undertaken and carried through successfully by General Goethals. It was opened to commerce and navigation on August 15, 1914.

When the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) began, President Theodore Roosevelt took an attitude of neutrality benevolent toward Japan, his object being to force Czarist Russia out of Manchuria, the much-coveted zone of America's commercial penetration. While Czarist Russia fought the war on French loans, Japan fought on British and American loans. But as Japan began to defeat the Romanoff forces, the President became apprehensive of a complete Russian collapse, and in consequence, his stratagem underwent two progressive changes: from the mere elimination of Russia from Manchuria, he turned to the re-establishment of a balance of power between Russia and Japan, and from that of co-operation with Japan, he turned to the prevention of further territorial expansion of Japan. His means toward both these ends was to persuade Britain, France and Germany to join the United States not only in bringing the war to a close, but also, as it finally transpired, in effecting a peace settlement favourable to Russia.

The first reaction in the United States to the Japanese military successes in the Russo-Japanese War was the discriminatory treatment of Japanese school children in San Francisco. On October 11, 1906, the Board of Education in San Francisco passed a resolution requiring all Japanese children to be segregated in an Oriental public school. A variety of lame charges were made against the Japanese children to justify the need of such a highly discriminatory measure. All accusations were found, on close investigation, to have been grossly and no doubt deliberately exaggerated. There were only ninety-three Japanese pupils in all of San Francisco's public schools when the segregation order was issued. And twenty-five of them were American citizens, twenty-eight girls and only thirty-three were over fifteen, the two oldest being twenty years of age. The segregation order along with the anti-Japanese riots, boycotts and Congressional resolutions marked the progress of an exclusionist movement. It must especially be remembered that the segregation order was issued just after the unparalleled Japanese sympathy was outpoured in connection with the great earthquake and fire which occurred in San Francisco in April, 1906. While the Japanese Red Cross contributed to the victims of the disaster most generously, the visiting Japanese scientists were stoned in the streets of San Francisco, Japanese restaurants were boycotted, and the Exclusion League, boasting a membership of 78,500, remorselessly pursued its goal. The school children question was temporarily resolved by the famous "Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1908. But this highly unfair act injected a lingering poison into the relations between Japan and the United States.

The Japanese-American relations under the baneful glare of the immigration controversy went from bad to worse. War talks became so constant and alarming in the summer of 1907 that President Theodore Roosevelt actually sent directions in code to General Wood, commander of the American troops in the Philippines, for defending the islands from a momentarily expected Japanese attack (July 6, 1907). William H. Taft was dispatched on a peace mission from Manila to Tokyo, which resulted in the receipt of a reassuring cable (October 18, 1907) stating that "the Japanese Government is most anxious to avoid war." Still the war talks failed to subside and the President, in order to meet the crisis with a "big stick" policy, sent the American fleet consisting of sixteen battleships on a world cruise. The cruise, which lasted from December 16, 1907, to February 22, 1909, was an obvious gesture. The President said: "I have become uncomfortably conscious of a very, very slight undertone of a veiled truculence." But the Japanese Government wisely extended an invitation, which President Roosevelt could not decile, to have the fleet visit its shores. The fleet arrived on October 18, 1908, at

Yokohama and for three days splendid hospitality was lavished on officers and sailors. The world cruise, besides advertising the fact that the United States was the second naval power in the world, heralded in a dramatic style the entrance of naval ratios into the complex Pacific politics and likewise marked the beginning of the end of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. In February, 1908, McKenzie King, Canadian Commissioner of Labour and Immigration, came to Washington and thanked President Roosevelt “very earnestly for having sent out the fleet to the Pacific.” Also Australians rejoiced at the advent of the United States as a great Pacific naval power and as a counter-balance to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Ten years later another attempt to impress Japan with the naval might of the United States was made in 1917. Circumstances were that the United States entered the World War and congratulatory missions from the Allied nations were dispatched to Washington. Secretary of State Lansing wrote as follows:

There were an addition to the formula of entertainment in the case of the Japanese Mission headed by Viscount Ishii which is worthy of record, and that is a visit which they made to the Atlantic fleet. The fleet had been assembled on the northern shore of Long Island where it was guarded by sea chains, nets and destroyers while awaiting order to put out to sea. It was proposed to take the Japanese Commissioners to see this grand fleet, and I am disposed to think that the motive was not solely to give entertainment to our guests, for there was in the minds of some of our officials the thought that it might also give them some idea of the naval power of the United States.

It was on December 22, 1910, at President Taft’s request, Theodore Roosevelt submitted to him his mature and reasoned judgement on the Far Eastern policy of the United States. The former Chief Executive had travelled a long road since he, Lodge and Mahan had planned the annexation of the Philippines. No one could speak from experience more authentically than he. Here is what he observed:

Our vital interest is to keep the Japanese out of our country and at the same time preserve the goodwill of Japan. The vital interest of the Japanese, on the other hand, is in Manchuria and Korea. It is, therefore, particularly to our interest not to take any steps as regards Manchuria which will give the Japanese cause to feel, with or without reason, that we are hostile to them, or a menace—in however slight a degree—to their interests. Alliance with China, in view of China’s absolute military helplessness, means of course not an additional strength to us, but an additional obligation which we assume . . . . As regards Manchuria, if the Japanese choose to follow a course of conduct to which we are adverse, we cannot stop it unless we are prepared to go to war, and a successful war about Manchuria would require a fleet as good as that of England, *plus* an army as good as that of Germany. The open door policy in China was an excellent thing, and I hope it will be a good thing in the future, so far as it can be maintained by general diplomatic agreements; but, as has been proved by the whole history of Manchuria, alike under Russia and under Japan, the open door policy, as a matter of fact, completely disappears as soon as a powerful nation determines to disregard it, and is willing to run the risk of war rather than forego its intention. How vital Manchuria is to Japan, and how impossible that she should submit to much outside interference therein, may be gathered from the fact—which I learned from Lord Kitchener in England last year—that she is laying down triple lines of track from her coastal bases to Mukden, as an answer to the double tracking of the Siberian railway by the Russians.

## VII

President Taft and his Secretary of State Knox came to office just at the beginning of one of the greatest expansions of American foreign investment in history. Knox immediately set out to reorganize the State Department in the interest of business and finance. On March 20, 1908, the first of the modern geographical divisions of the State Department was undertaken—the Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Because of the mysterious character of its business, the Far Eastern Division appears to have enjoyed from the outset a peculiarly independent position within the State Department. It is to this division that one must first look for the explanation of President Taft’s volte-face on the Far Eastern policy of his predecessor.



The first chief of the Far Eastern Division was William Phillips. He was succeeded by Willard Straight who served as acting chief of the division from November, 1908, to June, 1909. Straight was a less successful American “Cecil Rhodes.” He dreamed of an American empire in the territory of China. He was appointed the first American Consul-General in Mukden in June, 1906, and returned from that place to become the acting chief of the Far Eastern Division at the age of twenty-eight. He made both Theodore Roosevelt and E.H. Harriman, the railroad magnate, his admirers. From 1906 to 1908 Straight made the Mukden Consulate the headquarters of America’s “financial invasion” of Manchuria. With Harriman, he schemed of building the Manchurian link of a round-the-world American railway system. He encouraged the establishment of a Chinese-American publicity bureau which distributed its literature with such effect that the Japanese Ambassador protested to Secretary of State Root, and the State Department took steps to liquidate the bureau. Straight’s campaign against Japan in Manchuria ultimately led to his withdrawal from Mukden.

Harriman’s real object was the purchase of the South Manchuria Railway, but he found that Japan was unwilling to part with it. He, therefore, made up his mind to force Japan to sell out by purchasing from Russia the Chinese Eastern Railway and by obtaining from China the right to build a railway parallel to the South Manchuria Railway straight across Manchuria from Chinchow in the south to Aigun on the Siberian border. In case the threat of building the new railroad was not sufficient to persuade the Japanese to sell out, he planned its actual construction and operation. Harriman’s death (September 10, 1909), however, deprived the scheme of its principal supporter. For a moment, Straight was left virtually its sole protagonist. On October 2, 1909, he negotiated a preliminary agreement for the financing and construction of the Chinchow-Aigun line.

On November 6, 1909, expecting first to obtain British endorsement with which he would then confront Japan and Russia, Knox made two striking proposals to Sir Edward Grey. The first was that Great Britain should join the United States in effecting a complete neutralization of all the railways in Manchuria, and the second that, in case neutralization proved impracticable, Great Britain and the United States should jointly support the Chinchow-Aigun project. But Sir Edward declined to approve the plan of State Secretary Knox. Both Japan and Russia summarily rejected the neutralization scheme in almost identical notes (January 21, 1910). Thus failed the diplomacy of Knox in regard to Manchuria.

Most ironical of all, Straight and the American financial group—supposedly the principal beneficiaries of dollar diplomacy—accused the State Department of ruining their plans by affronting the Russians, and threatened to withdraw from the field entirely unless the department ceased to make them instruments of such an aggressive Far Eastern policy. For four years Knox and Taft tried to force American capital by diplomatic pressure into a region of the world where it would not go of its own accord. When things began to go against him in the Far East, Knox declared that his policy had a higher purpose than the mere promotion of American business, or even the defending of China’s territorial integrity. “Unfortunately, after I left office,” wrote the former President Theodore Roosevelt in 1913, “a most mistaken and ill-advised policy was pursued toward Japan, combining irritation and inefficiency.”

## VIII

The last World War (1914-18) destroyed the balance of power that had existed in the Far East

until the pre-war period and substituted for it a bitter Japanese-American antagonism. During the war, the United States launched the most ambitious policy in the Far East in an attempt to check the legitimate advance of Japan into contiguous territories. The American diplomatic offensive against this country at that time took a significant four-fold course: first, efforts regarding the binding of Japanese capital investments in China to the co-operative ordinances of the new Four-Power Consortium; second, participation in the Allied military intervention in Siberia in order to prevent Japanese expansion northward; third, insistence on the restoration of Shantung to China; and fourth, codification in treaty form the principles of the Far Eastern policy as enunciated by Washington.

President Woodrow Wilson's decision in November, 1917, to permit the organization of a new Four-Power Consortium served as a "curtain-raiser" to an immensely complicated wrangle that lasted until October, 1920. Neither President Wilson nor Secretary Lansing was finally reconciled to the impracticability of independent American loans to China until June, 1918. And when they, realizing the impracticability, summoned the bankers to Washington, they found the latter in a recalcitrant mood. The bankers notified their intention to accept Lansing's proposition only on two distinct conditions, that is, that they should be assured of pooling their interests with the French, British and Japanese financial groups in loans of a broadly international character, and that the United States Government should announce that such loans were being granted at its suggestion, a condition essential to their successful floatation on the American market. The American Government accepted these two conditions.

Meanwhile, prolonged Japanese-American negotiations ensued, in which Japan attempted to obtain the exclusion of Manchuria and Mongolia from the application of the consortium. To Japan, the pooling of options and the internationalization of loans in these regions appeared as a revised edition of the earlier proposal of Secretary Knox regarding the neutralization of railways in Manchuria. It became obvious that the United States was once more attempting by economic means to question Japan's economic rights in Manchuria—rights that rested on old and elaborate treaty structures duly recognized by France, Britain, Russia and China. Japan, in contending the policy of America, pointed out that "while the other Powers can afford to look upon the question of the new consortium solely or mainly from the standpoint of business interests, Japan, being contiguous to China, has to take into consideration the requirements of its national defence and economic existence in connection with any enterprise to be undertaken near her boarder." It added that "this special and particular position of Japan the other Powers have hitherto shown willingness to appreciate." A compromise was finally reached, in pursuance of which the United States assured Japan of its "good faith" that it and the other two consortium Powers (Britain and France) would "refuse their countenance to any operation inimical to the vital interests of Japan."

As early as December 1, 1917, M. Clemenceau was trying to convince Colonel House of America of the desirability of sending a Japanese expeditionary force into Siberia. On December 14, 1917, the British Ambassador in Tokyo, under specific instructions from London, broached the subject to the Japanese Foreign Office. Thus the initiative in the Siberian situation was taken by Great Britain. On January 28, 1918 Mr. Balfour sounded the American State Department on the plan to invite Japan as the sole mandatory of the Allies to undertake the occupation of the Siberian Railway. The first impulse of both Colonel House and President Wilson was to oppose Japanese intervention in any form. President Wilson refused to be moved by the combined importunities of France and Britain. But circumstances began first to undermine his resolve. As the military situation in France

grew more alarming in the spring of 1918, a greater measure of force attached itself to the French argument that the eastern front must be reconstituted in some form or other, with a view to relieving the German pressure on the western front. From all sides came disquieting reports of escaped German prisoners joining the Bolsheviks in the suppression of those Russians who attempted to renew allegiance to the Allied cause. A force of some 50, 000 Czechoslovakians, themselves liberated prisoners of war and deserters from the Austrian Army, had set out on a trans-continental journey to Vladivostok, whence they intended to return by sea to join the Allies on the western front. By June, 1918, the progress of the Czechs was alleged to have been seriously impeded by the Germans and the Bolsheviks. Relief of the Czechs was then added to the argument for intervention, and President Wilson was compelled to agree to the proposal of a Siberian expedition on July 17, 1918. He did so, however, only after it became evident that intervention would take place regardless of his view, probably Japan taking the leading rôle. He joined it not because he believed in it or wished to join it, but because, as in the case of the consortium, he thought that by this way he could impose greater restraint on Japan from “within” rather than from “outside”.

The intervention of the United States in the Nikolaievsk massacre case has a particular significance. Between March and May, 1920, more than 700 Japanese, including women and children, as well as the duly recognized Japanese consul, his family and his official staff were cruelly tortured and massacred by Russian Bolsheviks. No nation worthy of respect would have possibly remained forbearing under such a strain of provocation. Japan found no alternative but to occupy, as a measure of reprisal, certain points in the Russian Province of Sakhalin in which the outrage was committed, pending the establishment in Russia of a responsible authority with whom it could communicate in order to obtain due satisfaction. But the United States Government, which was undoubtedly an outsider in this particular case, on May 31, 1921, sent a note of non-recognition to the Japanese Government saying that “the Government of the United States can neither now nor hereafter recognize as valid any claims for titles arising out of the present occupation and control, and that it cannot acquiesce in any action taken by the Government of Japan which might impair existing treaty rights or the political or territorial integrity of Russia.” Thus Wilson applied to Russia the same principle that the United States had long applied to China.

## IX

On the outbreak of the last World War, Japan, as the ally of Great Britain, demanded of Germany that the Kiaochow leased territory should be handed over to Japan with a view to its eventual restoration to China. Upon this demand being disregarded by Germany, Japan landed forces in the Province of Shantung and in November, 1914, took possession of the whole leased territory of Kiaochow and of the German-owned Shantung Railway. On May 25, 1915, a treaty was signed between Japan and China by which the Chinese Government agreed “to give full assent to all matters upon which the Japanese Government may hereafter agree with the German Government relating to the disposition of all rights, interests and concessions which Germany, by virtue of treaties or otherwise, possesses in relation to the Province of Shantung.” Strangely enough, the United States Government, on May 11, 1915, in anticipation of the impending conclusion of such a Sino-Japanese treaty, dispatched to the Japanese Government a note of non-recognition. This was the first of a series of America’s non-recognition notes to Japan. The second non-recognition note was sent by Secretary

Hughes in May, 1921, in connection with the Nikolaievsk massacre. The third was dispatched by Colonel Stimson on January 7, 1932, in connection with the Manchurian incident. Secretary Hull for the fourth time gave vent to non-recognition policy on March 30, 1940, opposing the establishment of a new Nanking administration under Wang Ching-wei.

As a natural sequel to the Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1915, notes were exchanged between the Governments of the two countries on September 24, 1918, agreeing that the Shantung Railway should be operated jointly by Japan and China. At the Peace Conference at Paris, China insisted upon the restitution of all rights and privileges which Germany had possessed in Shantung. The decision of the conference was, however, unfavourable to the Chinese claim, in spite of the vigorous efforts of President Wilson and Secretary Lansing. Furthermore, the Chinese Delegation, encouraged by the American Delegation, not only refused to sign the Versailles Treaty, but also declined to entertain any proposals made by the Japanese Government for the adjustment of the Shantung question. Japan was willing to restore Shantung, but only in accordance with the terms of the 1915 and 1918 treaties and on the basis of independent negotiations with China. The latter opposed any compromise and demanded unqualified restitution.

For the purpose of settling the Shantung imbroglio, Ambassador Shidéhara on July 21, 1921, approached Secretary of State Hughes in intimating that China had refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty and denied that Japan had succeeded to the interests of Germany in Shantung; that this was an incorrect position from a legal point of view; that while China and the United States had not ratified the Versailles Treaty, still the Versailles Treaty had been ratified by Germany, Japan and other Powers; therefore, with respect to Germany, its interests had been renounced in favour of Japan, and that if China attempted to take these matters up with Germany, the latter would be compelled to reply that it could not deal with them because it had already parted with its interests; hence, if the question were to be taken up at all, it would have to be taken up between Japan and China. China was taking this position, believing that she could have the support of the United States, and was unwilling to discuss the matter with Japan. If the Secretary of State, in a friendly way, would suggest to China to undertake negotiations with Japan, he was sure that his Government would take up the Shantung question with the most generous disposition and make terms which would be entirely satisfactory to China and to all other Powers, and that in this way a very troublesome matter could in a short time be cleared up. Secretary Hughes was deeply moved by this appeal and he and Mr. Balfour persuaded the Chinese side to agree to a series of joint meetings with Japan to be attended by two British and two American "observers" to see that fair play was done.

No less than thirty-six meetings were held before a settlement could be reached. The most favourable term Japan offered was the immediate restitution of Shantung with the exception of the Tsinan-Tsingtao Railway, which it wanted to sell to China, because it had itself paid for the railway to Germany. In order to facilitate the purchase, Japan suggested that China should obtain money from Japanese bankers in the form of a fifteen-year loan secured by a lien on the railroad, and that Japanese technicians and accountants should share in the operation of the railway until the loan was fully repaid. Yet the Chinese side stubbornly refused to accept this term. Twice the meetings were broken off, to be resumed only after considerable Anglo-American exhortations at Peking. On one of these occasions, Secretary Hughes even took the Chinese Minister to see President Harding who told him that "it would be a colossal blunder in statecraft if China were not to take advantage of the opportunity now afforded her for the settlement of the Shantung question, as the alternative might

involve a risk of losing the province.” Under such persuasions, the Chinese Government at last gave way and on February 4, 1922, signed a treaty with the Japanese Government, securing full sovereignty over Shantung. The Shantung question was technically a question between Japan and China, but, in reality, it was a question between Japan and the United States. As a matter of fact, this question constituted one of the causes which prompted the United States Senate to refuse the ratification of the Versailles Treaty.

On May 7, 1919, the Council of Four, with President Wilson participating, had mandated to Japan the German islands in the Pacific north of the equator. Among these islands, lying athwart the path from Hawaii to the Philippines *via* Wake and Guam, was the island of Yap. Until his notice was drawn to it by his naval and communications experts at Paris, President Wilson had not paid any attention to it. The representations of his experts led him to consider its strategic and commercial value to the United States. On three occasions prior to the decision of May 7, President Wilson and Secretary Lansing expressed the opinion that the control of Yap should be international. Their expressions, however, had taken the form of indefinite, oral reservations, which none of the other parties to the decision awarding the German islands to Japan accepted as conditions precedent to the award. At any rate, President Wilson concurred in the award and signed the Versailles Treaty.

No more was heard of the matter until the spring of 1920, when the State Department started to organize the conference on international electrical communications. The preparation of the agenda, as well as the opening session of the conference reawakened American interest in Yap and enabled the State Department to revive the claim that President Wilson had raised at Paris. This it did on November 9, 1920, a year and a half after the Council of Four had mandated the German islands to Japan. The British Government promptly rejected the American contention, pointing out that the minutes of the Council of Four contained no record that Yap had been excluded from the Japanese mandate, and that the Council of the League of Nations had formally approved that mandate. Similar replies were received from France and Italy. Colby and Hughes exhausted their supply of legal talents in a protracted but vain effort to rehabilitate President Wilson’s “reservation,” but Japan was not swayed.

## X

The Washington Conference of 1921-22 was the fourth diplomatic move on the part of the United States to arrest Japanese expansion, the other three being, as already mentioned, participation in the Siberian expedition, organization of the new banking consortium, and the restoration of Shantung to China. This conference was purposely mooted as an attempt to arraign Japan before an Anglo-American tribunal. On November 11, 1921, the day on which the Washington Conference was officially opened, Mr. Balfour discussed the Anglo-Japanese Alliance privately with Secretary Hughes, reminding the latter of several good reasons for retaining it, such as Japan’s *amour propre*, the control it gave Britain over Japan’s actions and the security it afforded to the British Dominions and Far Eastern possessions. He showed Hughes the drafts of two “arrangements” which he proposed to substitute for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. One of them formed the nucleus of the Nine-Power Treaty relating to China and the other amounted to a re-written version of the old Anglo-Japanese Alliance with a provision for the inclusion of the United States. Hughes, however, considered any such “arrangements” out of the question. To supersede the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, he wanted a

definitive statement resembling the Root-Takahira Agreement, which he termed a “coin to be reissued.” He rejected the British and Japanese drafts, substituted his own formula and in a series of meetings with Baron Shidéhara and Mr. Balfour induced them to accept it. On December 2, 1921, he asked, and received the following day Japan's consent, to include France in the proposed Pacific agreement. Thus the Four-Power Treaty, applicable to “insular possessions and insular dominions in the region of the Pacific Ocean” of the signatories was signed on December 13, 1921, superseding the Anglo-Japanese Alliance on ratification. Concerning the new agreement, a Japanese diplomat aptly remarked to his British colleague that Britain “has given the Anglo-Japanese Alliance a splendid funeral.” That the United States regarded the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as an obstacle in its path is clear from the following passage in the report of the American Delegation to the President:

It may be stated without reservation that one of the most important factors in the Far Eastern situation was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. This alliance has been viewed by the people of the United States with the concern. Originally designed as a measure of protection in view of the policies of Russia and Germany in Far Eastern affairs, the continuance of the alliance after all peril from those sources had ceased could not fail to be regarded as seriously prejudicial to our interests. Without reviewing the reasons for this disquietude, it was greatly increased by the state of international tension which had arisen in the Pacific area.....It was, therefore, a matter of the greatest gratification that the American Delegation found that they were able to obtain an agreement by which the Anglo-Japanese Alliance should be immediately terminated.

The reasons for the disquietude omitted in the report were supplemented beforehand by the statement of Secretary Hughes on June 23, 1921, to the British Ambassador that “if Great Britain and Japan had any arrangement by which Great Britain was to support the special interests of Japan, the latter might be likely, at the instance of the militaristic party, to be led to take positions which would call forth protests from this [American] Government, and that in making such representations this Government might find itself virtually alone; that the making of such representations might be called for by American opinion and yet might be met with considerable opposition in Japan, leading to a state of irritation among the people in both countries, and that such a condition of affairs would be fraught with mischief.” Senator Lodge even went so far as to declare in the Senate that “the chief and most important point in the Four-Power Treaty is the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. That was the main object of the treaty.”

The United States had emerged from the World War as the foremost economic power in the world. The war had proved a powerful stimulus to the construction of an American navy “second to none.” President Wilson’s demand for “incomparably the most adequate navy in the world” found ready response in the passage of the famous Naval Appropriation Act of 1916. If the construction schedules fixed by this Act had been completed, the American Navy would at least have equalled, and probably outstripped, the British Navy by 1924. It is a straight fact that American strategists had advocated the digging of the Panama Canal as a substitute for the maintenance of two large fleets separated by the isthmus. The quick access from coast to coast, they had argued, would enable one fleet to do the work of two. No sooner was the canal completed and opened to navigation in 1914 than this argument gave place to one in favour of a larger navy to protect the canal.

Because Great Britain suffered considerably in the last World War, its recuperation was slow. On the other hand, its vast interests, augmented by the annexation of German colonial possessions, lay exposed not only to the dangers of a fresh upheaval in Europe, but also to the possible designs of Japan and America, the two great naval Powers that had become invigorated rather than exhausted by the war. The American Navy, taking advantage of the situation, threatened to eclipse the Navy of



Great Britain which, then groaning under the economic ravages of the war, could ill afford to hold up its end in a naval race with the United States. Nevertheless, it manifested in an astute manner its reluctance to relinquish the naval supremacy to America.

Lord Lee of Fareham, newly inducted First Lord of the Admiralty, proposed on April 22, 1921, through Mr. Ochs of the *New York Times*, to the American Government that “the British Government are prepared to abandon their traditional policy and enter into an agreement with the United States for equality. Under such an agreement as proposed by me the United States could concentrate its Navy in the Pacific Ocean and the British Navy could be relied on for protection in the Atlantic Ocean.” Lord Lee’s proposal attempted to remove the American fleet from coming into contacts [sic] with the British Navy—a scheme which aimed at lessening the chances of rivalry between the two, leaving Britain, at the same time, actually supreme in the Atlantic. The other objective of the proposal was to make the American Navy act as a counter-balance to Japan in the Pacific, while Britain continued to enjoy the benefit of Japanese friendship. It does not need any foresight to see that Lord Lee’s proposal was intended to kill two birds with one stone.

The geographical situation of Japan necessarily rendered the disposition of naval forces in the western Pacific of more vital concern to it than either to Great Britain or the United States. Whatever construction might be placed upon it, the mission of British and American warships in the Far East could never be made appear wholly defensive to the Japanese eyes. Japan, therefore, refused to adhere to the Hughes’ naval programme of 10:6 ratio until it could obtain some more reliable assurance of its security in its own waters than that afforded by the Four-Power Treaty. Early in December, 1921, having first secured Mr Balfour’s approval, Admiral Kato suggested that Japan might consent to the 10:6 ratio if the United States and Britain would agree to maintain the *status quo* with respect to fortifications in their Pacific possessions. He also stipulated that Japan be allowed to retain the highly prized and all-but-completed battleship *Mutsu*, which Hughes had earmarked for the scrap-heap, and substitute in its place the *Séttsu*, an older vessel. On December 12, 1921, Admiral Kato made the *status quo* proposition definite. Hughes accepted it—provided it should not apply to Hawaii—but he strenuously opposed the retention of the *Mutsu*. Fortified with the statistics supplied by his naval experts, he contended that this would force Britain and the United States to retain, and even to build, vessels in compensation, and so defeat the purpose of the naval treaty. In the end he was forced to concede the point or lose the treaty. The *Mutsu* was kept at last, and the extended discussion on the size and shape of the zone to be affected finally resulted in a carefully defined non-fortification agreement. It was announced on December 15, 1921, and incorporated in the Five-Power Naval Treaty signed on February 5, 1922. This treaty was to remain in force until December 31, 1936. The Japanese Government gave notice of its intention to abrogate it on December 29, 1934. The note thereanent, in part, says.

It is impossible for the Japanese Government to acquiesce in the continuation for a further term of the Washington Treaty of Naval Limitation, which not only permits the retention of the kind of vessels which the Japanese Government intended to abolish as the most offensive ships, but also admits disparity in naval strength through the adoption of a ratio system. Moreover, the allocation of an inferior ratio, so detrimental to our national prestige, is bound to remain a source of permanent and profound discontent to our people.

Mr. Wakatsuki as early as April 22, 1930, at the London Naval Disarmament Conference, declared: “Needless to say, it is important that, in an agreement on disarmament, the matter of national safety should be fully taken into consideration. As I had several opportunities to state in and out of the conference, it has always been the policy of the Japanese Government to maintain a minimum naval

strength sufficient for defensive purposes and for fulfilling Japan's obligations in the maintenance of general peace in Eastern Asia—strength that can in no sense arouse apprehension in the minds of other nations.”

## XI

John Hay and Theodore Roosevelt had, after much reflection, come eventually to the conclusion that the American people would neither fight for the open door and the territorial integrity of China nor support a Far Eastern policy based on the use of force. Secretary Hughes had evidently reached the same conclusion, but that did not prevent him from making the most vigorous effort to defend China's integrity and the open door policy. Just as the open door notes of John Hay grew out of the Hippisley memoranda, the Nine-Power Treaty was the outcome of the Balfour draft of November 11, 1921. Hughes made the Nine-Power Treaty the most categorical and aggressive affirmation of the Far Eastern policy of the United States yet on record. It comprised the most stringent abstinence pledge the United States had yet sought from its competitors in China.

In the opinion of the American Delegation, the Nine-Power Treaty “reaffirmed the postulates of American policy which were no longer to be left to the exchanges of diplomatic notes, but were to receive the sanction of the most solemn undertaking of the Powers.” But the Nine-Power Treaty did not legally bind the United States to “defend” the open door and the territorial integrity of China from any other nation; it merely approved that America itself would “respect” them. It was a self-denying ordinance rather than a collective security pact. The only sanction behind it was the good faith of the signatories. Whatever the moral commitments implicit in its periodic efforts in behalf [sic] of China's integrity and the open door, the United States had never legally bound itself to defend those objectives against other Powers. Still, the self-denying ordinance contained in the Nine-Power Treaty was assuredly the most stringent yet applied to its competitors in China.

The Japanese Government, in its note under date [sic] of November 18, 1938, to the American Government, declared that “in the face of the new situation, fast developing in East Asia, any attempt to apply to the conditions of today and tomorrow inapplicable ideas and principles of the past neither would contribute toward the establishment of a real peace in East Asia nor solve the immediate issues.” The inapplicable ideas and principles of the past evidently referred to the Nine-Power Treaty. Mr Arita, then Foreign Minister, developed the idea in the following words:

When the doctrines of freedom of communications and trade prevailed the world over, enabling men and goods to move from one country to another with comparative ease, regardless of the status of their countries, it was possible even for small nations, through study and effort, to maintain a respectable existence side by side with great Powers. Under such conditions, therefore, the opinion which denounced territorial ambition and opposed the establishment of spheres of influence was quite justified. In other words, the theory as well as the practice of respecting territorial sovereignty and administrative rights exist and can exist only on the basis of free communications and trade. Now, however, that such doctrines have all but disappeared with the great Powers' closing or threatening to close their doors to others, small countries have no other choice left but to strive as best as they can to form their own economic *blocs* or to found powerful States, lest their very existence should be jeopardised.....As long as military self-defence is universally recognised as justifiable, there is no reason why economic self-defence, which is the same in its ultimate effect, should not be acknowledged as proper in international relations.

## XII

The Gentlemen's Agreement of 1908 did not put a stop to American discrimination against

the Japanese, and also agitations for their total exclusion. While constantly pressing Congress for a national exclusion law, the people of California did what they could to discourage Japanese immigration into their own state. In 1913, the legislature enacted a law prohibiting the Japanese from owning land and limiting their tenure of it to leases of three years' duration. Exercising the initiative in 1920, the people of California voted 668,483 to 222,986 to remove even the right to lease land. President Wilson sent Secretary of State Bryan to California in an attempt to head off the laws of 1913, but to no avail. It passed the state senate by 25 to 2 and the assembly by 73 to 3, leaving the governor no choice but to sign it. "The fundamental basis of all legislations upon this subject," declared the attorney-general of the state, "has been, and is, racial undesirability."

The exclusionist movement began to assume rapidly national proportions. From 1921 to 1924, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas and Washington, all enacted alien land laws similar in purpose to the one of California. In 1922, the United States Supreme Court finally ruled that the Japanese were ineligible for citizenship by naturalization. Early in December, 1923, a bill was introduced in the House and the Senate, prohibiting the admission to the United States of aliens ineligible for citizenship—a legal phraseology designed to exclude the Japanese without naming them. Secretary of State Hughes wrote on February 7, 1924, to Chairman Albert Johnson of the House Committee on Immigration to the following effect:

The Japanese are a sensitive people, and unquestionably would regard such a legislative enactment as fixing a stigma upon them. I regret to be compelled to say that I believe such a legislative action would largely undo the work of the Washington Conference which so greatly improved our relations with Japan. The manifestation of American interest and generosity in providing relief to the sufferers of the recent earthquake disaster in Japan would not avail to diminish the resentment which would follow the enactment of such a measure, as this enactment would be regarded as an insult not to be palliated by any act of charity.

Upon the representation of the Japanese Ambassador, Hughes recommended that the bill be so amended as to recognise the Gentlemen's Agreement and the quota system to Japanese immigration. On March 11, 1924, Hughes again stated his position to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Immigration. But on April 14, Senator Lodge seized on the concluding sentences of Mr. Hanihara's letter, particularly the words "grave consequences," to declare that they constituted a "veiled threat" to the United States and advised the rejection of the above-referred amendment. On May 15, both the House and the Senate passed the bill—to become effective on July 1, 1924—by votes of 308 to 62 and 69 to 9 respectively. President Coolidge signed it on May 26, 1924. Thus the exclusion law, which the Japanese Government had tried to avoid for thirty years, became a concrete reality, and the Japanese Government on May 31, 1924, placed on record its solemn protest in the subjoined terms:

International discriminations in any form and on any subject, even if based upon purely economic reasons, are opposed to the principles of justice and fairness upon which the friendly intercourse between nations must, in its final analysis, depend. To these very principles the doctrine of equal opportunity, now widely recognised, with the unfailing support of the United States, owes its being. Still more unwelcome are discriminations based on race. The strong condemnation of such practice evidently inspired the American Government in 1912 in denouncing the commercial treaty between the United States and Russia, pursuant to the resolution of the House of Representatives of December 13, 1911, as a protest against the unfair and unequal treatment of aliens of a particular race in Russia.

Yet discrimination of a similar character is expressed by the new statute of the United States. The Immigration Act of 1924, considered in the light of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the naturalisation laws, clearly establishes the rule that the admissibility of aliens to the United States rests not upon individual merits or qualifications but upon the division of race to which applicants belong. In particular, it appears that such racial distinction in the Act is directed essentially against Japanese, since persons of other Asiatic races are excluded under separate enactments of prior dates, as is pointed out in the published letter of the Secretary of State of February 8, 1924, to the Chairman of the Committee on Immigration and Naturalization of the House of Representatives.

At the time when the commercial treaty between Japan and the United States was signed on February 21, 1911 the Japanese Government declared that they were fully prepared to maintain with equal effectiveness the limitation and control which they had for the past three years exercised in direct regulation of the immigration of labourers to the United States.....With regards to the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement, it will be recalled that it was designed, on the one hand, to meet the actual requirements of the situation as perceived by the American Government concerning Japanese immigration, and on the other, to provide against the possible demand in the United States for a statutory exclusion which would offend their just susceptibilities of the Japanese people. The arrangement came into force in 1908. Its efficiency has been proved in fact.....If even so limited a number should in any way be found embarrassing to the United States, the Japanese Government have already manifested their readiness to revise the existing arrangement with a view to further limitation of emigration.

Unfortunately, however, the sweeping provisions of the new Act, clearly indicative of discrimination against Japanese, have made it impossible for Japan to continue the undertakings assumed under the Gentlemen's Agreement. An understanding of friendly co-operation reached after long and comprehensive discussions between the Japanese and American Governments has thus been abruptly overthrown by legislative action on the part of the United States. The patient, loyal and scrupulous observance by Japan for more than sixteen years of these self-denying regulations, in the interest of good relations between the two countries, now seems to have been wasted.

### XIII

On September 18, 1931 the Manchurian incident broke out and, at that time, both Japan and China were members of the League of Nations. As China appealed to the League, the Manchurian question came under the sole competence of the Geneva international machinery. The United States of America was outside the League and had no voice in the League Council; yet Secretary of States [sic] Stimson, becoming impatient with the "conservatism" of the League, took initiatives in issuing direct remonstrances against Tokyo and in submitting proposals to Geneva. On October 10, 1931, Colonel Stimson obtained President Hoover's approval of a plan to have the United States participate in all sessions of the League Council. He then arranged to have the invitation extended by the Council so as to avoid giving Japan the impression that the United States was "the instigator of the entire matter—of having wormed herself into the League Council—in order to stir up hostilities against Japan." On November 19, 1931, after a conference with Hoover, Stimson sent words to M. Briand that in case the League wished to impose the economic sanctions provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant, the United States was "anxious not to discourage them or to put any obstacles or dangers in their path." In this way, the United States, a non-member of the League, suggested the application of sanctions against Japan before the League had considered the desirability of such a step.

Disappointed at the failure of the League to take more positive actions against Japan, Stimson shifted his attention to the resources offered by American diplomacy. From these he selected, as the most powerful weapon of the type he desired, the non-recognition doctrine of Bryan that had been used in connection with the so-called "twenty-one demands" episode in 1915. On January 4, 1932, Stimson obtained President Hoover's consent to a bold, independent move. The following day, he revealed his design first to the British, then to the French, Ambassadors, and invited their Governments to take similar steps. The British response was one of studied casualness. The *communiqué* of the British Foreign Office of January 3, 1932, deprecated the necessity of addressing "any formal note to the Japanese Government on the lines of the American Government's note." The *communiqué* was accompanied by an editorial in the *London Times* which characterized China's administrative integrity as an "ideal" rather than an "existing fact," and endorsed the wisdom of the Foreign Office in refusing to associate itself with the American proposition. But Stimson without waiting for replies from London or Paris dispatched the non-recognition note to Japan on January 7, 1932.

Fighting broke out in Shanghai soon after the middle of January, 1932, and the hostilities shifted from Manchuria to China proper. Stimson redoubled his efforts to secure British co-operation and to assist the League in bringing a judgement against Japan. On January 24, 1932, he and Hoover decided to send naval vessels to Shanghai. Stimson promptly called in the British Ambassador asking him "if we should send such vessels, would Britain do likewise." It is obvious that Stimson was thinking of more than the mere protection of American citizens and their possessions. At about the same time the entire American fleet was manoeuvring in the Pacific between California and the Hawaiian Islands. It was decided that the entire American fleet would remain in Hawaii and, as a matter of fact, it was not dispersed or sent back to the Atlantic on the conclusion of the manoeuvres. This time Stimson received a reply "favourable in its tenor," and learned on January 31, 1932, that Britain was sending two cruisers and reinforcements of marines to Shanghai. Thereupon, the United States Thirty-first Infantry was ordered from Manila to Shanghai and the entire American Asiatic squadron was concentrated in Shanghai harbour.

A Japanese request for the good offices of the neutral Powers in restoring peace at Shanghai (January 31, 1932) inspired Stimson to exercise the initiative still more vigorously. He and Hoover quickly drew up peace terms, telephoned British Prime Minister McDonald and Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon for their approval, and with the concurrence of France and Italy presented them to the belligerents (February 2, 1932). The terms, among others, called for "negotiations to settle all outstanding controversies between Japan and China with the aid of neutral observers or participants." Stimson thus tried to do what neither Wilson nor Hughes had been able to accomplish: to induce Japan to abandon the principle—that it had been so resolutely defending since 1915—of settling its issues with China independently, without outside intervention.

In the face of Japanese refusal, Stimson wished to encourage the League to impose sanctions on Japan and hoped that Congress might be persuaded to do so. He felt that an embargo on Japanese goods would have more chance of being adopted by Congress if it were recommended following the invocation of the Nine-Power Treaty than if it had been recommended solely by the League of Nations. He, therefore, invited Britain (February 9, 1932) to join the United States in a formal invocation of the Nine-Power Treaty. Stimson repeatedly called Sir John Simon on the trans-Atlantic telephone during the next few days, pressing the invitation on him as urgently as he could. But to no avail. So John would not join Stimson in the manoeuvre, especially when the latter represented a nation that was not a member of the league, to prepare the way for the imposition of sanctions before these had been recommended or even considered at Geneva. Again Stimson was thrown upon his own resources and he acted more boldly than Great Britain or the League. On February 22, 1932, he and his advisors composed a long public letter to Senator Borah, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. In it, he contended that the Nine-Power Treaty was but one of several "interrelated and interdependent" treaties negotiated at the Washington Conference; that the "willingness of the American Government to surrender its then commanding lead in battleship construction and to leave its positions at Guam and in the Philippines without further fortifications, was predicated upon, among other things, the self-denying covenants contained in the Nine-Power Treaty." He implied that a violation of that treaty might release the other Powers from observing the limitations of the Four-Power Treaty, the Naval Limitation Treaty and the non-fortification agreement.

On October to 1932, the report of the Lytton Commission on the Manchurian question was published. After a long and dramatic debate, the League adopted the Lytton Report (February 24,

1933) and the Japanese delegation walked out of the Assembly, Japan later notifying its withdrawal from the League. On January 9, 1933, Stimson held an all day conference on foreign policy with President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt, as a result of which the League of Nations was assured that “a change in American policy toward the Far Eastern controversy on the part of the new administration need not be apprehended.” On March 4, the same year, Stimson left office and on March 27, Japan gave notice of its decision to resign from the League. So ended the long cycle of post-bellum American attempts to prevent the rightful advance of Japan into areas contiguous to it.

## XIV

President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull had no sooner taken office on March 4, 1933, than they confirmed that the assurances exchanged by Stimson and Roosevelt on January 9, 1933. On the same day the League of Nations adopted the Lytton Report, created an Advisory Committee to observe the Far Eastern situation and invited American co-operation in its work. Secretary Hull accepted its invitation on March 13, 1933, and in this manner the Roosevelt administration acted with alacrity to adhere to the Stimson-Hoover policy of active collaboration with the League on the Far Eastern question. On April 17, 1934, Eiji Amau, then spokesman of the Foreign Office, made the following statement:

Owing to the special position of Japan in her relations with China, her views and attitude respecting matters that concern China may not agree in every point with those of foreign nations, but it must be realized that Japan is called upon to exert the utmost effort in carrying out her mission and in fulfilling her special responsibilities in East Asia.... We oppose, therefore, any attempt on the part of China to avail herself of the influence of any other country in order to resist Japan; we also oppose any action taken by China, calculated to play one Power against another. Any joint operations undertaken by foreign Powers even in the name of technical or financial assistance at this particular moment after the Manchurian and Shanghai incidents are bound to acquire political significances....Japan, therefore, must object to such undertakings as a matter of principle, although she will not find it necessary to interfere with any foreign country negotiating individually with China on questions of finance or trade as long as such negotiations benefit China and are not detrimental to the maintenance of peace in East Asia. However, supplying China with warplanes, building aerodromes in China and detailing military instructors or military advisors to China, or contracting a loan to provide funds for political use, would obviously tend to alienate the friendly relations between Japan and China and other countries and disturb peace and order in East Asia. Japan will oppose such projects.

The Amau statement was prompted not only by the so-called technical assistance rendered to China by the League of Nations, but also by the economic and military aids given to Chiang Kai-shek by the United States Government and its citizens. In May, 1933, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation granted a three-year wheat and cotton credit of \$50,000,000 to the Chinese Government. Toward the end of 1933, the Curtiss-Wright Corporation announced plans for the construction of a five-million-dollar airplane assembly plant in China, specifically for the purpose of assembling military planes. The plant was set up at Hangchow early in 1934. Between 1932 and 1933 the Aeronautics Trade Division of the Department of Commerce co-operated with American aircraft firms in the selection of a number of American aviation officers who would assist in the establishment of training schools for Chinese pilots in Hangchow and Canton. The sale of American aircraft and parts thereof to China, chiefly military planes, rose from \$157,515 in 1932 to \$1,762,247 in 1933, registering a ten-fold increase. On November 16, 1933, the United States resumed diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia after a lapse of sixteen years. It can be said that Washington made this fresh move obsessed by the desire of redressing the balance of power in the Far East against Japan.

On July 7, 1937, the China affair broke out and on August 23, 1937, Secretary of State Hull in a pronouncement stated that the United States Government had given orders for a regiment of marines to prepare to proceed to Shanghai. He added: "The issues and problems which are of concern to this Government in the present situation in the Pacific area go far beyond merely the immediate question of protection of the nationals and interests of the United States."

On October 15, 1937, the Belgian Government, in response to the request made by the United Kingdom with the approval of the United States, announced that it had agreed to convene in Brussels conference in accordance with the terms of the Nine-Power Treaty and had extended invitations to all the parties to that treaty, including Japan. The Japanese Government in its note of October 27, 1937, declined the invitation to participate in the conference on the ground that Japan's actions in China, being one of self-defence motivated by China's violent anti-Japanese policy and practice, especially by its provocative acts appealing to force of arms, lay outside the purview of the Nine-Power Treaty. The note went on to say that the League of Nations on October 6, 1937, expressed its views casting reflection on the honour of Japan and adopted a resolution which was incontestably unfriendly toward Japan; and that the United States Government, a non-member of the League, declared its approval of the resolution and, therefore, the Brussels Conference could not but be regarded to have been linked to the resolution of the League. Under these circumstances, the Japanese Government was constrained to believe that a frank and full discussion to bring about a just, equitable and realistic solution of a conflict between Japan and China could not be expected at the proposed conference. Moreover, the Sino-Japanese conflict, arising from the special situation of the Far East, "has a vital bearing upon the very existence of the two countries." Hence, a conference of so many Powers with varying interests in the Far East, or with none at all, would only serve to complicate the situation and put further obstacles in the path of a just and proper solution. A just and proper solution could be reached only through direct negotiations between the countries primarily concerned.

The day following Japan's refusal, the Belgian Government extended invitations to the Governments of Germany and the Soviet Union, both of which were neither signatories of nor adherents to the Nine-Power Treaty. While the Soviet Government accepted the invitation, Germany declined it on the ground that it was not a party to the treaty. The Brussels Conference was convened on November 3, 1937, and Count Aldrovandi Marescotti, Italian delegate, in his speech bluntly asserted that unless the realities of the situation were taken into account, nothing would result from the conference but platonic resolutions and fresh proof of the sterility of such intervention. He insisted that the only thing that conference could do was to make an attempt to bring the two parties into direct contacts [sic] with each other. On November 6, 1937, the conference despatched a second invitation to Japan. On the same day the Italian Government joined the Anti-Comintern Pact of November 25, 1936, concluded between Japan and Germany. The Japanese Government again declined to participate in the conference, stating that "her action in China, as it is one of self-defence, is outside the scope of the Nine-Power Treaty; and that it is impossible for Japan to accept the invitation to a conference in accordance with the stipulations of that treaty after she has been accused of violating its terms." The Brussels Conference, without the participation of the principal party concerned, that is, Japan, adopted an abortive resolution and adjourned *sine die* on November 24, 1937. On November



28, 1937, Prince Fumimaro Konoye, then Premier, in an interview with the press, set forth Japan's policy toward China, outlining five basic points.

The first Konoye point made it clear that Japan did not object to neutral third Powers which offered their good offices to assist in bringing about direct negotiations with China, but could not accept third party participation in the negotiations. The second point stated that Japan had not yet formulated its terms of peace, but since its aim was primarily the achievement of a fundamental readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations, it would be ready to negotiate with the Nanking Government if the latter would change its present policy to one of co-operation with Japan. If the Nanking Government refused to so alter its present anti-Japanese attitude, the war would go on until that Government was overthrown. The third declared that should the war be continued for any length of time, it might lead to the establishment of local régimes with which Japan could co-operate. If one of these régimes should control a sizeable portion of China, Japan might recognize it as the National Government of China and deal with it exclusively. The fourth averred that Japan for the present had no intention of declaring war against China. If, however, military supplies continued to pour into China, the decision might be altered. The last point announced that Japan might, at a suitable time in the future, propose a revision or abrogation of the Nine-Power Treaty.

## XVI

On December 12, 1937, the day on which Nanking was occupied, Japanese naval airplanes, in their pursuit of retreating Chinese forces, discovered and bombed at a point about twenty miles above Nanking on the Yangtze River more than ten steamers which seemed to them to be Chinese military transport ships. Later, it was found that among the bombed vessels was the United States gunboat *Panay*, which was sunk. On the day following the *Panay* incident, President Roosevelt sent a memorandum to Secretary Hull with instructions to inform the Japanese Ambassador that the President "is deeply shocked and concerned by the news of indiscriminate bombing of American and other non-Chinese vessels on the Yangtze, and that he requests that the Emperor be so advised." In the typewritten text of this memorandum, the word "requests" was penned by the President in his own handwriting over the typed word "suggests." A copy of the revised memorandum was handed to the press. The Japanese Government, on being informed of the President's feeling, expressed profound regrets and sincere apologies for the incident which had occurred "entirely due to a mistake." It also made indemnification for the losses suffered and punished appropriately those responsible for the sinking of the gunboat. Secretary Hull accepted the entire action of Japan as "responsive" to the American request; yet he relied on the findings of the American Naval Court of Inquiry as to "the origin, causes and circumstances of the incident."

After the fall of Nanking, the Chinese Government determined itself to continue a protracted resistance against Japan. The Japanese Government, therefore, decided on January 16, 1938, not to deal any more with the Nanking Government and to look forward to the establishment of a new Chinese régime with which it could fully co-operate for the adjustment of Sino-Japanese relations.

The American resentment against this decision of Japan manifested itself in various forms. On April 23, 1938, the annual convention of the New York Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church censured the policy of the United States in continuing "to buy Japanese goods" and "to sell Japan the materials with which she has been waging war on China." On June 1, 1938, a plea for

cession of American economic aid to Japan was made at the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. On June 11, 1938, Secretary Hull indicated that the State Department was informally discouraging the sale of American bombing planes to Japan. A poll of Congressmen conducted by the *Christian Science Monitor* indicated general support for Hull's effort to discourage shipment of American aircraft to Japan, as well as the rise of a sentiment for applying an embargo to a wider range of exports to this country. In October, 1938, Canton and Hankow fell into the hands of the Japanese Army and the Chiang Kai-shek Government became a mere local régime. On November 23, 1938, the Japanese Government declared:

What Japan seeks is the establishment of a new order which will insure the permanent stability of East Asia. This new order has for its foundation a tripartite relationship of mutual aid and co-ordination between Japan, Manchoukuo and China in political, economic, cultural and other fields. Its object is to secure international justice, to perfect the joint defence against Communism, and to create a new culture and realize a close economic cohesion throughout East Asia.

In its note of November 18, 1938, to the American Government, the Japanese Government announced:

Japan at present is devoting her energy to the establishment of a new order based on genuine international justice throughout East Asia, the attainment of which end is not only an indispensable condition of the very existence of Japan, but also constitutes the very foundation of the enduring peace and stability of East Asia. It is the firm conviction of the Japanese Government that in the face of the new situation, fast developing in East Asia, any attempt to apply to the conditions of today and tomorrow inapplicable ideas and principles of the past would neither contribute toward the establishment of a real peace in East Asia nor solve the immediate issues. However, as long as these points are understood, Japan has not the slightest inclination to oppose the participation of the United States and other Powers in the great work of reconstructing East Asia along all lines of industry and trade.

Japan's announcement of the policy of establishing a new order in East Asia evoked a crop of criticisms from diverse American quarters, and American proclivity [sic] of aiding Chiang Kai-shek reached a new height. The United States Export-Import Bank on December 15, 1938, placed a credit of \$25,000,000 at Chungking's disposal; in addition, the United States Treasury extended the Chinese-American monetary agreement of July 9, 1937, thereby enabling Chungking to dispose of its silver and obtain dollar exchange against its gold reserves accumulated in New York. The American Committee for Non-participation in Japanese Aggression, headed by Henry H. Stimson, urged Congress to take positive measures against Japan. The Conference on the Cause and Cure of War, meeting at Washington in January, 1939, went on record for the first time in favour of an embargo on war materials to Japan. In May 1939, the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church adopted a resolution condemning America's continued "partnership in aggression" and urging immediate legislation by Congress to prevent the sale of munitions and war materials to Japan. Several bills placing limitations on Japan's trade with the United States were offered by members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. A resolution was sponsored by Senator Pittman empowering the President to impose an embargo on war supplies to Japan. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee requested Secretary Hull to indicate whether the proposed action would "violate any treaty." Although Hull on July 21, 1939, gave a non-committal answer, the same answer actually preceded the State Department's decision on the abrogation of the Commercial Treaty with Japan by only five days.

On July 24, 1939, as a result of an agreement between the then Foreign Minister Hachiro Arita and British Ambassador Sir Robert Craigie, the text of a basic accord under which negotiations would be conducted for a formal settlement of the Tientsin dispute was announced in Tokyo and London. The significant Arita-Craigie formula ran as follows:

His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom fully recognize the actual situation in China where hostilities on a large scale are in progress, and noted that, as long as that state of affairs continues to exist, the Japanese forces in China have special requirements for the purpose of safeguarding their own security and maintaining public order in regions under their control, and that they have to suppress or remove any such causes or acts as will obstruct them or benefit their enemy.

His Majesty's Government have no intention of countenancing any acts or measures prejudicial to the attainment of the above-mentioned objects by the Japanese forces, and they will take this opportunity to confirm their policy in this respect by making it plain to the British authorities and British nationals in China that they should refrain from such acts and measures.

On July 26, 1939, only two days after the announcement of the Arita-Craigie formula, Secretary Hull served a notice of abrogation of the Japanese-American Commercial Treaty. The motives underlying the abrogation of the 1911 treaty were mixed. As already pointed out, ever since the beginning of the China affair there had been agitation within the United States for an embargo on the sale of war materials to Japan. By the spring of 1939 the American sympathy for China had expressed itself in the form of an official loan to the Chinese Government and an unofficial and yet fairly effective embargo on the sale of arms, ammunition and implements of war to Japan. Not satisfied with this, public opinion demanded more stringent measures and the extension of the unofficial munitions embargo to the sale to Japan of materials that could be put to military use, such as oil, trucks, steel, scrap iron, etc. As the United States could not honourably impose an embargo on Japan while it still remained a party to the Commercial Treaty, it renounced the pact to remove the obstacle for the prosecution of an economic boycott against Japan.

## XVII

On September 1, 1939, the European war broke out. Curiously enough, the first and immediate step the United States Government took was to transfer the major portion of its Navy to the Pacific coast centring on Pearl Harbour—a step which was obviously planned to intimidate Japan. Early in 1933, a sum of \$238,000,000 from the P. W. A. funds was allotted to naval construction. In March, 1934, the Navy Department, in view of the Vinson-Trammell Act, secured authorization from Congress to proceed with a naval building programme designed to reach the figure sanctioned by the Naval Treaty before the end of 1942. President Roosevelt accelerated his construction schedules with the greatest peace-time naval appropriations (for 1936–1937 and 1937–1938) in American history. While Roosevelt's programme did not contemplate an exact parity with Great Britain, it provided for a substantially greater margin of superiority over Japan, especially in capital ships. Moreover, the London Agreement of 1936 not only lessened the pre-occupation of the United States with the British and French competition, but also enabled it to replenish its naval strength more freely against Japan. On April 1, 1936, the United States, Great Britain and France adopted an increased maximum gun calibre of sixteen inches. On June 30, 1938, these three Powers signed an agreement raising their capital ship tonnage limit to 45,000 tons. The United States played an active part in bringing about their revisions, focusing its attention as it did on one nation—Japan.

On January 26, 1940, the Japanese-American Commercial Treaty expired and the United States became quite at liberty to impose an embargo at any time on Japan. On January 11, 1940, Henry L. Stimson in a long letter in the *New York Times* recommended legislation to prohibit the export to Japan of arms, munitions and raw materials needed for the manufacture of accessories, to some of which a moral embargo had already been applied since June of 1938. Two embargo

proposals prepared by Senators Pittman and Schwellenbach were placed before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On March 12, 1940, Wang Ching-wei declared his intention to establish a new Central Government of China. To forestall it, on March 7, 1940, the United States Government gave a loan of \$20,000,000 to Chiang Kai-shek. Thereafter, on March 30, 1940, Secretary Hull issued his statement of non-recognition of the newly organized Nanking Government under the presidency of Wang Ching-wei.

On September 22, 1940, an agreement was concluded between the Governments of Japan and France, by which the former was to respect the rights and interests of the latter in East Asia and, in particular, the territorial integrity of Indo-China and the sovereign rights of France over all parts of Indo-China. On the part of France it was required to grant Japan special facilities in Indo-China in order to enable the Japanese Army and Navy to pursue their operations. Retaliating this accord, which in no way affected the rights and interests of America, President Roosevelt on September 26, 1940, declared an embargo on the export of iron and steel scrap as from October 16, except to countries of the Western Hemisphere and to Great Britain. Of the exports of steel scrap in the first seven months of 1940, Japan took about one third, that is, over half a million tons. Simultaneous with the enforcement of the embargo, the Federal Loan Administration Office announced that a further credit of \$25,000,000 was to be granted to Chungking from the American Export-Import Bank to assist it in meeting exchange needs, and that the loan would be liquidated by the sale of tungsten, the United States Government having undertaken to buy as much as thirty million dollars' worth of tungsten for defence needs. The new loan to China and the fresh embargo order were, in the opinion of the leaders of the Capitol Hill, measures "short of war, but more effective than mere words."

## XVIII

On September 27, 1940, a ten-year pact among Japan, Germany and Italy was signed in Berlin and by the terms of Article III of which the three Powers undertook to "assist one another with all political, economic and military means, if one of the High Contracting Parties should be attacked by a Power not at present involved in the European war or in the Sino-Japanese conflict." From this stipulation, one can clearly see that the three Powers did not wish to have any third Power intervene either in the European war or in the China affair. The then Foreign Minister Yosuké Matsuoka referring to the Tripartite Axis Pact said that "Japan does not challenge any country." The Foreign Office spokesman affirmed: "It is a pact to end wars, not to start them." Regarding the allegation of the United States that the Tripartite Pact was solely directed against it, Yosuké Matsuoka in his statement of October 10, 1940, made clear its implications, so far as Japan was concerned, in the following words:

Japan wishes earnestly to bring about an all-around peace in China at the earliest possible date. No other people have been more eager than the Japanese to see peace restored between Japan and China. As a matter of fact Japan has been and is actually bending every effort to that end. The conclusion of this pact with Germany and Italy is in a way another attempt to achieve the same end...I might add that the Tripartite Pact has not been entered into with the intention of directing it "against" the United States, but it is, I should say, directed, if at all, "for" the United States. To state frankly, the parties to the pact wish earnestly that such a powerful nation as the United States in particular and all other nations at present remaining neutral will not be involved in the European war, or come by any chance into conflict with Japan because of the China affair or otherwise. Such an eventuality, with all the possibility of bringing an awful catastrophe upon humanity, is enough to make one shudder if one stops to imagine the consequences. In short, the pact is a pact of peace.

President Roosevelt, however, in his fireside chat on December 29, 1940, assailed the Tripartite Pact in scathing terms. He persisted that “the three totalitarian Powers have, by the pact of September 27, 1940, joined together in the threat that if the United States interfered with or blocked their expansion programme, a programme aimed at world control, they will unite in military action against the United States.”

On November 30, 1940, Wang Ching-wei and General Nobuyuki Abé, Japanese special envoy to Nanking, signed a treaty of basic relations between China and Japan. Four documents were initialled, giving Japan the right to station troops in North China and Inner Mongolia “for defence against Communist activities” and naval units in China, besides making it obligatory on Japan to co-operate with China in the development of China’s resources, especially minerals “required for national defence.” In a joint declaration issued by Nanking, Tokyo, and Hsinking, Wang Ching-wei recognized the independence of Manchoukuo; Japan agreed to surrender its extra-territorial rights, as well as its concessions in China in consideration of China opening its territory to the domicile and business of Japanese subjects; China undertook to pay compensation for “damages to the rights and interests” of Japanese subjects caused by the hostilities; and Japan undertook to withdraw all its troops from China, except those in North China and Inner Mongolia, within two years from the date when general peace was restored and a state of war had ceased to exist. President Roosevelt, in order to advertize that this Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty could not prove a deterrent to the intervention of the United States in the affairs of East Asia, granted a new loan of \$100,000,000 to Chiang Kai-shek. Half the money was advanced by the Export-Import Bank to be used for general purposes on condition that repayment would be progressively made by Chungking through deliveries of wolfram, antimony and tin. The remaining half was made available for currency adjustment and was furnished by the Treasury Stabilization Fund of the United States Government.

## XIX

The United States Government, in addition to intensifying its assistance to Chiang Kai-shek against Japan and embargoing the export of raw materials to Japan, started the building of a “two-ocean” Navy. According to the Annual Report of the Secretary of the Navy issued on November 26, 1939, the United States Navy, during the year under report, consisted of fifteen battleships, eighteen heavy and eighteen light cruisers, 121 destroyers and light mine-layers, fifty-eight submarines and five aircraft carriers. Apart from these ships, eighty more fighting vessels were under construction on July 1, 1939. These included eight battleships each of 35,000 tons, two battleships each of 45,000 tons, two aircraft-carriers, five light cruisers, twenty submarines, forty-two destroyers, three submarine chasers and a number of auxiliary craft. On top of this, a new naval construction plan was given effect to in 1940, and the Department of the Navy awarded on September 9, 1940, contracts for 200 combat ships—seven battleships, eight aircraft-carriers, twenty-seven cruisers, 115 destroyers and forty-three submarines—at a cost of over three and a third billion dollars.

On July 2, 1940, Colonel Frank Knox, appearing before the Senate Naval Affairs Committee to testify to his qualifications for the post of Secretary of the Navy, said: “It is of the very essence of our self-protection that we develop our sea power until we possess, incomparably, the strongest Navy in the world. We now have a fleet second to none, and with the imminent additions to its striking power, we will soon have the greatest Navy on the ocean and the world around.” The chairman of the

committee, after approving the appointment of Knox, said that “it is the opinion of the committee that Colonel Knox possesses the driving force and general knowledge of existing conditions to contribute much to the speeding up of our naval programme.”

Secretary Knox intimated to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives on January 17, 1941, the necessity of having a “two-ocean” Navy. He reasoned that “both the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations actually have had a two-ocean Navy operated for a single peaceful purpose. We still have a one-ocean Navy; we are building a two-ocean Navy; but its structure will not be completed for six years. We need to complete that structure so far as we can, because the other part of our two-ocean Navy is now in grave danger.” As a matter of fact, the British Navy at that time was not “in grave danger,” as the German or Italian Navy was not strong enough to challenge the British Navy in the Atlantic or in the Mediterranean. Considered in this light, there was no immediate need for the United States to rush the building of a “two-ocean” Navy. The truth is that under this pretext America desired to gain a swift overwhelming superiority over the Japanese Navy in the Pacific. In the *Annual Report* (from July 1, 1940, to June 30, 1941) issued on December 6, 1941, Secretary Knox related:

On any comparable basis, the United States Navy is second to none. International situation is such that we must arm as rapidly as possible to meet our naval defence requirements simultaneously in both oceans against any possible combination of Powers concerting against us. Our aim must always be to have forces sufficient to enable us to have complete freedom of action in either ocean, while retaining forces in the other ocean for effective defence of our vital security.

During the fiscal year, Congress authorized new combatant ship construction totalling 1,434,300 tons and shortened the course of auxiliaries and miscellaneous construction to 725,000 tons. The fiscal year 1941 witnessed the virtual transition of the nation from a peace time to a wartime footing, with tremendous industrial expansion for production of war materials.

The progress made with the building of the “two-ocean” Navy, as well as the aims underlying it were revealed by Secretary Knox in an address made before the Convention of the American Legion on September 15, 1941. His speech, in part, follows:

As Secretary of the Navy, it naturally is on my heart to talk to you men of the Legion of that great service and of the progress we have made toward the building of a two-ocean Navy. For achievement of this purpose, awards have been made for the construction of 332 new combatant ships. The building of these vessels, which will cost about \$6,000,000,000, added to what we already possess, will give us a combined sea strength of thirty-two battleships, eighteen aircraft-carriers, ninety-one cruisers, 364 destroyers and 186 submarines, a total fleet of 691 vessels of war. Incomparably, this will be the greatest sea power, with air power auxiliary, ever created by any nation in the history of the world. At the outset of the programme it was estimated that it could not be given effect to before 1946. I shall not attempt to tell you how much short of that time the objective will be realized, but I do dare to say to you that the whole fleet will be completed far ahead of schedule, and that every ship coming into commission is going into service months ahead of the scheduled time. Before the end of 1941 we will have added to the fleet, commissioned and ready for service, two battleships, one aircraft-carrier, eighteen destroyers and ten submarines.

Let me emphasize to you two things: No war of significant proportions can now be fought anywhere in the world save by those nations which have access to the seas. Raw materials out of which the complicated instruments of war are now wrought come from the four corners of the earth. No continent has a monopoly of them and, therefore, those nations which possess sea power are the nations into whose hands will be entrusted the peace of the world in the future... The only peace in which the world can put any confidence, for at least one hundred years to come, is the kind of peace that can be enforced by the peace-loving nations of the world. It will not be sufficient just to love peace if these nations are to support the cause of peace effectively. It is imperatively necessary to have not only the will to have peace but the power to enforce it. In such a world as that of today, sea power for America is more vital, more essential, than ever before in its history. We are on the way to achieve that power. We shall soon have the fleet that will make us the greatest maritime power the world has ever known, and we have the materials, the skills and the capacity to maintain that leadership indefinitely.

We must also remember that it is only the strong who can promote and preserve a righteous peace. When war threatens and human liberties are at stake, when attempts at world-wide domination are to the fore, we must be sure that the world understands that we do not withhold our hand through weakness or timidity. Idle and futile is the voice of the weak nation, or the craven nation, when it clamours for peace. At this point I should like to quote from a former President, Theodore Roosevelt, who, like Franklin D. Roosevelt,

was a courageous, virile champion of just and righteous peace, and a foe of those who put peace before righteousness. Theodore Roosevelt once said: "Peace is a great good, and doubly harmful, therefore, is the attitude of those who advocate it in terms that would make it synonymous with selfish and cowardly shrinking from warring against the existence of evil. The wisest and most far-seeing champions of peace will ever remember that, in the first place, to be good it must be righteous, for an unrighteous and cowardly place may be worse than any war; and in the second place, that it can often be obtained only at the cost of war." A powerful national defence, especially on the high seas, is a prerequisite of the peace-promoting, justice-loving America. During the last half a dozen years it has been clear to almost any man that a powerful fleet and a powerful air force, neither of which can be extemporized, are vital essentials to our national security in a time of great world turbulence.

It is remarkable that, according to the Roberts Report, as early as January 24, 1941, Secretary of the Navy Knox, in a letter to Secretary of War Stimson, advised that "if war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the fleet or the naval base at Pearl Harbour."

## XX

Admiral Nomura, new Japanese Ambassador, assumed his duties on February 11, 1941, and promptly took up negotiations with President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull for the adjustment of relations between Japan and the United States. In the middle of April, 1941, the United States Government submitted to Admiral Nomura an informal proposal intended to serve as a basis for a general agreement concerning all questions relating to the Pacific area. The United States Government, in the proposal, asked the Japanese Government to give an undertaking not to menace the United States when the latter should be obliged to participate in the European war for self-defence and, at the same time, proposed that it would undertake to use its good offices for the initiation of peace negotiations between Japan and the Chungking régime on such terms as would be acceptable to the United States.

In a counter-proposal sent in the middle of May, 1941, the Japanese Government explicitly stated that Japan's obligation to render military assistance to Germany or Italy or both of them when they were attacked by any third country including the United States would arise as stipulated under the Tripartite Pact, while regarding the China affair the Japanese counter-proposal stated that the United States Government, accepting the five Konoye points, the Sino-Japanese Basic Treaty and the Joint Declaration of Japan, Manchoukuo and China, would urge upon the Chungking régime to enter into negotiations with the Japanese Government for the restoration of peace, and that in case Chiang Kai-shek refused to accept the American advise, the United States was to cease from aiding the Chungking régime. In the latter part of June, 1941, the United States Government submitted a new proposal which, compared with its April proposal, set forth the American claims in a more concrete manner.

On July 12, 1941, a complete agreement of views was reached between the Japanese and French Governments concerning the joint defence of Indo-China. Under-Secretary Sumner Welles on July 23 told the Japanese Ambassador that "by the course it has followed and is following in regard to Indo-China, the Japanese Government is giving a clear indication that it is determined to pursue an objective of expansion by force or threat of force." Welles further argued that the "steps taken by the Japanese Government tend to jeopardize the procurement by the United States of essential materials, such as tin and rubber, which are necessary for the normal economy of the United States and the consummation of its defence programme." He concluded: "Steps taken by the Japanese Government also endanger the safety of other areas of the Pacific, including the Philippine Islands." The following day (July 24, 1941) President Roosevelt, in an informal talk with the members of the Volunteer



Participation Committee, presaged the total economic blockade of Japan in the following rather humorous vein intentionally in the past tense.

There happened to be a place in the southern Pacific where we had to get a lot of things—rubber, tin, and so forth and so on, down in the Dutch Indies, the Straits Settlements and Indo-China. And we had to help get the Australian surplus of meat, wheat and corn for England...It was very essential from our own selfish point of view of defence to prevent a war from starting in the southern Pacific. So our foreign policy was—trying to stop a war from breaking out down there.

Now here is a nation called Japan. Whether they had at that time aggressive purposes to enlarge their empire southward, they didn't [sic] have any oil of their own up in the north. Now, if we cut the oil off, they probably would have gone down to the Dutch East Indies a year ago, and you would have had a war.

Evidently President Roosevelt believed that if the supply of oil to Japan were cut off the war was inevitable. And two days afterwards, on July 26, 1941, he issued an order “freezing” all Japanese assets in the United States, thus stopping all trade relations with Japan, including the sale of oil. The Army Department announced on the same day that all troops under the Hawaiian Command had [sic] been ordered to be placed “on a training and precautionary alert status” at once. It was also announced that the President had created a new Army Command known as the U.S. Army Forces in the Far East. It would include 75,000 American troops and about 180,000 Filipino armed forces. Obviously President Roosevelt decided in favour of a war with Japan at the time when he issued the freezing order. The Japanese Government in its statement of December 8, 1941, the day on which the Pacific war broke out, justly pointed out: “Finally they (United States Government) went so far as to adopt the outrageous measure of severing economic relations with Japan. Between non-belligerent Powers the rupture of economic relations constitutes a hostile action comparable to a challenge by armed force.” Concurrently with the freezing of Japanese assets in America, the British Empire and the Dutch administration in Batavia took similar actions against Japan in their respective zones. Thus eighty per cent. of the export and import trade of this country was brought to a standstill at a moment's notice. Japan, as a matter of routine, issued asset-freezing orders against the United States, the British Empire and the Netherlands East Indies. It needs no amplification to assert that this excessive Anglo-American move virtually amounts to the strangulation of the whole Japanese nation.

Even in the face of this violent provocation, the then Premier Konoye, still hoped for a peaceful settlement, and in August sent a personal message to President Roosevelt, proposing a meeting between the responsible heads of the two Governments. The United States Government maintained that, for the holding of such a meeting, a prior agreement on basic principles, especially on the questions of the Tripartite Pact, the stationing of Japanese troops in China and the non-discriminatory treatment in international commerce was necessary. In the middle of October, 1941, the Konoye Cabinet resigned. On October 16, 1941, both Admiral Kimmel, then commander of the Pacific Fleet, and General Short, then commander of the Hawaiian District, were advised by the Departments of War and the Navy respectively of the changes in the Japanese Cabinet, of the probability of hostilities between Japan and Russia, and of the possibility of an attack by Japan on Great Britain and the United States.

## XXI

After the resignation of the Konoye Cabinet, the Emperor ordered General Hidéki Tohjo, who was War Minister in the Konoye Cabinet, to form a Ministry. Thus the Tohjo Cabinet came to be

formed, and it took up the thread of negotiations with the American Government in order to retrieve the situation in the Pacific. In its solicitude for the peace of the Pacific, the Tohjo Cabinet transmitted the following proposal to the Washington Government:

- (1) The United States Government undertakes not to enlarge unduly the meaning of “self defence.”
- (2) A certain number of Japanese troops will be stationed for the necessary duration in specified areas in China and the rest of the troops will be withdrawn upon the conclusion of peace. The Japanese troops in Indo-China will be withdrawn immediately either upon the settlement of the China affair or upon the establishment of peace in East Asia on an equitable basis.
- (3) The Japanese Government recognizes that the non-discrimination principle in international commerce to be applied to all the Pacific areas, including China, on the understanding that the said principle is to be applied uniformly to the rest of the world.

The United States Government, however, contended that there would be no need for Japan to maintain the Tripartite Pact after the conclusion of a Japanese-American agreement. While the United States Government insisted on the unconditional application of the non-discrimination principle to China, it proposed that the economic development of China should be jointly undertaken by the Powers. To these arguments the Japanese Government replied that Japan hoped for the application of the non-discrimination principle throughout the world, that Japan would recognize its application to China in accordance with the realization of this principle throughout the world, and that the American proposal for the joint international economic development of China would open the way for the joint international control of China. In order to avert a rupture of diplomatic relations, the Japanese Government presented on November 20, 1941, the following new proposal:

- (1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to make any armed advancement into any of the regions of south-eastern Asia and the southern Pacific, excepting French Indo-China.
- (2) The Governments of Japan and the United States shall co-operate with a view to securing the acquisition of those goods and commodities which the two countries need in the Netherlands East Indies.
- (3) The Governments of Japan and the United States mutually undertake to restore their commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of the assets. The Government of the United States shall supply Japan a required quantity of oil.
- (4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to indulge in measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
- (5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific area. The Government of Japan declares that it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops now stationed in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part of the said territory upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

Secretary Hull in respect of the new proposal remarked that the United States could not cease aiding Chiang Kai-shek unless Japan clarified its relations with the Tripartite Pact and gave assurances regarding its adoption of a peaceful policy, and that the President's offer to act as an “introducer” of Sino-Japanese peace was predicated upon Japan's adoption of a peaceful policy. The Japanese Government pointed out to Secretary Hull that in case direct negotiations were opened between Japan and Chiang Kai-shek through “introduction” by the President, the continuation of aid to Chiang Kai-shek would constitute a self-contradictory attitude on the part of the United States. On November 24, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to Admiral Kimmel in which he stated that in the opinion of the Navy Department a surprise aggressive movement in any direction by the Japanese, including an attack on the Philippines, or Guam, was a possibility. On November 26, 1941, the United States Government, after consulting the representatives of Great Britain, Australia,

the Netherlands and the Chungking régime, presented the following proposal as a basis for future negotiations:

- (1) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will endeavour to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, The Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
- (2) Both Governments will endeavour to conclude among the American, British, Chinese, Japanese, the Netherlands and Thailand Governments an agreement whereunder each of the Governments would pledge itself to respect the territorial integrity of French Indo-China and, in the event that there should develop a threat to the territorial integrity of Indo-China, to enter into immediate consultation with a view to taking such measures as may be deemed necessary and advisable to meet the threat in question. Such agreement would provide also that each of the Governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use its influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.
- (3) The Government of Japan will withdraw all military, naval, air and police forces from China and from Indo-China.
- (4) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will not support—militarily, politically, economically any Government or régime in China other than the National Government of the Republic of China with capital temporarily at Chungking.
- (5) Both Governments will give up all extra-territorial rights in China, including rights and interests in and with regard to international settlements and concessions, and rights under the Boxer Protocol of 1901.
- (6) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most favoured nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
- (7) The Government of the United States and the Government of Japan will, respectively, remove the freezing restrictions on Japanese firms in the United States and on American funds in Japan.
- (8) Both Governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and a half by the United States.
- (9) Both Governments will agree that no agreement which either has concluded with any third Powers shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.
- (10) Both Governments will use their influence to cause other Governments to adhere to and to give practical application to the basic political and economic principles set forth in this agreement.

In view of the attitude heretofore taken by the Japanese Government, the new American proposal constituted a virtual ultimatum. That America was fully prepared against a war with Japan has been conclusively proved by the following excerpts from the findings of the Roberts Report on the Pearl Harbor *débâcle* which took place as a result of furious Japanese air assaults on the first day of the Pacific war.

On November 27, 1941, the Chief of Staff of the Army informed the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department that negotiations with Japan seemed to be ended with little likelihood of their resumption; that Japanese action was unpredictable; that hostilities on the part of Japan were momentarily possible; that in the event hostilities could not be avoided the United States desired that this nation should not commit the first overt act.

On the same day (November 27, 1941) the Chief of Military Intelligence sent a message to the Intelligence Officer on the staff of the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, directing him to inform the Commanding General and his Chief of Staff that negotiations with Japan had practically ceased; that hostilities might ensue.

On the same day (November 27, 1941) the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet, which stated in substance that the dispatch was to be considered a war warning; that the negotiations with Japan in an effort to stabilize conditions in the Pacific had ended; that Japan was expected to make an aggressive move within the next days; that an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra Peninsular, possibly Borneo, was indicated by the number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of their Navy task forces.

After receipt of the message of November 27, 1941, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet made certain dispositions of units of the fleet for the purpose of strengthening his outposts to the south and west of the Hawaiian Islands, and also issued an order

that any Japanese submarine found in the operating areas around the island of Oahu should be attacked. This order went beyond the authority given him by the Navy Department.

On November 29, 1941, the Chief of Naval Operations sent a message to the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet, which was in substance a quotation of the Chief of Staff's dispatch of November 27 to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department; and in addition directed the addressee to take no offensive action until Japan had committed an overt act. The foregoing messages did not create in the minds of the responsible officers in the Hawaiian area apprehension as to probable imminence of air raids...The necessity for taking state-of-war readiness which would have been required to avert or meet an air raid attack was not considered. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet and the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District, their senior subordinates, and their principal staff officers, considered the possibility of air raids. Without exception they believed that the chances of such a raid while the Pacific Fleet was based upon Pearl Harbour were practically nil. The attack of Sunday, December 7, 1941 [Japan time, December 8] was therefore a complete surprise to each of them.

On December 2, 1941, Sumner Welles, acting under the President's order, made an enquiry of the true intentions of the Japanese Government regarding the movements and reinforcement of Japanese troops in Indo-China. The Japanese Government replied that, in view of the recent marked activities of the Chungking forces in the frontier of Indo-China, Japan made partial reinforcements in the northern Indo-China as a precautionary measure, and that this resulted naturally in the movement of the Japanese troops in the southern area.

On December 4, 1941, the Navy Department instructed the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet to destroy confidential documents and means of confidential communication.

At about noon, December 7, 1941, an additional warning message indicating an almost immediate break in relations between the United States and Japan was dispatched by the Chief of Staff after conference with the Chief of Naval Operations for the information of responsible Army and Navy commanders. The delivery of this urgent message was delayed until after the attack.

At 6:30 a.m., December 7, 1941, a suspicious object was cited in the prohibited area of Pearl Harbour by the U.S.S. *Antares*. Between 6:33 and 6:45 this object, which was a small submarine, was attacked and sunk by the concerted action of naval patrol planes and the U.S.S. *Ward*.

As the Roberts Report mentions that between 6:30 and 6:45 am on December 7, 1941, that is, half an hour before the start of the Pacific war, American patrol planes and warships sighted, attacked and sunk a midget Japanese submarine, it is all the more explicit that the Hawaiian Command would not have taken such an action unless it had received the order to attack. Therefore, the American allegation that Japan attacked Pearl Harbour without warning is undoubtedly groundless. The then Foreign Minister Shighénori Togo on December 16, 1941, reiterated in the Diet that the United States Government must have been fully aware, through the protracted negotiations, what constituted the limit to which Japan could acquiesce in. He emphasized: "If they truly misunderstood that the statement clarifying the limit of our conciliatory attitude as implying a bargaining or bluff, we must conclude that the United States Government were utterly blind to the actual situation." Shighénori Togo further stated that the moment the American Government submitted its final proposal to Japan in the nature of an ultimatum, it ought to have known that the outbreak of a war between the two countries was imminent. Now that the Roberts Report has revealed that the United States was absolutely prepared against the war with Japan, the question of Japan's attack on Pearl Harbour has become an exanimate issue.

## XXII

Viewed in this light, it can be safely concluded that the genesis of the Pacific war lies in the boundless ambition of the American people for the westward expansion of its territory, especially

through the naval superiority in the Pacific Ocean. In spite of the process of continuous expansion, which the survey of the history of the United States discloses, there can be no doubt that there exists among the American people a prevalent belief that they are characterized above all things by freedom from territorial ambitions and a peculiarly peace-loving disposition. "And yet, what is there," as John Bassett Moore aptly asserts, "in the history or antecedents of the American people to justify the presupposition that they are not only unaggressive but that they shrink from conflict and are perversely and incorrigibly peaceful? It is derived from the fact that the territory which they now hold, and which has been acquired largely as the result of war, is five times as great as that of the imperial domain with which they began their national career? Is it inferred from the circumstance that, since they forcibly established their independence by an armed conflict of nearly eight years, they have waged six foreign wars (including the Pacific war), five general and one limited, and the greatest civil war in history?" The American people have forgotten the clamour for intervention, which is only another name for war, between Spain and Cuba, in 1898. They have also forgotten that since the close of the Napoleonic wars, German wars have scarcely exceeded in number those of the United States, even excluding from the computation the latter's Indian wars. As the matter of fact, the years spent by Germany, during the same period, in war, stand to those similarly spent by the United States in the proportion of one to two. It is this militant spirit, incarnated especially in Franklin D. Roosevelt and Frank Knox, of the American people which caused the Pacific War.

## **JAPAN'S MEMORANDUM TO THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT**

*December 7, 1941*

I. The Government of Japan, prompted by a genuine desire to come to an amicable understanding with the Government of the United States in order that the two countries by their joint efforts may secure the peace of the Pacific Area and thereby contribute toward the realization of world peace, has continued negotiations with the utmost sincerity since April last with the Government of the United States regarding the adjustment and advancement of Japanese-American relations and the stabilization of the Pacific Area.

The Japanese Government has the honor to state frankly its views concerning the claims the American Government has persistently maintained as well as the measures the United States and Great Britain have taken toward Japan. during these eight months.

II. It is the immutable policy of the Japanese Government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world.

Ever since China Affair broke out owing to the failure on the part of China to comprehend Japan's true intentions, the Japanese Government has striven for the restoration of peace and it has consistently exerted its best efforts to prevent the extension of war-like disturbances. It was also to that end that in September last year Japan concluded the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy.

However, both the United States and Great Britain have resorted to every possible measure to

assist the Chungking regime so as to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China, interfering with Japan's constructive endeavours toward the stabilization of East Asia. Exerting pressure on the Netherlands East Indies, or menacing French Indo-China, they have attempted to frustrate Japan's aspiration to the ideal of common prosperity in cooperation with these regions. Furthermore, when Japan in accordance with its protocol with France took measures of joint defence of French Indo-China, both American and British Governments, willfully misinterpreting it as a threat to their own possessions, and inducing the Netherlands Government to follow suit, they enforced the assets freezing order, thus severing economic relations with Japan. While manifesting thus an obviously hostile attitude, these countries have strengthened their military preparations perfecting an encirclement of Japan, and have brought about a situation which endangers the very existence of the Empire.

Nevertheless, to facilitate a speedy settlement, the Premier of Japan proposed, in August last, to meet the President of the United States for a discussion of important problems between the two countries covering the entire Pacific area. However, the American Government, while accepting in principle the Japanese proposal, insisted that the meeting should take place after an agreement of view had been reached on fundamental and essential questions.

III. Subsequently, on September 25th the Japanese Government submitted a proposal based on the formula proposed by the American Government, taking fully into consideration past American claims and also incorporating Japanese views. Repeated discussions proved of no avail in producing readily an agreement of view. The present cabinet, therefore, submitted a revised proposal, moderating still further the Japanese claims regarding the principal points of difficulty in the negotiation and endeavoured strenuously to reach a settlement. But the American Government, adhering steadfastly to its original assertions, failed to display in the slightest degree a spirit of conciliation. The negotiation made no progress.

Therefore, the Japanese Government, with a view to doing its utmost for averting a crisis in Japanese-American relations, submitted on November 20th still another proposal in order to arrive at an equitable solution of the more essential and urgent questions which, simplifying its previous proposal, stipulated the following points:

- (1) The Governments of Japan and the United States undertake not to dispatch armed forces into any of the regions, excepting French Indo-China, in the Southeastern Asia and the Southern Pacific area.
  - (2) Both Governments shall cooperate with the view to securing the acquisition in the Netherlands East Indies of those goods and commodities of which the two countries are in need.
  - (3) Both Governments mutually undertake to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the freezing of assets.
- The Government of the United States shall supply Japan the required quantity of oil.
- (4) The Government of the United States undertakes not to resort to measures and actions prejudicial to the endeavours for the restoration of general peace between Japan and China.
  - (5) The Japanese Government undertakes to withdraw troops now stationed in French Indo-China upon either the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of an equitable peace in the Pacific Area; and it is prepared to remove the Japanese troops in the southern part of French Indo-China to the northern part upon the conclusion of the present agreement.

As regards China, the Japanese Government, while expressing its readiness to accept the offer of the President of the United States to act as "introducer" of peace between Japan and China as was previously suggested, asked for an undertaking on the part of the United States to do nothing prejudicial to the restoration of Sino-Japanese peace when the two parties have commenced direct negotiations.

The American Government not only rejected the above-mentioned new proposal, but made known its intention to continue its aid to Chiang Kai-shek; and in spite of its suggestion mentioned above, withdrew the offer of the President to act as so-called "introducer" of peace between Japan and China, pleading that time was not yet ripe for it. Finally on November 26th, in an attitude to impose upon the Japanese Government those principles it has persistently maintained, the American Government made a proposal totally ignoring Japanese claims, which is a source of profound regret to the Japanese government.

IV. From the beginning of the present negotiation the Japanese Government has always maintained an attitude of fairness and moderation, and did its best to reach a settlement, for which it made all possible concessions often in spite of great difficulties. As for the China question which constituted an important subject of the negotiation, the Japanese Government showed a most conciliatory attitude. As for the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce, advocated by the American Government, the Japanese Government expressed its desire to see the said principle applied throughout the world, and declared that along with the actual practice of this principle in the world, the Japanese Government would endeavour to apply the same in the Pacific Area including China, and made it clear that Japan had no intention of excluding from China economic activities of third powers pursued on an equitable basis. Furthermore, as regards the question of withdrawing troops from French Indo-China, the Japanese Government even volunteered, as mentioned above, to carry out an immediate evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China as a measure of easing the situation.

It is presumed that the spirit of conciliation exhibited to the utmost degree by the Japanese Government in all these matters is fully appreciated by the American Government.

On the other hand, the American Government, always holding fast to theories in disregard of realities, and refusing to yield an inch on its impractical principles, caused undue delay in the negotiation. It is difficult to understand this attitude of the American Government and the Japanese Government desires to call the attention of the American Government especially to the following points:

(1) The American Government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favorable to it and urges upon the Japanese Government the acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.

Of the various principles put forward by the American Government as a basis of the Japanese-American Agreement, there are some which the Japanese Government is ready to accept in principle, but in, view of the world's actual conditions, it seems only a utopian ideal on the part of the American Government to attempt to force their immediate adoption.



Again, the proposal to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact between Japan, United States, Great Britain, China, the Soviet Union, the Netherlands and Thailand, which is patterned after the old concept of collective security, is far removed from the realities of East Asia.

(2) The American proposal contained a stipulation which states-“Both Governments will agree that no agreement, which either has concluded with any third power or powers, shall be interpreted by it in such a way as to conflict with the fundamental purpose of this agreement, the establishment and preservation of peace throughout the Pacific area.” It is presumed that the above provision has been proposed with a view to restrain Japan from fulfilling its obligations under the Tripartite Pact when the United States participates in the War in Europe, and, as such, it cannot be accepted by the Japanese Government.

The American Government, obsessed with its own views and opinions, may be said to be scheming for the extension of the war. While it seeks, on the one hand, to secure its rear by stabilizing the Pacific Area, it is engaged, on the other hand, in aiding Great Britain and preparing to attack, in the name of self-defense, Germany and Italy, two Powers that are striving to establish a new order in Europe. Such a policy is totally at variance with the many principles upon which the American Government proposes to found the stability of the Pacific Area through peaceful means.

(3) Whereas the American Government, under the principles it rigidly upholds, objects to settle international issues through military pressure, it is exercising in conjunction with Great Britain and other nations pressure by economic power. Recourse to such pressure as a means of dealing with international relations should be condemned as it is at times more inhumane than military pressure.

(4) It is impossible not to reach the conclusion that the American Government desires to maintain and strengthen, in coalition with Great Britain and other Powers, its dominant position it has hitherto occupied not only in China but in other areas of East Asia. It is a fact of history that the countries of East Asia for the past hundred years or more have been compelled to observe the status quo under the Anglo-American policy of imperialistic exploitation and to sacrifice themselves to the prosperity of the two nations. The Japanese Government cannot tolerate the perpetuation of such a situation since it directly runs counter to Japan's fundamental policy to enable all nations to enjoy each its proper place in the world.

The stipulation proposed by the American Government relative to French Indo-China is a good exemplification of the above-mentioned American policy: Thus the six countries,-Japan, the United States, Great Britain, the Netherlands, China and Thailand,-excepting France, should undertake among themselves to respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of French Indo-China and equality of treatment in trade and commerce would be tantamount to placing that territory under the joint guarantee of the Governments of those six countries. Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese Government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the Nine Power Treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

(5) All the items demanded of Japan by the American Government regarding China such as wholesale evacuation of troops or unconditional application of the principle of non-discrimination in international commerce ignored the actual conditions of China, and are calculated to destroy Japan's position as the stabilizing factor of East Asia. The attitude of the American Government in demanding Japan not to support militarily, politically or economically any regime other than the regime at

Chungking, disregarding thereby the existence of the Nanking Government, shatters the very basis of the present negotiation. This demand of the American Government falling, as it does, in line with its above-mentioned refusal to cease from aiding the Chungking regime, demonstrates clearly the intention of the American Government to obstruct the restoration of normal relations between Japan and China and the return of peace to East Asia.

V. In brief, the American proposal contains certain acceptable items such as those concerning commerce, including the conclusion of a trade agreement, mutual removal of the freezing restrictions, and stabilization of yen and dollar exchange, or the abolition of extra-territorial rights in China. On the other hand, however, the proposal in question ignores Japan's sacrifices in the four years of the China Affair, menaces the Empire's existence itself and disparages its honour and prestige. Therefore, viewed in its entirety, the Japanese Government regrets that it cannot accept the proposal as a basis of negotiation.

VI. The Japanese Government, in its desire for an early conclusion of the negotiation, proposed simultaneously with the conclusion of the Japanese-American negotiation, agreements to be signed with Great Britain and other interested countries. The proposal was accepted by the American Government. However, since the American Government has made the proposal of November 26th as a result of frequent consultation with Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands and Chungking, and presumably by catering to the wishes of the Chungking regime in the questions of China, it must be concluded that all these countries are at one with the United States in ignoring Japan's position.

VII. Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia, and especially to preserve Anglo-American rights and interests by keeping Japan and China at war. This intention has been revealed clearly during the course of the present negotiation. Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese Government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The Japanese Government regrets to have to notify hereby the American Government that in view of the attitude of the American Government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.

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- [2] “WW2: Our Job in Japan”, YouTube video, 17:19, posted by *The Digital Implosion*. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=osol0bpanSs>
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- [4] Gerald Horne, *Race War: White Supremacy and the Japanese Attack on The British Empire* (New York University Press, 2005), 23.
- [5] My research indicates that beyond selected translations produced as evidentiary submissions at the Tokyo Trials and with the exception of his *A History of Anglo-American Aggression in Asia* (1944), that none of Shumei Okawa’s writings is available for popular consumption in the English language. However for those who are able to read Japanese, most of his writings are archived at the website: <http://www.okawashumei.net>
- [6] Cemil Aydin, “Japan’s Pan-Asianism and the Legitimacy of Imperial World Order, 1931-1945”, *The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus*, March 2008, accessed January 22, 2015. <http://www.japanfocus.org/-Cemil-Aydin/2695> I have adopted the same spelling of *Manchoukuo* as that of the Japanese authors whose work is contained in this book.
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- [12] “Inventory of the Wilfred Feisher Papers”, University of Wyoming Heritage Centre, accessed January 22, 2015: <http://rmoa.unm.edu/docviewer.php?docId=wyu-ah07055.xml>
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- [14] Harold Isaacs, *The Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution*, (Secker and Warburg, 1938).
- [15] Arnold Leese, “Chinese Communism?”, *Gothic Ripples*, February 1949, accessed January 22, 2015. [http://www.jrbooksonline.com/HTML-docs/chinese\\_communist.htm](http://www.jrbooksonline.com/HTML-docs/chinese_communist.htm)
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- [17] Ralph Townsend, *Asia Answers* (New York: Putnam, 1936), 161.
- [18] John Koster, *Operation Snow: How a Soviet Mole in FDR’s White House Triggered Pearl Harbor* (Regnery History, 2012).
- [19] See: “ ‘Hate Speech’ Hysteria Spreads to Japan ”, published in *Moon Metropolis*, January 4, 2015, accessed January 22, 2015. <https://moonmetropolis.wordpress.com/2015/01/04/hate-speech-hysteria-spreads-to-japan/>
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- [21] In the current environment it is necessary for me to clarify that I am using the epithet *kamikaze* metaphorically here and do not encourage the use of violence.
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- [44] *The Memoirs of Count Witte*, pp. 107-108.
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